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Preface 
This dissertation is a product of my life history, and all the significant and insignificant 
incidents that contributed to shape my personal political labels up to this moment.  In that 
sense, I feel the need to narrate the notion of different benchmarks in creating the fabric of my 
doctoral work. 
 
I was the Director of Quaker Palestine Youth Program in the West Bank- AFSC, when I 
received a PhD scholarship award from the Austrian Exchange Service- Austrian Cooperation 
Development. This is shortly after the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election when Hamas’s 
sweeping victory stunned Israel, USA, Europe and the Arab regimes favoring Hamas’s main 
rival secular Fatah movement that had led the Palestinian national movement for almost half a 
century without interruption. How could Hamas, the “terrorist organization” as it has always 
been labeled in the West, with an image of terror as it has always portrayed in the Western 
media, emerge as a victorious popular political power? Yet, persistence and prevailing 
misconception of Hamas have been stunning in the context of the Palestinian election. 
Contrary to the Western reductionist approach of Hamas as a terrorist organization, Hamas on 
the ground of Palestine has been seen by many Palestinians as a popular-based socio- 
religious and political movement. Taking double paths in resisting the occupation, including 
military confrontation, and providing charitable and social work, religious mobilization and 
networking with other movements and states. 
 
The Quartet’s boycott of the elected Hamas government left no room for many NGOs 
including my employer to decide whether to engage with Hamas or not. As a result, there was 
a withdrawal from work- activities with any national- political question, including the reality 
of the occupation, while maintaining civic work regardless the incapability to articulate the 
civic without politics. This reflects the absence of long term vision or strategy for how NGOs 
can contribute to the national transition. At that point, I did not have much time to consider 
how this scholarship will fit with my future plans in the rise of the unbelievable human stories 
along internationally isolated elected government. This was followed by the Palestinian 
employees’ strike for the lack of salaries, implying further obstacles in arranging any civic- 
work activity with young students in school settings. A bit later, there was the catastrophic 
Palestinian in-fights leading to a deep division of not only political views between young 
Palestinians but also imposed geographical one dividing further the Palestinian territories and 
denying the rights of Palestinians including the young Palestinians I am working with, in 
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movement and in every basic freedom under Israeli occupation. For example, I was hardly 
able to organize any event between two neighboring villages in Jenin or one side of the city of 
Jerusalem and the other. Advanced technology was sought to resolve such problem such as 
video conferences. One video for example was organized between one Public achievement 
(PA) young group in the West Bank with a Minnesota- USA (PA) young group and another 
one with Gaza Strip (PA) young group. However, this was hardly managed due mainly to the 
restriction of movement for young people coming from places where such technology is not 
available to another place within the cantoned territories provided with such facilities. The 
obstacles go beyond the availability of advanced technology but also and not limited to its 
related high cost. 
 
For example, one video conference between the Gaza PA group and Jenin PA group was 
cancelled suddenly for air plane attack had begun and returning young participants to “safe 
home” was prioritized. As another example, in an exchange of Irish- Palestinian PA 
experiences, an Irish PA group after long coordination visited the Palestinian PA projects in 
the West Bank. During one activity though, only the Irish participants were allowed to cross 
the checkpoint to Jericho and the Dead Sea, while the Palestinian PA group was inclusively 
forbidden by soldiers to cross the checkpoint. Needless to mention, Palestinians, mainly 
young work-target group hungry to freedom trapped under siege in Gaza; trapped in Hebron's 
old city neighbored by militant settlers; trapped in Nablus under closure; trapped behind the 
wall in Qalqilya, Palestinians trapped in their homes during curfews; by which I felt 
completely helpless in the face of powerful political and military forces and actions of the 
Israelis. 
 
Rethinking my life in those days of angst and fear while stripped completely from any binds 
of secure feeling and amenity of my self or those young Palestinians I am responsible to look 
after, I decided to take the opportunity and flee for some time to Vienna. Initially, I was 
planning to carry out a research on None- Governmental Organizations (NGO) in Palestine 
and donor policies for it is more related to my work and MPA studies in the states and my 
professional experience but with focus this time on the EU policy for basically my doctorate 
work is taking place in central Europe in Austria- Vienna. 
 
I was placed in political science department in the University of Vienna, not thinking exactly 
whether political science as a discipline was suitable for my thoughts and ambitions. My 
background with political science was modest, and the way I understood it was based on the 
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basic of political science courses, which I had taken during my Masters studies. Within my 
doctorate program, I also took a few more political science courses that left me with an 
impression of complication: I don’t know if that is due to language challenges, for I am 
enrolled in an English scholarship program but in a German speaking country and university 
where few English courses are offered. Also, most time, students and professors carry on 
intense discussions in the German language that I do not understand. Or was it for being a 
Palestinian given a hard time by some students where the holocaust legacy took place to 
speak up my mind when taking a critical position to Israel policy. 
 
I went through long discussions with my Jewish Austrian supervisor John Bunzl. Professor 
Bunzl has influenced me in his way of thinking and his experience as well as an expert of the 
Middle East in the Austrian Institute for International Affairs (OIIP). He touched on several 
accounts of my research to an extent I gradually, started to think Israel-Palestine conflict in 
association with concepts such as Holy land, Christianity, Judaism, and Islam. This was a first 
and perhaps the main benchmark that directs my research work in the following manner: 
 
Firstly, Professor Bunzl provided me with an article of the European views on the Middle 
East which highlighted its perception, prejudice and projection. I read more with respect to 
the complex feelings embodied in European thought reflected in their policy towards Israel- 
Palestine. I started to understand why a critical position against Israel policy is taken as ‘neo 
anti- Semitism’ by some in Europe and it became clear then why this ‘neo-‘ term should be 
further explored and analyzed. Secondly, I thought of the political, economic and military 
power of Israel which prevails in different forms as an occupying power of Palestine. 
 
Moreover, I started to reflect on the interrelations between global powers such as those of 
USA and the EU and Israel, and the fact that the latter is not only a strong ally of the USA on 
almost all political fronts but also Israel security seems as a leading principle in the EU 
foreign policy in the Middle East. Thirdly and importantly, I started to learn more about 
Islamophobia in Europe and abroad. The Palestine- Israel Journal of Politics, Economics and 
culture on anti Semitism and Islamophobia was an asset for tackling Islamophobia and anti 
Semitism from different angles.  More comparisons between Islamophobia and anti- Semitism 
were made while pointing out similarities and differences. Consequently, I reached another 
benchmark in my research. I decided to shift research focus from NGO- EU policy to 
Islamophobia- EU policy. 
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I read more and reflected on Israel’s active role in term of the politics and research of anti-
Semitism that is tackled often in ways that are still unknown to Arab- Muslim neighboring 
countries and Islamic movements such as Hamas and Palestinian society at large. On the one 
hand, Israel seems to take advantage of the limited cognition of anti-Semitism among the 
Middle Easterns, including the occupied. On the other hand, it enforces an Islamophbic 
approach towards Hamas making an over- simplified connection between Hamas and other 
Islamic movements or states such as that of al- Qaida or Iran. 
 
At that point, it was clear how my dissertation could be a means of reducing misconception. I 
decided to write down my thoughts, everything I have gathered and written which I either 
presented in lectures, seminars and conferences or handed to professors and also discussed 
with students. I eventually received some comments, feedback and critiques in the content, 
structure and arguments that have supported the process and context of dissertation. 
Eventually, the purpose of my research has become more refined and the thematic questions 
became clearer for I was keen to revise my course of thinking in dealing with the research 
theme and paradigm and eventually the direction towards the exit. 
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Abstract 
The term ‘Islamophobia’ has become popular in Europe, where the Islamic threat is 
considered the enemy within, and has also been on the rise, where the enemy is perceived to 
be external: but what exactly does it refer to? 
 
Internally, it is noted that a considerable volume of research has been published on 
Islamophobia within Europe. Researchers have studied the socio- economic, political, and 
cultural differences in reference to patterns of fear, prejudice and discrimination against 
Muslims and the position of Islam in Europe. 
 
Externally, very little research has examined Islamophobia in foreign policy. Nevertheless, 
the US- led war on terror is widely perceived as a war on Islam. However, Muslim relations 
with Europeans involve more than fear of the former by the latter.  One needs to take into 
account the multiple layers of history, sociology, and politics in relations among Christian, 
Jewish and Muslim populations whether secular or not. 
 
Arguing that the phobia in Islamophobia reduces the complex set of imbalanced power 
relations against Muslims, this dissertation advances various options open for debate 
regarding the definitions and manifestations of Islamophobia. It proposes an abstract and 
operational model of the EU’s foreign policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories 
(OPT). This thesis illustrates how imbalanced power relations operate and identifies key 
factors influencing EU foreign policy. The dissertation subsequently illustrates the model’s 
relevance through the examination of a specific instance: the EU’s boycott policy of elected 
Hamas government in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. In this investigation, this 
work draws on expert interviews conducted and interpreted on a comparative basis. 
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Kurzfassung 
Islamophobie ist in Europa zu einem gängigen Begriff geworden, um die islamische 
Bedrohung als einen Feind im Inneren zu bezeichnen. Gleichzeitig wird der Feind als von 
außenkommend wahrgenommen. Worauf bezieht er sich genau? 
 
In Europa gibt es umfangreiche Forschungen zu Islamophobie. WissenschafterInnen haben 
sozio-ökonomische, politische und auch kulturelle Differenzen hinsichtlich Ängste, Vorurteile 
und Diskriminierung von MuslimInnen und dem Stellenwert des Islam in Europa untersucht. 
 
Wenig bis gar keine Forschung gibt es bisher zur Rolle der Islamophobie in der Außenpolitik 
Europas, obwohl der US-amerikanisch geführte Krieg gegen den Terror im Allgemeinen als 
Krieg gegen den Islam wahrgenommen wird. Dennoch beinhalten Beziehungen zwischen 
MuslimInnen und EuropäerInnen mehr als nur die Angst der EuropäerInnen vor den 
MuslimInnen. Um Islamophobie zu erklären müssen die unterschiedlichen geschichtlichen, 
soziologischen und politischen Ebenen der Beziehungen zwischen Christen, Juden und 
Muslimen, egal ob säkular oder nicht, in Betracht gezogen werden. 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation zeigt auf, dass die Reduktion der Islamophobie auf die Phobie 
die komplexen unausgewogen Machtbeziehungen zwischen MuslimInnen und EruopäerInnen 
ignoriert und eröffnet zahlreiche Optionen für einer Debatte über Definitionen und 
Manifestationen von Islamophobie. Im Zuge dieser Arbeit wird ein  abstraktes und 
operationalisiertes Modell für die EU Außenpolitik in Bezug auf die Besetzten 
Palästinensischen Gebiete entwickelt. Es wird aufgezeigt, wie unausgewogen die 
Machtbeziehungen sind und warum sie funktionieren. Dabei werden Schlüsselfaktoren 
identifiziert, die die EU Außenpolitik beeinflussen. 
 
Die vorliegende Dissertation zeigt die Relevanz dieses entwickelten Models am Beispiel des 
Boykotts der Hamas durch die EU nach den palästinensischen Parlamentswahlen 2006 
anhand einer Analyse von ExpertInneninterviews auf Basis eines Vergleichs. 
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1 Introduction 
In view of the victory of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) in the 2006 Palestinian 
parliamentary elections and its subsequent entry into the Palestinian Authority (PA), the 
European Union (EU) alongside the Quartet partners, immediately imposed several 
conditions on the legitimately elected government. They insisted on three “principles” (an 
end to violence, recognition of Israel and acceptance of previous agreements), which soon 
evolved into strict conditions for the recognition of the government.1 
 
Initially for EU policymakers, the first condition stood in the forefront since Hamas has been 
included on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations since 2003. Apparently, the Quartet went 
beyond calling for Hamas to renounce terrorism. The latter two conditions in particular were 
disputable. Hamas was called upon to recognize Israel, despite the fact that states (or in this 
case the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) as a legal representative of the 
Palestinians - of which Hamas is not a part - which had recognized Israel) recognize other 
states while the borders by which Israel would be recognized were left undefined. Regarding 
the acceptance of previous agreements, ironically, it was the Israeli government led by Ariel 
Sharon, which first asserted that it would only respect, rather than accept previous agreements 
in 2001.2 
 
In this research, the question is what does the EU response to the victory of Hamas in the 
“legitimate and democratic”3 election of 2006 suggest? What are the main factors influencing 
EU policy towards Palestine? Could ‘Islamophobia’ be a factor? Why? How? The response is 
not a simple yes or no answer. These questions hint to larger issues about the relationship 
between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy. 
 
1.1 Research Problem 
This section connects the EU boycott policy towards the elected Hamas government to the 
research problem. The research problem is divided accordingly into four main parts: (1) 
research scope (2) research aims (3) research questions and (4) the inner structure of the 
research. 
                                                           
1  Alvaro de Soto, (2007), End of Mission Report, May, 2007. Reprinted in the Guardian, June 14th, p 17-19. See 
at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/13/usa.israel 
2 Akiva Eldar, (2007), The Syrian secret Sharon did not reveal to Olmert, Haaretz, March 20th. See at   
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/839634.html 
3  The international community including the EU had accepted Hamas participation in the parliament election. 
The conduct of the elections was monitored by EU observers and viewed them as being free and fair 
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Through the literature, it shows that no research was conducted on the impact of 
Islamophobia on EU foreign policy towards the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT), and 
the EU boycott policy of Hamas in particular. Most literature describes Islamophobia around 
Muslim minorities in Europe but neglects to answer how Islamophobia can be manifested in 
different forms and how it eventually can be prevented from being a factor in EU foreign 
policymaking. 
1.1.1 Research scope 
The research scope can take many tracks. The tracks can be divided into two categories: (1) 
local and (2) international 
1.1.1.1 Local 
This local research scope can potentially deal with numerous topics. For example, 
Islamophobia and Hamas (strategy, ideology, leadership, structure and finance), Islamophobia 
and Palestinian national struggle, Islamophobia and secular Palestinian parties, Islamophobia 
and Palestinian Islamic movements, or Islamophobia and anti Semitism. 
1.1.1.2 International 
Likewise, many topics internationally-related could be derived including: Islamophobia and 
international Islamic movements, Islamophobia in Muslim countries, Islamophobia in Israel, 
Islamophobia in Europe, Islamophobia elsewhere, Islamophobia in foreign policy 
“compared”, Hamas and global Islamism, or Islamophobia and anti Semitism globally. 
However, the researcher selected a scope with an international notion, which is summarized 
as follows: 
The EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. 
Is it Islamophobia? 
Examining Islamophobia in EU policymaking is an attempt to provoke further debate and 
thought on such a pressing matter so as to be prepared to respond to the challenges 
Islamophobia presents to successful EU policymaking towards Palestine. 
1.1.1.3 Limitations 
Several factors have influenced the researcher to limit the research to the scope defined 
above: 
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- The escalating Israeli-Palestinian conflict beginning at the starting phase of this 
research implies the following: 
 The territories occupied in 1967 are still occupied and further fragmented. 
 Existing illegal Israeli settlements continue to expand and new ones have been 
erected on confiscated Palestinian land. Jerusalem is being de- Arabized. 
 Violation of Palestinian fundamental rights continue along various forms of 
collective punishments, including the separation wall, home demolitions, closures of entire 
areas, checkpoints, detentions and imprisonments. 
 Palestinian in-fighting and the separation between Hamas-controlled Gaza and 
Fatah-controlled West Bank. 
 Worse of all - Israel’s Cast Lead Operation in Dec. 2008 and the continuing siege 
of the Gaza Strip. 
- The lack of detailed official documents regarding the EU policy towards Palestine and 
that of a formulated EU boycott policy of Hamas. 
- The researcher personal interest in the EU policy. 
- The researcher personal interest in Islamophobia. 
1.1.2 Research aims 
The aims of the research depend on the research scope and problem statement in the 
following manner: 
1.1.2.1 General aim 
To uncover, understand and explain the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU 
boycott policy of the elected Hamas, in 2006 Palestinian Parliamentary election. This is by 
providing an analytical lens to fill the gap between research and public debate over 
Islamophobia, in the EU boycott policy. As well, reflecting on Islamophobia and its 
manifestation, in articulation with imbalanced power relations, in the EU foreign policy 
towards Palestine. 
1.1.2.2 End product aim 
It is to examine Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy. In doing so, it analyzes the EU 
boycott policy, as a case study, along the political dynamics underpinning the EU position and 
policymaking process. 
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1.1.2.3 Analytical aim 
It is to analyze the relationship between the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas and 
imbalanced power relations. Further, related European and Palestinian views, at comparative 
basis, are analyzed. This includes the views of Palestinian academics and politicians including 
Islamists, European diplomats and academics working in Palestine and in Brussels. 
1.1.2.4 Contribution aim 
It is to contribute to the definition and, eventually, the theorization of Islamophobia in foreign 
policy. This is as much as related to one case study, namely, the EU boycott of elected 
Hamas. 
1.1.2.5 Utilization aim 
It aims to serve political scientists who embark on issues of Islamophobia and policy- making. 
It is a document particularly for policymakers who are involved in international development 
and cooperation. 
1.1.2.6 Research approach aim 
It aims at exploring and analyzing policy that already exists but not at collecting and 
presenting views as ultimate truth. Consequently, the research aims have drawn the guidelines 
for deriving the main and secondary research questions. 
1.1.3 Research Questions 
1.1.3.1 Main question 
What is the relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas, 
in articulation with imbalanced power relations, in 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections? 
1.1.3.2 Secondary questions 
What are the definitions and manifestations of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards 
Palestine? 
 What is the political context in which the EU reactions to the victory of Hamas in 
2006 Palestinian parliamentary election are constructed and pursued? 
 What is the relationship between the EU boycott policy and imbalanced power 
relations? 
 How is Islamophobia related to those imbalanced power relations? 
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 How do informed EU policymakers, Palestinian and Europeans experts view 
Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas? 
1.1.4 Inner structure of research 
In this section, a brief description of the contents of each chapter of the research is set out in a 
general matter. The first chapter is an introductory chapter. Chapter two specifies the research 
methods and methodology. Chapter three presents theoretical analysis and theoretical findings 
about Islamophobia. Chapter four analyzes EU policy towards Palestine with a focus on the 
EU boycott of elected Hamas. Chapter five presents, respectively, a conceptualized EU policy 
model, and an operationalized EU policy model formulating the final findings. Chapter six 
explores and compares the views of European and Palestinian experts on Islamophobia in the 
EU boycott policy of Hamas. Finally, chapter seven concludes the dissertation results and 
recommendations. 
1.1.4.1 Chapter one 
The introduction is in the form of preparatory information as a prerequisite for understanding 
the subsequent chapters of the research. This chapter formulates the research problem and 
consequently the research scope, aims and questions. The research problem is highlighted 
within a case study, namely, the EU boycott of the elected Hamas government in 2006, which 
stimulated the idea of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine. 
1.1.4.2 Chapter two 
This chapter presents the research methodology. It also outlines the two major methods 
carried out through the research, respectively, interpretative policy analysis as well as 
interviews comparative analysis in chapter six. 
1.1.4.3 Chapter three 
This chapter compares and adopts one theory among four theories, as related to Islamophobia, 
in consideration of imbalanced power relations, as a major analytical lens in the EU policy 
towards Palestine. It investigates Islamophobia as conceptualized and theorized. Further, it 
sets the analysis in the debate over Islamophobia as compared to anti Semitism in the EU 
policy towards Israel- Palestine and suggests basic definitions of Islamophobia. 
1.1.4.4 Chapter four 
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The “EU policy” discusses the EU foreign policy towards Palestine over time. More 
specifically, it sets the socio- economic and political context. Then it explores the EU 
common strategy and instruments in a contextual particularity around the 2006 election. 
1.1.4.5 Chapter five 
Firstly, it explains the role of Islamophobia, in articulation with imbalanced power relations, 
in the EU boycott policy towards the elected Hamas government. Secondly, it suggests an 
abstract model and an operationalized model of the EU policy towards Palestine.  
1.1.4.6 Chapter six 
This chapter, “Interviews,” compares and analyzes different views among European and 
Palestinian experts on the issue of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy towards Palestine. 
Focus is placed on the EU boycott policy against several question- parameters. 
 
1.1.4.7 Chapter seven 
This chapter is an outlook of the discussion and debates about the EU boycott policy of 
elected Hamas and Islamophobia.  It demonstrates common and different views on this issue. 
Also, it aims at elucidating the misconceptions caused by Islamophobia and the potential 
contribution of the EU policy towards Palestine in solving such misconceptions in regional 
disputes. Finally, it suggests future research directions on Islamophobia. 
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2 Methodology and methods 
Islamophobia means different things to different people and is consequently interpreted 
differently. There is also no intention to use the word as though its meaning is self- evident. 
Therefore, a qualitative research is most convenient in this research. 
In doing so, this research starts and maintains dialogue between data and theory, where 
preliminary insights guide the selection of data, and new data result in new theoretical 
explanations or reformulation of existing theories. 
The general methodology scheme is presented in term of three phases (observatory phase, 
analytical phase, and model formation phase). This three-phase scheme is sufficiently flexible 
to allow for free movement between the phases whenever necessary. 
1. Observatory phase: this phase is the stage where the main observations of research were 
originated through reviewing related literature. The observation have led to the 
formulation of research scope where the interest of the researcher played a major role in 
focusing the research aims and eventually framing the research problem as demonstrated 
in chapter one. The research problem was translated into detailed research aims and 
questions which in turn helped in setting a clear direction for the research. 
2. Analytical phase: in this phase, the investigation and discussion is undertaken through the 
review of theories, and theoretical perspectives on Islamophobia. It explores 
Islamophobia as conceptualized, theorized and compared and also brings attention to 
power in the analysis of related theories to Islamophobia. 
3. Model formulation phase: The findings from the analytical phase are used to formulate an 
abstract conceptual model for Islamophobia. The abstract concept is then operationalized 
through the insertion of suitable social, political processes that help in achieving the end 
product aim of the dissertation as set out in chapter one. 
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As for the research methods, two major methods are used in this research. Each method is 
explained explicitly in the following order: 
1. Interpretive Policy analysis of the EU common strategy, the EU instruments via Israel- 
OPT, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections and the collapse of the 
national unity, and 
2. Interviews comparative analysis of Palestinian and European’s views in order to examine 
Islamophobia in the policy making process.  
2.1 Interpretative policy analysis 
In social science research, the customary dual taxonomy of quantitative and qualitative 
research methods is increasingly being challenged by tripartite taxonomy: quantitative, 
qualitative, and interpretative methods. Yonow (2008) further argued that all research is 
interpretative. The question then is not whether or not there is interpretation, but rather how 
much interpretation is involved in a particular analysis, determined in large part by the nature 
of the problem under investigation.4 
Yanow also highlighted that qualitative and interpretative approaches share the same set of 
methods for accessing or generating data: observing (with different degrees of participation); 
talking (from “ordinary language” conversations to more formal interviews); and/ or the close 
reading of relevant documents. However, when it comes to analyzing those data, 
interpretative approaches draw on a variety of methods that contemporary qualitative research 
focuses on less, such as semiotics, ethno-methodology, and discourse analysis.5 
Basic to interpretative analysis is the study of the frames that defines policy problems and the 
way different participants understand them. More specifically, how various communities in a 
given policy arena frame the situational contexts that attribute social meanings to the problem 
under investigation. Also of significance are the ways languages is used to call attention to 
the conflict that reflects different communities views. For example, the method of “thick 
description” is used in explicating the core norms and values.6 
Yanow also stated that knowing which words and actions are more important can come only 
from familiarity with the situation and what is significant to stakeholders and policy- relevant 
                                                           
4 Yanow (2008),Interpretative Policy Analysis course, University of Vienna 
5 Yanow, (2008), ibid. 
6 Yanow, Dvora, (2008), ibid. Supplemented by additional articles and papers and a lecture by D. Yanaw at the 
university of Vienna. 
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groups. This familiarity obtained from social interaction by probing the balance between 
strange-ness and insider-ness to move back and forth between seeing things as they are and as 
they are not.7 
In this research, interpretative policy analysis is directed not only at the specific language of a 
policy document but also at what people do in response to it. In other words, it explores the 
contrasts between policy meaning as intended by policy makers- authored text and the 
possibility variant meanings- constructed texts made of them by other policy- relevant group. 
Therefore, policy analysis cannot be restricted to policy language or ideas as understood and 
intended by their authors. Others whose understandings of the policy are or will be central to 
its enactment are also of analytical concern. 
The author takes on the analysis of the EU common strategy in term of the EU position, 
declarations, legal obligations, the EU instruments via Israel- OPT in term of diplomacy, 
contractual and capacity building, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections 
and the collapse of the national unity. Moreover, the understanding of EU- policy towards 
OPT by informed Europeans and Palestinians. Category analysis, metaphor analysis, space 
analysis, framing (or frame- reflective analysis), and political and organizational ethnography 
are the ones the author proposed to engage whereby writing and reading as, themselves, are 
methods 
The elements involved in interpretative policy analysis as outlined by Yonow are: 8 
1. Who? Is explained in term of actors (individual, collective) where relevant 
interpretive/discourse communities (communities of meaning) = stakeholders with respect 
to the focus of analysis [impact of Islamophobia on the EU policy]. 
 
2. How? Is explained as a vehicle in identifying key symbols (language, objects, and/or acts) 
which have significant meanings for these interpretive communities. 
 
3. What? Is explained in terms of a content in identifying meanings (note plural:  multiple 
possible meanings) that key symbols have for each stakeholder group/community of 
meaning, and their similarities and differences. 
 
                                                           
7 Yonaw,Dvora, (2000), Conducting Interpretative Policy Analysis, qualitative research methods, Sage 
Publications, California 
8 Yanow, Dvora, (1996), How does a policy mean? Interpretating policy and organizational actions, Georgetown 
University Press 
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4. Intervention? Is explained in term of a frame-reflection leading to a resolution of conflict 
that requires frame-breaking! 
 
In relations, Yonaw outlined four basic methodological steps for interpretative policy analysis 
by identifying (1) art crafts or objects (2) interpretations (3) relevant discourses, and (4) point 
of conflict.9 
 
2.2 Interviews Comparative Analysis 
Interviews comparative analysis method is the most convenient in this research. It details 
information that is still scarce on the Palestinians’ views on the EU foreign policy and 
initiatives. Further, it examines Islamophobia from a comparative perspective by interviewing 
informed Palestinian academics and politicians including the Islamists as well as European 
officials, diplomats and academics “experts” working in Palestine and in Brussels. 
 
While seeking a common structure in the case study, the author recognized the need for 
variation given a wide range of interviewees. For example, those who were elected for Hamas 
government, and those who were nominated by Hamas to the joint unity government. As 
well, those who belong to other Palestinian political parties such as Palestine Liberation 
Movement (Fateh), Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PLPF), etc. and those 
informed academic professors from Najah National University in Nablus and those in Bir Zeit 
University in Ramallah. 
 
The Palestinian interviewees and the only interviewer with no exception were nationals of 
Palestine, all living in West Bank.  It was impossible to conduct interviews with Palestinians 
in Gaza as it is under siege by Israel. Interviews with Palestinians were conducted in Arabic 
whereas the interviews with Europeans were conducted in English. 
 
In addition, the European representative interviewees come from different European 
countries. Most of them occupy political positions in their representative offices in Palestine- 
Ramallah. Those in Brussels occupy official policymaking and advisory positions. 
Interviewing European diplomats in Jerusalem was impossible for the author has no access to 
the city of Jerusalem as a Palestinian from the West Bank.  The researcher was however 
allowed to conduct phone interviews and this was approved by one office only, namely, the 
                                                           
9 Yanow, (2000), ibid. 
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European commission. The author could not get an Israeli permit to enter the city of 
Jerusalem. 
 
Therefore, the interviews were guided by a common questionnaire set out in Annex A in 
English and Annex B in Arabic. The questionnaire was adapted from a research-paper titled 
Political Islam and European foreign Policy; perspectives from Muslim Democrats of the 
Mediterranean.10 In consultancy with the research advisor and other professors and several 
colleagues in political science in the University of Vienna, the questionnaire was divided into 
three parts in the following consequences: 
 
Part A: EU policy 
A.1 Pre- election EU Policy 
A.2 Post- election EU Policy 
 
Part B: Islamophobia 
B.1 Islamophobia Meanings and Manifestation 
B.2 Islamophobia and Anti- Semitism 
 
Part C: Evaluations 
C.1 Islamophobia and the EU Policy 
C.2 what is next? 
 
The questionnaire was also tailored in a way to answer the paper’s main question; what is the 
relationship between Islamophobia and the EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 
Palestinian parliamentary elections? In answering this question, the author reports the views 
of the interviewees without intervening judgment over whether these views could be 
contested or not. The author thus is not necessarily in agreement with all the views presented 
in this research. However, in analyzing the interviews, the raw interview data is transformed 
into analytical categories while the author became more sensitized to which data provided 
theoretical insights. 
                                                           
10 Emerson, Michael (2007), Political Islam and European foreign Policy; perspectives from Muslim Democrats 
of the Mediterranean, Centre for European Policy Studies CEPS, Brussels 
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2 Theories 
Currently, there is no legally agreed upon definition of Islamophobia, nor a political social 
science- developed common definition. Even in narrowing the debate over related literature to 
identify it, diverging conceptions of Islamophobia and its broad application remain a 
contested issue. In addition, data on Islamophobic incidents in Europe remains limited. 
Moreover, Islamophobia and its manifestation are unexamined in foreign policy. 
Therefore, this chapter sets up starting points for a socio- political legal or official definition 
since the author seeks to research Islamophobia and its relation to EU foreign policy. 
However, it is necessary to clarify whether the definition of Islamophobia is an academic 
issue or a politicized enterprise. It is difficult to make a sharp distinction though between 
diverging opinions and conclusions on Islamophobia explained by different scientific 
traditions and academic observations, and those explained by the political or perhaps biased 
viewpoints and opinions about Islam, Muslims and the future of Europe. 
With this said, the author attempts to stipulate a methodologically sound definition of 
Islamophobia while recognizing that it would require more discussion and debate than what 
this dissertation allows. To take a step forward, this chapter explores Islamophobia in the 
following manner (1) concept (2) theory and (3) comparison. 
3.1 Islamophobia Conceptualized  
This section takes three tracks to explore Islamophobia (1) in language (2) in the work of 
NGOs, and (3) in the work of the Council of Europe. 
3.1.1 Islamophobia in language 
Islamophobia is not defined in English dictionaries. However, there are definitions of Islam 
and of phobia. Both are defined separately and structured independently. To demonstrate the 
different meanings and angles upon which the meaning of Islam and phobia are structured, 
definitions of each term are presented as follows: 
3.1.1.1 Islam 
In Oxford dictionary,11 Islam/ Iz-lam is defined as: 
1. The religion of Muslims based on a belief of one God and revealed through Mohammad 
                                                           
11 Oxford paperback Dictionary Thesaurus and word power Guide (2006), Oxford University Press Inc., New 
York 
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as the Prophet of Allah. Allah is the name of God among Muslims (and Arab Christians). 
2. The Muslim world. 
Searching further on line,12 Islam refers to: 
1. The religious faith of Muslims, based on the words and religious system founded by the 
prophet Muhammad and taught by the Koran, the basic principle of which is absolute 
submission to a unique and personal god, Allah. 
2. The whole body of Muslim believers, their civilization, and the countries in which theirs 
is the dominant religion. Also, in the same search, Islam is found as a monotheistic 
religion characterized by the acceptance of the doctrine of submission to God and to 
Muhammad as the chief and last prophet of God. It is also related to the people or nations 
that practice Islam; the Muslim world and to the civilization developed by the Muslim 
world. 
The cultural dictionary refers to Islam as a religion, founded by Mohammad whose members 
worship the one God of Jews and Christians and follow the teachings of the Koran. Islam 
means “submission to the will of God”; adherents of Islam are called Muslims. The 
fundamental belief of Islam is “There is only one God, and Muhammad is his prophet.” 
Muslims are obliged to pray five times a day, to fast in the daytime during the holy month of 
Ramadan, to abstain from pork and alcohol, and to make gifts to the poor. All of them are 
expected to make a pilgrimage to Mecca, Muhammad’s birthplace, at least once in their lives. 
It also notes that Shi’a and Sunni Muslims make up the two main branches of Islam. As well, 
Islam is the dominant faith in Arab nations, a number of countries of central Asia, and 
Malaysia and Indonesia. 
In addition, the smart thesaurus shows synonyms, related words and phrases that make up this 
topic Islam including (Allah, Fatwa, hajj, hijab, jihad, Mecca, minaret, Mohammad, 
Mohammadan, mosque, Muslim, prayer, Ramadan, salam, sharia, Shiism, Sunni, Koran and 
the Taliban). 13 From those synonyms, it is worth to note definitions of currently and widely 
spread ones as follows; 
1. Muslim (also Moslem) is defined as a noun as a follower of Islam and as an adjective: 
relating to Muslims or Islam. 
2. Shia (also Shi’a) is defined as one of the two branches of Islam regarding Ali, the fourth 
                                                           
12 http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/islam  
13  http://dictionary.cambridge.org/define.asp?key=42152&dict=CALD&topic=islam  
Theories 
 
15   
 
caliph, as Muhammad’s first true successor. Compare with Sunni, the Shi’a is a Muslim 
who adheres to his branch of Islam with Arabic origin “party of Ali”. 
3. Sunni (also sooni) is defined as one of the two branches of Islam, differing from Shia in 
its acceptance of the first three caliphs. Compare with Shia, the Sunni is a Muslim who 
adheres to this branch of Islam with Arabic origin “custom, normative rule”. 
4. Islamic (Izlammik) s defined as an adjective relating to Islam along the derivate of 
Islamicize (also Islamicise)- verb. 
5. Mohammedan (also Mohammedan) is defined as a noun and adjective archaic term for 
Muslim (not favored by Muslims) with Arabic origin from the name of the Arab Prophet 
and founder of Islam. 
3.1.1.2 Phobia: -phobia 
It is defined in Oxford English dictionary as extreme or irrational fear or dislike of a specified 
thing. Also, it refers to anxiety, aversion, dislike, and dread, informal hang- up, hatred, 
horror, loathing, neurosis, obsession, repugnance, and revulsion, see fear. However, -phobe 
refers to a person having a fear or dislike of a specified thing. 
It is defined in the Cambridge Advanced Learner Dictionary,14 as a noun, as an extreme fear 
of a particular thing or situation, especially one that cannot be reasonably explained.  – 
Phobia as a suffix, whereby Xenophobia is defined as hatred of foreigners. Phobic as an 
adjective or a noun defined as having a strong dislike of something. 
The author searched the Oxford dictionary for anti- Islam and anti- religion but none was 
found. Only anti- as a prefix was found. It is defined as (1) Opposed to; against: antisocial. 
(2) Preventing or relieving: antibiotic. (3) The opposite of: anticlimax with Greek origin “fit 
for life”. However, Anti- Semitism was found and it is defined as a noun as hostility to or 
prejudice against Jews. 
Reviewing the definitions of Islamophobia, some remarks can be made: 
- If the combination of Islam+ phobia (Islamophobia) means extreme or irrational fear 
of Islam or dislike of Islam or a specified thing, and this thing is related to Islam, whether, a 
follower of Islam, or the religion of Muslims, or the Muslim world, then, the weight of the 
term Islamophobia is placed on irrational feelings. 
                                                           
14  http://dictionary.cambridge.org/results.asp?searchword=phobia&x=43&y=4  
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- The two latter derivatives, namely, Islamist- noun and Islamize (also Islamise) as a 
verb show the extreme irrational fear of the action of Islamizing carried out by Islamists as a 
feature Islam. Such definitions suggest irrational and extreme fear of Islamizing a non- 
Muslim society. Consequently, the definitions see the act of Islamizing as an independent act, 
not as a product of social interaction or other social processes, systems and relations which 
integrate Islamic acts. 
- The definitions related to Shi’a and Sunni present two branches of Islam. Here, one 
can observe that these meanings vary in time and space. What is appropriate for an individual 
to be a Shi’a or a Sunni is not appropriate for another individual. It can be also collectively 
carried out (e.g. inherited by the society in the form of Shia or Sunni formal and informal 
traditions and teachings of Islam) or is constructed by small groups/ individuals and 
sometimes enforced through institutional mechanisms with executive powers. Whereby, the 
differences between the two branches of Islam is unclear to many Shi’a and Sunni 
themselves, it is even less clear for non- Muslims. Consequently, it is least clear in term of 
reasoning the irrational extreme fear of Muslims irrespective to which branch a Muslim 
belongs to. 
- As for Islamic (Izlammik), it is as an adjective relating to Islam. Here Islamic can 
refer to countries, traditions, and cultures. The everyday use of the adjective can be 
misleading. This is because the meaning of Islamic is mainly based on what can be observed. 
The definition ignores the existence of much Islamic informality and what is practiced 
privately away from state mechanisms and formal or spiritual space by which the Islamic also 
inhabits. Also, it brings about different queries regarding the right of the different segments of 
society to contribute to the definition of what is Islamic. 
Islamophobia: extreme or irrational fear or dislike of Islam/ Muslims/ Islamic and 
Islamization 
Reflections 
- Islamophbia as irrational fear or dislike is directed against not only Islam and 
Muslims and Islamization but also whatever related to Islam. In other words, whatever is 
Islamic. This is challenging for it potentially includes all Islamic political parties including 
Hamas with no distinction. 
- This fear or dislike of Islam in a society could be reflected in a formal form (e.g. in 
laws, buildings, etc) and an informal form that is defined by unwritten rules or feelings which 
are based on a particular context. 
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- Contexual particularity of in/formal forms of Islamophobia is more likely to change 
over time and space whereby it is neither inherited nor passing from one generation to 
another. However, there might be some inherited components of (e.g. religious, military) 
systems exerting a historical influence on the rules and structure of society in dealing with 
issues relating to Islam. 
- There can be varied degrees of agreements over such rules between people as 
individuals or groups in order to define what Islamophobic is and what is not. 
- Certain forms of Islamophobia informally and formally can exist unless this form of 
Islamophobia is disagreed upon by some groups or individuals resulting in more contested 
definitions of Islamophobia. 
- Here, power relations interplays in different forms, essentially, in producing a formal 
unified definition of Islamophobia. 
- The definition provided earlier is insufficient to define or explain Islamophobia and its 
manifestations in different contexts. 
-  Nevertherless, there are quite enough Islamophobic incidents in Europe that are 
documented and debated among different actors. Such incidents contributed to define 
Islamophobia. This will be demonstrated in the following section/s. 
3.1.2 In the work of the NGOs 
Some NGOs attempted to define Islamophobia and to record relevant incidents against 
Muslims especially in Europe. Most notably, the term Islamophobia became first part of the 
contemporary political discourse, in one of the UK, Runnymede Trust’s publication. It 
published a report, namely, Islamophobia: A challenge for Us All in 1997.15 In explaining 
Islamophobia, it draws a key distinction between closed views of Islam on the one hand and 
opened views on the other as follows.16  
Closed and open views of Islam 
Distinctions Closed views of Islam Open views of Islam 
1. Monolithic / diverse Islam seen as a single 
monolithic bloc, static and 
unresponsive to new 
realities. 
Islam seen as diverse and 
progressive, with internal 
differences, debates and 
development. 
2. Separate / interacting Islam seen as separate and Islam seen as 
                                                           
15 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia, (1997), A challenge for Us All. See also, 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/74.html   
16 Runnymede Trust, Islamophobia, (1997), A challenge for Us All. See also, 
http://www.runnymedetrust.org/publications/17/74.html  
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other – (a) not having any 
aims or values in common 
with other cultures (b) not 
affected by them (c)not 
influencing them. 
interdependent with other 
faiths and cultures – (a) 
having certain shared 
values and aims (b) 
affected by them (c) 
enriching them. 
3. Inferior / different Islam seen as inferior to 
the West- barbaric, 
irrational, primitive, 
sexist. 
Islam seen as distinctively 
different, but not deficient, 
and as equally worthy of 
respect. 
4. Enemy / partner Islam seen as violent, 
aggressive, threatening, 
supportive of terrorism, 
engaged in ‘a clash of 
civilizations’. 
Islam seen as an actual or 
potential partner in joint 
cooperative enterprises 
and in the solution of 
shared problems. 
5. Manipulative / sincere Islam seen as a political 
ideology, used for political 
or military advantage. 
Islam seen as a genuine 
religious faith, practiced 
sincerely by its adherents. 
6. Criticism of West 
 rejected / considered 
 
Criticisms made by Islam 
of “the West” rejected out 
of hand. 
Criticisms of ‘the West’ 
and other cultures are 
considered and debated. 
7. Discrimination 
defended / criticized 
 
Hostility towards Islam 
used to justify 
discriminatory practices 
towards Muslims and 
exclusion of Muslims 
from mainstream society. 
Debates and 
disagreements with Islam 
do not diminish efforts to 
combat discrimination and 
exclusion. 
8. Islamophobia seen as 
natural / problematic 
Anti-Muslim hostility 
accepted as natural and 
“normal”. 
Critical views of Islam are 
themselves subjected to 
critique, lest they be 
inaccurate and unfair. 
Reviewing open and closed views of Islam- phobia, here are some remarks: 
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- The distinction between closed and open views of Islam took eight tracks. The first 
five tracks only addressed those views.  The last three tracks did not actually address any 
views of Islam. 
- Track number 6 addressed criticisms of the West. The last two tracks addressed 
discrimination and Islamophobia as perceived or acted upon against Muslims and not by 
Muslims. 
- The closed views of Islam are respectively, monolithic, separate, inferior, enemy, and 
manipulative. The open views are respectively, diverse, interacting, different, partner, and 
sincere. 
-  The closed views are not always opposite to the open views. However, closed views 
are considered negative while the open views are considered positive or at least less negative. 
Islamophobia: closed views vs. open views of Islam as monolithic/ diverse, 
separate/interacting, inferior/ different, enemy/ partner, and manipulative/ sincere.  
Reflections 
- It is clear that Islam is viewed in negative as well as in positive terms. The extent to 
which and context in which Islam is viewed negatively or positively is not clear though. 
- The more negatively Islam is viewed, the more Islamophobia is assumed. 
- The dichotomy between good/positive Islam and bad/negative Islam is evident. 
- The dichotomy between Islam and the West appeared in the sense it is only Islam/ 
Muslims criticizing the West whereby who else is critical of the West is not clear or 
important, perhaps. In addition, the West itself is presented as monolithic. 
- This dichotomy demonstrates further reinforces Islam as the enemy- other that is 
feared in opposition to the West. 
- The closed views of Islam holders seem to justify their reaction in term of 
discrimination and exclusion. Islamophobia for them is natural. The holders of the open views 
of Islam debate and combat discrimination and exclusion of Muslims. Islamophobia for them 
is problematic. 
- those views are more likely addressing Islam and Muslim minorities in Europe. 
Contextual particularities are not addressed. 
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3.1.3 In the work of the Council of Europe 
In the work of the Council of Europe (CoE) on discrimination, race- based discrimination is 
related to religion in many cases and it is found in different times. The advocates of anti- 
discrimination considered religion to be a key factor in discrimination. 
However, it is difficult to deduce particular measurements for Islamophobia in the EU policy 
towards Palestine for Palestine is out of Europe and out of the Council frame. Therefore, the 
definition of Islamophobia in this context cannot be held as a universal norm to measure the 
processes of Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy. Therefore, in the development of a 
definition of Islamophobia, it is important to note the contextual particularity at least in term 
of (1) space- the EU and the Palestinians’ definition/s of Islamophobia and (2) time- two 
years around 2006 Palestinian elections in order to capture the phenomenon. 
3.1.3.1 Space 
It is necessary to note that debate over Islamophobia has taken place in Europe rather than in 
Palestine. The Council of Europe has responded initially to two main obstacles with respect 
to Islamophobia in Europe. The first obstacle is in defining Islamophobia and the second is in 
the limited related data about Islamophobic incidents. 
As for the first obstacle, in response to the absence of a legally agreed upon definition of 
Islamophobia, or a social science- developed common definition, policy and action to combat 
Islamophobia is taken within the broad concept of racism and discrimination. Therefore, the 
approach to identify the phenomena is based on internationally agreed standards on racism 
and the ongoing work of the Council of Europe and the United Nations that are largely 
accepted by governments and international organizations. To that point, the CoE’s European 
Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI) published relevant general policy 
recommendations in accordance with the European Monitoring Center on Racism and 
Xenophobia (EUMC) as follows: 17 
No. 5- (CRI (2000) 21). In combating intolerance and discrimination against Muslims, it 
notes that Muslim communities are subject to prejudice that 
“May, manifest itself in different guises, in particular through negative general attitudes 
but also to varying degrees, through discriminatory acts and through violence and 
                                                           
17 EUMC: Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia, European Monitoring Center on 
Racism and Xenophobia (2006), p13-14  
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harassment” 
No. 7- (ECRI (2003) 8) on the national legislation combating racism and racial 
discrimination, it defines racism as 
“The belief that a ground such as race, color, language, religion, national or ethnic 
origin justifies contempt  for a person or a group of persons or the notion of superiority 
of a person or a group of persons”. 
No.8 (ECRI (2004) 26) notes that 
“As a result of the fight against terrorism ... vulnerable to racism and/ or to racial 
discrimination across many fields of public life including education, employment, 
housing, access to goods and services, access to public places and freedom of 
movement”. 
In 2005, another publication of the CoE referred to Islamophobia by addressing its 
consequences on young people as: 
“The fear of or prejudiced viewpoint towards Islam, Muslims and the matters pertaining 
to them. Whether it takes the shape of daily forms of racism and discrimination or more 
violent forms, Islamophobia is a violation of human rights and a threat to social 
cohesion”. 
As for the second obstacle, namely, the limited data on Islamophobic incidents, the EUMC 
has set up and coordinated a Racism and Xenophobia European Network composed 
(RAXEN) of 25 National Focal Points (NFP)- one in each EU member state. The task of the 
NFP is to provide the EUMC with objective, reliable and comparable data on Racism and 
Xenophobia. The two channels for data collection focusing on racist violence and crime are 
firstly, official criminal data including police reports, prosecution reports and case files and 
secondly, other related data including NGOs reports and research, surveys and media. 
RAXEN showed that police and criminal justice data identifying Muslim victims is absent in 
all EU states with the exception of the United Kingdom. Also, country data is limited and 
most reports refer to incidents in the “old” EU 15 states where the relatively larger EU 
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Muslim populations live.18 
It is worth noting that accounts of incidents against people who are characterized as Muslims 
could be difficult to be labeled as Islamophobic. In comparison, an anti Islamic statements or 
drawings is clearly Islamophobic. On the other hand, incidents of crimes against Muslims 
may be driven by other motives than Islamophobia such as anti- migrant/ refugee/ asylum 
seeker sentiments – and these can be labeled as a hate crime instead. 
Moreover, the existence of empirical data depends on a definition of Islamophobia that has 
been officially accepted by specific states. In other words, it is almost impossible to have any 
empirical data for measuring a term that is undefined. Nevertheless, the lack of empirical data 
should not be seen as an indication that there are no expressions, opinions, or actions that 
could be related to Islamophobia in Europe. 
Interestingly, most of what is reported as Islamophobic incidents in Europe refers to incidents 
against people from countries of origin predominately Muslim. Eventually, EUMC 
recognizes that perception plays an essential role in the manifestation of Islamophobia in the 
following manner:19 
1. The victim perception of a crime as Islamophobic as a first step for potential 
Islamophobic incident as it might be. 
2. The perpetrator perceives a target of abuse as a Muslim although s/he might be a non- 
Muslim can also be an Islamophobic incident. 
Therefore, perception of the other, in two directions, plays a crucial role in defining 
Islamophobia 
3.1.3.2 Time 
Francisco (2007) argued that anti- Muslim stereotypical and negative schemes go even further 
back in history to the Middle Ages, the Crusades and the Reformation. The reformer Martin 
Luther in 1483- 1546 held for example negative opinions about Muslims. Anti- Muslim 
literature, especially against the Quran, was part of the Christian self- image and the 
construction of European boundaries in association with negative and essentialistic images 
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according to stereotypical schemes and the fear of the other.20  Further, Andre Gingrich 
(2005) argued such constructions might lead to the identification of a new variant in the 
present that nevertheless, arguably, is the transformation of its not- so recent predecessors.21 
However, Öyzürex, Esra, (2005) argued that the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989 fundamentally 
transformed the nature of political alliances in Europe. When European leaders met at 
Maastricht, in 1991, they agreed to change the basis of the supranational European entity 
from an economic to a political confederation. Hence, in the transition to this new form of 
union, the question of the place of Islam in Europe has been central in the search for common 
basis. 22 
Following Sep 11th, the German philosopher Jürgen Habermas pointed out that some of 
today’s political leaders adopting an apocalyptic discourse enforce the prejudices towards 
Islam. For example, when they talk about the struggle against evil, speak in the name of God, 
and try to impose their perception of the good.23 Moreover, the Swedish national council for 
crime prevention detailed annual report showed an increase of Islamophobic crimes since 
2001.24 
Parallel to this, EUMC critical assessment of available data on Islamophobia reveals incidents 
directed against Muslims including incitement to hatred, threats, and actual acts of violence. 
In the aftermath of September 11, and in light of subsequent attacks in Europe, the Council of 
Europe general recommendation no. 8- (ECRI (2004) 26) mentioned earlier also indicates, 
that Arabs, Muslims, Jews, immigrants and persons perceived belonging to such groups have 
become subject of discrimination in many fields. 
However, the same period witnessed, arguably, Islamophobic attitudes in politics. To this 
point, Strindberg and Wärn argue that whereas Hamas is a domestic Islamic movement 
focused on Palestine, a political effort to lump together diverse resistance movements into a 
homogenous terrorist enemy is evident. Al Quaida has come to serve as explanatory matrix 
for a range of dispute militant groups in the Middle East and beyond. It mattered little that 
                                                           
20  Francisco (2007) in Göran, Larsson, (2009), current Debates about Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within 
the Academia, in September, 16-21, 2009 series of lectures, Oslo 
21 Gingrich, Andre, (2005), Anthropological analysis of Islamophobia and anti- Semitism in Europe, the 
American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No., 4, p513-515 
22  Öyzürex, Esra, (2005), The politics of cultural unification, secularism, and the place of Islam in the new 
Europe, the American Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No., 4, p 509- 512 
23 Chahuan, Eugenio (2005), An East- West Dichotomy: Islamophobia, p47 
24  Göran, (2009), current Debates about Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia within the Academia, in September, 
16-21, 2009 series of lectures, Oslo. 
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Hamas had not been involved in global terrorism. However, Hamas was placed beyond 
reason and dialogue and found itself to the head of key enemies in the new war on terror.25 
Time and space along the perception of the other are important factors in defining 
Islamophobia. In terms of space, Islamophobia is a phenomena-taking place in 
Europe. In terms of time, Islamophobia is addressed because of the fight against 
terrorism in the aftermath of Sep 11th.  
Reflections 
- It is necessary to note that debate over Islamophobia has taken place in Europe 
ratherIslamophobia is present in Europe. 
- Islamohobia manifests itself in different forms through general negative attitudes such 
as fear, prejudice and violence, leading to discrimination on the bases of religion (Islam), 
race, etc, leading to violence and violation of human rights. 
- Islamophobia contextual particularities are little addressed in different EU member 
states. Further, it is unexamined in foreign policy. However, contextualizing Islamophobia 
shows its particularities in a more subtle way and often beyond a simple antiforeign 
sentiment. 
- Time and space are crucial in defining Islamophobia not only inside Europe but also in 
connection to the EU foreign policy in an international context in the aftermath of Sep.11th. 
 
3.2 Islamophobia Theorized 
In this section, the author explores and discusses Islamophobia in four theories and theoretical 
perspectives in relevance. A reflection on the socio- political discourses of Islamophobia at 
the end of the debate is also made 
3.2.1 Clash of civilization Theory 
With the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new world order emerged and Islam became a 
potential new enemy. The historical delineation of Islam is borrowed from Huntington. He 
did most to generalize and popularize the clash of civilization model on which Bernard Lewis 
had long relied upon in the debate over Islam and terrorism in the wider debates over the post- 
Cold War era.26 Lewis goes further in time and presents a longstanding framework. He argued 
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that the ongoing struggle has taken place between the “rival systems” of the Judeo- Christian 
and Muslim “Blocks” for nearly fourteen centuries. He specifically says: 
“It has consisted of a long series of attacks and counter attacks, jihads and crusades, 
conquests and recon quests”27 
According to Lockman Zachary, the advocates of various books, articles, and media argued 
that different ideological circumstances dominated between the First World War and the end 
of the Cold War. They also suggested that the conflict of nation- states was supplemented by 
the conflict of ideologies. Further, they argued that Islam-ism in this case had replaced 
communism through the 1990s as a big threat facing the West as well as Israel and that only a 
firm aggressive stance, including military force, could eradicate it.28 Meghand Desai makes 
demarcations, arguing that what caused terrorism was not Islam as a religion or the lifestyle 
or culture of Muslims but Islamism as an ideology.  He based this assessment on his analysis 
of Osama Bin Laden’s speeches.29 
Islam as an ideology of terror is a threat to the West and only an aggressive stance 
could eradicate it.  
In this specific situation immigrants in Europe, and Muslims in particular, became the new 
enemy that better serves the new political landscape. This is seen in political publications and 
political manifests of some of the right wing parties in Europe in the 1990s. An example is 
the Dutch politician Pim Fortuyn and his book Against the Islamization of our Culture, a 
publication that clearly addressed immigrants and Muslims in particular as a problem for 
Europe. 
In disagreement with the ideological link, Huntington starkly argued that the fundamental 
sources of conflict in the world would not be primary ideological or economic but rather 
cultural lines between groups or nations belonging to different civilizations defined by 
language, history, and religion and also by how people identify themselves.30 He argued that 
the conflict is no longer between different ideologies as it was in the cold war but between 
distinct cultures, often influenced by religious overtones. Consequently, the analysis of 
                                                           
27 Lewis, (1990), ibid.. See also, Lewis, Bernard, (1982), the Question of Orientalism, New York Review of 
books, XXIX,No. 11, p49-56 
28  Lockman, Zachary, (2004), Contending Visions of the Middle East, the history and politics of Orientalism, 
Cambridge, UK, p233-236 
29 Desai, Meghnad, (1997), Rethinking Islamism, I.B. Tauris and Co. Ltd, London, pvii- 12 
30  Huntington, Samuel, (1996), the Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. 
New York, Simon and Schuster.  
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Huntington differs substantially from those that framed the analysis of the Cold War. To 
Huntington, this new global conflict is potentially more intransigent than the Cold War had 
been because the people tend to have deep, and sometimes nonnegotiable attachments to their 
own civilizations. 
Islam as a distinct culture is a fundamental source of conflict 
3.2.2 Orientalism 
Huntington is often credited for having remarkable foresight in the aftermath of September 
11th, but it was in fact, Orientalism that was the prescient work. Edward Said’s book engaged 
the relationship between the Orient and its forms of knowledge, enabling scholars to 
recognize in arguments, such as those put forth by Huntington, an imperial vision that would 
work to make real the very clash of civilizations that Huntington “foresaw”. After all, 
Orientalism lays out “the pattern of imperial culture”31 that made imaginable, even natural, 
imperial vision of the Arab- Muslim as a space demanding intervention; a space radically, 
even incommensurably, different from the West and one that had to be remade by and in the 
image of European civilization. He said that, 
“No one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of 
the limitation on thought and action inspired by Orientalism.” 
In 2003, Said wrote 25 years after its initial publication, 
“Orientalism once raises the question of whether modern imperialism ever ended, or 
whether it has continued in the Orient since Napoleon’s entry into Egypt two centuries 
ago”.32 
Of importance, Orientalism raises the questions and seeks to understand the specific terms 
and institutions through which imperial power operates. It examines an “internally structured 
archive”33 of the character of the Arab and Muslim East among other things that helped to 
generate and make possible the imperial policies. In Said’s words, Orientalism is still a book 
“about culture, ideas, history and power”.34 In other words, it is methodologically and 
historically attempting to answer how culture, history and power articulate within specific 
contexts of empires. 
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In this research, the author deals with the institutional power highlighted in Orientalism for it 
examines Islamophobia in foreign policy making towards the Orient- in this case Palestine by 
the EU as an institution and a global power. To this point, the author notes a relevant 
definition among Said’s overlapping definitions of Orientalism: 
“corporate institution for dealing with the Orient- dealing with it by making statements 
about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, and ruling over 
it: in short, Orientalism as a Western style of dominating, restructuring, and having 
authority over the orient”.35 
This definition engages distinct aspects of knowledge, representation and empire. Said also 
questions how human societies distinguish between selves and others and with what 
consequences: 
“can we divide human reality, as indeed human reality seems to be genuinely divided 
into clearly different cultures, histories, traditions, societies, even races, and survive the 
consequences humanly?”36 
Of significance, Islam is mostly read in Orientalism as the alien, foreign. Exotic terms are 
also found. Said argues that this is not merely a matter of distaste or prejudice, but when the 
idea of others as less than human gathers revolutionary force, it leads to destruction of human 
beings.37 
For a scholar such as Foucault, representation is very important. For example, he assumes 
that what we take to be the truth is in fact always really the product of a certain way of 
representing reality, of a certain “discourse: a structured system of meaning which shapes 
what we perceive, think and do”. This “way of seeing” is not a misrepresentation, a false or 
distorted perception of reality, because there is no truth and no accurate representation.  
Taken this argument to the extreme, once can state there is no reality out there. This makes it, 
however, challenging if not impossible to come up with any definition, for example, a 
definition of Islamophobia. 
Therefore, Orientalism contributes to somehow resolve this problem. It sought to understand 
how in a context of specific historical encounters Europe represented Arab Middle East 
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otherness, demarcating the difference between East and West, between Christianity and 
Islam- generated imperial power in the West, and helped to elaborate the patterns of thought 
and culture that made that imperial endeavor imaginable, sustainable and quite centrally 
“morally- good”. 
In doing so, Said started to analyze how Europeans had perceived the (Non- Western) peoples 
and cultures over which Western power was increasingly being exerted during the colonial 
era and afterward generating a colonial discourse. This way, Orientalism traced the 
transformation of Islam from “alien into colonial space”38in the late 19th century. Precisely, 
Orientalism traced how the former- a persistent discourse about alien made it possible the 
latter- a colonial space. He analyzed the transformation of a largely imagined and often 
fraught relationship between the world of Christendom and that of Islam, into a colonized 
one. 
Islam as an alien transformed into a colonial space  
Some scholars such as Lewis (1982)39, critical of Orientalism raised the question of whether 
or not Said engaged in a reverse Orientalism, in “Occidentalism”. However, this question can 
only be asked from within a partial reading of Orientalism. Such a reading is stripped of its 
entanglement with forms and institutions of power in which the Orientalist discourse was and 
remains embedded. In other words, this question requires that historical and institutional 
elements of Orientalism particular argument be sidelined. This way, the question of empire 
must be treated as either irrelevantly or at very least not central. 
3.2.3 Nativism Theory 
Nativism is defined in Merriam- Webster 40 dictionary as:  “(1) a policy of favoring native 
inhabitants as opposed to immigrants, and (2) the revival of perpetuation of an indigenous 
culture especially in opposition to acculturation”. 
However, Anti- immigration can be a more neutral term that may be used to characterize 
opponents of immigration. Anti- immigration is also a typical pressing concern in the 20th and 
21st century.41 It is often argued, that immigrants will distort existing cultural values, and 
perhaps that immigrants cannot be assimilated. In the United States where the so called white 
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natives are themselves non- native, authors such as Samuel Huntington have seen recent 
Hispanic immigration as creating a national identity crisis and presenting problems for social 
institutions in the United States.42 
Regarding Nativism in Europe, Lucassen (2005) argued that religiosity and nationalism were 
fundamental in generating nativism and intergroup hostility. He gave the example of the 
religious divide between the Protestants and Catholics of the Irish in British society. Another 
example is the Poles in the mining districts of Western Germany before 1914. In this 
example, it was nationalism which kept Polish workers separate from the host German 
society.  Further, Lucassen sees the post- 1950s wave of immigration in Europe as 
fundamentally different from the pre- 1914 patterns. For example, the Algerian migration to 
France escalated a debate over the impact of cultural differences, race, fundamentalism, 
poverty, poor education on nativism. 43 
Further, in regards to economic competition and the global economy, Brodkin (2005) pointed 
out that racism’s resonance rests on institutionalized and persistent racial and ethnic 
segregation in the labor force, and in neighborhoods whereby new groups of immigrants 
become racial others. She also argued that the Bush administration has rivaled European 
governments in Islamophobic state policies and discourse; this, despite the fact that Muslims 
are not the primary focus of popular xenophobia in the USA. Still, many Americans 
stereotype Mexican and Central American immigrants for taking USA jobs and public 
services in much the same way that Europeans blame Turks and other Muslims. It seems that 
much of those attitudes in Europe rest on earlier decades of immigration of workers from the 
Middle East. Most of working class post- World II rebuilding and industrialization came from 
Turkey and former North African colonies. Those immigrants are also vulnerable to 
exploitation because they are sometimes subject to state imposed restrictions on work and/or 
conditions of residence.44 
As far as national security is concerned, Brodkin (2005) argued in relation to previous point 
that despite the national trauma inflicted by September 11th, there has been little nativist 
sentiments in the United States targeting immigrants from Islamic countries. In Europe, after 
September 11th and the subsequent attacks in London and Madrid, there has been a 
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considerable rise in anti- Islam sentiments.45 
Betz and Meret (2009) reflected on the connection between Europe and Islam. The former is 
seen as civilized and the latter is seen as a barbarian savage who is driven by violence with a 
so-called medieval mentality.46 Putting the argument this way does not depend on racial 
theories but on essentialistic way of presenting Islam and Muslims that is driven by cultural 
explanations and consequently it is a representation of the new racism. They argued further 
that whilst racial theories are biological constructions, the essentialistic cultural way of 
pressing Islam and Muslims is often based on a preconceived cultural construction. 
In conclusion, the distinguishing feature of nativism is the opposition between established 
inhabitants and recently arrived immigrants. In addition, it can be understood as racial/ social/ 
cultural constructions. It is also noted that whereas nativism can vary widely over time and 
space, anti- Muslim sentiments was and is more present in Europe than the USA. 
Nativism might be driven by religion such as Islam, nationalism, culture, race, 
economy, and national security. 
3.2.4 Populism Theory 
Canovan, Margaret argues that populism pits a homogeneous people against a set of elites and 
dangerous others who are together seen as depriving (or attempting to to do so) the sovereign 
people of their rights, values, prosperity, and identity.47 Betz, Hans-Georg argues that 
populism often implies a rhetorical style in a way that can take different forms of politics that 
bring people of different views together without claiming a certain position of the political 
spectrum.48 In doing so, populist politics often represents politics of horizontal interactions 
among equals who are different for the sake of problem solving.49 
In Europe, Gingrich argues that there are different political parties advocating Islamophobia 
by going back to old myths and traditions and revitalizing them in the new contexts of 
migration. There are many incidents in Europe on history, where Islamophobia is used for 
instrumentalzing these incidents. For example, Islam was able to pose a real threat to 
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European powers during the Ottoman Empire.50 
To this point and to make use of the term Islamophobia by synthesizing it with the notion of 
populism, Farid Hafez, argues that while populism is about simplification, dichotomization 
and a duality, such as in the paradigm of Islamophobia, “confrontation and antagonism” is 
possible between the West – and Islam. In this sense, Islamophobia can play a role in the 
production of xenophobic affects. Those affects can be enforced and instrumentalized by 
populist actors in a form of populist Islamophobia51constructing Islam in opposition to the 
“good” West as a monolithic, static, homogenous, reactionary, and hostile. 
Islamophobia as dichotomizing stereotypical views of “bad” Islam vs. “good” West 
can play a role in the production of xenophobic affects in a form of populist 
Islamophobia 
Interestingly, the author compared several classical features of Islamophobia, as outlined in 
clash of civilization theory, Orientalism, nativism and populism. In doing so, Runnymede 
Trust report was useful in suggesting starting points for comparison in term of opened and 
closed views about Islam as follows: 
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Specific features of Islam-phobia in relation to theories  
Islam-phobia Clash of 
civilisation 
Orientalism Nativism Populism 
1. Monolithic / 
diverse 
  
A monolithic 
bloc, static 
and 
unresponsive 
to new 
realities 
Alien, other, 
static, 
primitive, 
hostile,  
incompatible 
with the West/ 
Christianity   
Alien, foreigner, 
different and 
immigrant 
Alien, 
foreigner, 
homogeneous 
with no 
internal 
differences, 
and hostile  
2. Separate / 
interacting 
 
Exclusionary 
culture 
Exclusionary 
geo- political 
block  
Exclusionary 
communities   
Exclusionary 
project  
3. Inferior / 
different 
Islam seen as 
different 
distinctively 
compared to 
the West  
Different and 
inferior to the 
West  
Distinctively 
different, but 
not deficient 
different 
compared to 
the West- 
Christianity 
4. Enemy / 
partner 
 
Islam seen as 
violent, 
aggressive, 
threatening, 
supportive of 
terrorism 
A constructed 
threat to the 
West- 
Christianity  
Feared of 
invasion or 
competition  
A threat to 
national 
security  
5. 
Manipulative / 
sincere 
A hostile 
culture  
A politicized, 
anti- 
imperialism 
religion  
A practiced faith 
and culture   
A politicized- 
militarized  
faith 
6. Criticism of 
West 
 rejected / 
considered 
Islam in 
opposition to 
the West and 
its criticisms 
of “the West” 
Incompatible 
with the West 
democracy 
and modernity  
Criticisms of 
“the West” and 
other cultures 
are considered 
upon specific 
Islam in 
opposition to 
the good West 
and Jude- 
Christianity   
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 rejected out of 
hand. 
elements    
7. 
Discrimination 
Defended / 
criticized: The 
author argues 
that both 
views do exist 
at varied 
degrees with 
specific 
emphasis 
 
A dichotomy 
debate  is 
used to fuel 
cultural 
differences 
internally and 
to justify “war 
on terror” 
abroad driven 
often by 
culture 
Debates over 
Islam support 
efforts to 
combat 
exclusion of 
Muslims and 
wars against 
Muslims 
abroad 
whereby 
culture, 
religion, race, 
and power 
relation 
differences 
are key 
factors 
Debates over 
discriminatory 
practices against 
Muslims is 
combined and 
sometimes 
driven by 
religion, race, 
language, power 
relation in term 
of economy and 
education 
Anti- Islam 
theses is used 
to justify 
discriminatory 
practices 
driven by 
religion, 
nationalism, 
race, and 
national 
security  
8. 
Islamophobia 
seen as 
natural / 
problematic  
Hostility and 
clashes with 
Islam is 
accepted as 
natural and 
“normal” 
Critical views 
of Islam are 
themselves 
Subjected to 
critique, lest 
they be 
inaccurate  
Natural and also 
problematic 
Natural and 
also 
problematic 
Reflections 
It is worth noting firstly that most of the features of Islamophobia have much more in 
common with the closed views about Islam than the opened views. A threat, alien, other, 
foreigner, hostile, terrorist, violent, static, monolithic, backward, primitive, different, inferior 
are quoted often. 
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- The driving force of Islamophobia is from religion (Islam) as much as from race, 
culture, linguistics, economy, and nationalism, and even psychology in term of fear and 
superiority/inferiority complex, and national security (and at varied degrees). 
- It should be noted that those features are presented in a stereotypical fashion that is 
mostly oversimplifying, generalizing, dichotomizing and sometimes imagining and/or 
constructing. In other words, the West - Islam dichotomy has played a role in dividing the 
worldviews. 
- In this sense, Islam gets converted into not only the basis of anti- West, anti- 
modernism and anti- civilization but also the primitive and yet aggressive and terrorist other 
all in one. 
 
However, the author finds the orientalism concept more helpful in explaining Islamophobia in 
the EU boycott policy of Hamas. First of all, and in connection to Foucault, Orientalism as a 
discourse had been a specific form of knowledge of the premises, rules, conventions and 
claims to truth produced by the power relations that western states exercised (or sought to 
exercise) over the (Orient) in this case, Islam. This specific knowledge is related to EU 
policymaking over time towards Palestine and eventually Hamas. Secondly, Israel has made 
great efforts to delegitimize any critique of the Zionist project of colonizing Palestine, 
presenting any Palestinian rejection of the state of Israel as a hatred derived from culture and 
religion, namely, Islam. Consequently, this dilutes any rational behaviour against colonisation 
by the Palestinians.  This is argued by Said as well as by Massad (2000)52 and others. Further, 
today’s Orientalist terrorist discourse is a part of a Western tradition of vilification of critics 
and opponents as an instrument that sustains neo-colonial interests. This particular point is 
strongly debated by Strindberg and Wärn (2005) while giving the example of Hamas.53 
 
Therefore, Orientalism not only deals with the universal problem of representation. This is in 
terms of West- East/ Islam or that of the EU- Hamas, which is an important issue in defining 
Islamophobia as explored earlier. More importantly, it contributes to the question of power in 
the EU policy towards Palestine whereby it is intimately entangled with distinct colonial 
histories and imperial institutions of power. This is more explored and discussed in the EU 
policy abstract and operationalized models. 
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3.2 Islamophobia compared 
This section draws attention to the comparisons between Islamophobia and Anti- Semitism 
made by some authors worldwide in order to proceed further in defining Islamophobia in 
foreign policy. The author finds it useful to do the comparison for the following reasons: 
Firstly, due to the long history and rich debate about anti- Semitism in Europe. Secondly, the 
rise of both anti- Semitism and Islamophobia in the aftermath of Sep.11th. Thirdly, the 
international attempts to place Islamophobia as well as anti- Semitism as a form of religion 
based- discrimination. Finally, it is a step forward to explore the connection and interaction 
between Christian Europe, Islam as well as Judaism. For example, this research examines 
Islamophobia in the EU boycott policy of Hamas in a country perceived to be predominantly 
Muslim, namely Palestine. Palestine is also occupied by a self- defined Jewish state, namely 
Israel. 
In this sense, the author considers the Swedish national council for crime prevention detailed 
annual report.54 Firstly, it included what can be linked to the definition of Islamophobia as 
well as anti Semitism. Secondly, the report did not only show the increase of Islamophobic 
crimes since 2001 but also underlined a connection between international terrorism and the 
political development in the Middle East. Thirdly, it also showed that Jews and Muslims have 
suffered from discrimination and exclusion in Europe and both have a common enemy in 
right-wing Christian fundamentalism. 
Nevertheless, Matti Bunzl argues that specific historical trajectories must be considered when 
comparing Islamophobia to Anti- Semitism. For example, anti-Semitism was at its peak as 
part of the project of modernity in the late 19th century, culminating in a genocidal fantasy of 
creating racially pure nation-states in the mid 20th century. Today, even right-wingers in 
today’s secular Europe have abandoned this project. Parties in different European countries 
have disavowed Nazi ideology and court Jewish voters. By now, the memorialization of the 
holocaust is a primary feature of the EU and European identity. In a vivid form, Europe 
defines itself as a Judeo- Christian entity.55 
From a different perspective, Göran (2009) argues that some authors such as Cesarani seem to 
                                                           
54 Klingspore and Molarin (2009), the English summary of Bra report no 2009:10, p50-51. It can be retrieved 
from,  http://www.bra.se/extra/faq/?module_instance=2&action=question_show&id=521&category_id=9 
55 Bunzl, Matti, (2007), Anti-Semitism and Islamophobia: Hatreds Old and New in Europe. Chicago: Prickly 
Paradigm Press/University of Chicago Press. Also, Bunzl published in a special issue of the American 
Ethnologist, Vol. 32, No. 4, November (2005), p533- 537. Both publications include discussion, comments on 
anti Semitism and Islamophobia. See also, Bangstand, Sindre and Bunzl, Matti, (2010), “Anthropologists Are 
Talking About Islamophobia and Anti- Semitism in the New Europe”, 2009 Routledge Journals, Taylor and 
Francis, ETHNOS, Vol. 00:0, MONTH 2010, p1-16 
Theories 
 
36   
 
neglect reports that documents Islamophobia in the EU and that Muslims are suffering from 
discrimination and anti- Muslim attitudes in contemporary western societies. He also noted 
that Cesarani seems comfortable with the EU anti- discrimination laws that prohibit the rise 
of any ideology to discriminate, imprison, and murder people on ethnic, religious or 
ideological grounds.56 However, Cesarani is also well aware that there are gaps between what 
the laws stipulate and what the actual situation is for many people of a Muslim cultural 
background.57 
The author finds it more useful to identify starting points for comparison between 
Islamophobia and anti- Semitism. Related views of scholars involved in comparison are 
briefly presented in the table below: 
Brief summarized comparison between anti Semitism and Islamophobia 
Dimensions  Anti- Semitism  Islamophobia  
Time: 
Old phenomenon/ New 
forms 
 
 
Old phenomenon! 
- Anti- Semitism is far 
older than anti- Islam for 
Jews had a central place in 
Europe’s Christian culture 
in a way that Muslim 
never did. 
- It is transformed into an 
“ideology in reserve”. For 
example, integration into 
the EU might influence 
local attitudes but it does 
not determine them. 58  
Old phenomenon! 
- A phenomenon of at 
least the “late 20th or 21st 
century” in particular and 
it goes even back further 
in history. 
- Anti Islam theme might 
be transformed into the 
identification of a new 
variant of Islamophobia in 
the present. 59 
 
Driving forces: 
Other forces such as 
By race! 
Anti-Semitism took its 
By religion! 
Islamophobia is not 
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culture, nationalism, 
linguistics, economy and 
national security are also 
debated at varied degrees 
and sometimes in 
combination to race and 
religion  
peak as part against 
modernity late 19th century 
culminating in a genocidal 
fantasy of creating racially 
pure nation states mid 20th 
century.60   
analyzed thoroughly in 
most European countries 
whereby so called 
practicing/ believing 
Muslims are represented 
as all people of Muslim 
background.61 
- Islamophobia may be in 
fact a variant of race 
thinking.62 
Assimilation/  Integration: 
It is debated differently in 
a different geopolitical-
historical context. 
Whether Jews can be good 
Germans, Austrian, etc.? 
 
 
Whether Muslims can be 
good Europeans? 
 
Present political moment  By now, the protection of 
the Jews and the 
memorialization of the 
Holocaust have become 
defining features of the 
European Union. 
- (Europe defines itself as 
a Judeo- Christian 
entity).63 
 
Anti Islamic theme in 
Europe is related to a 
project of solidifying a 
European identity by 
portraying Islam as 
dangerous other. One 
repeatedly given example 
as a critical expression of 
identity is the rejection of 
the Turkish accession as a 
Muslim country to the EU   
Local vs. Global: 
Particularly when it comes 
to the Middle Eastern 
Israel is seen as: 
- A Jewish state by even 
Islam is seen as: 
A threat to Israel and anti- 
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relations with Western 
powers. 
its own definition. 
- It is not seen first and 
foremost as a European 
colony but also as the 
unwavering ally of the 
United States as a global 
superpower. 64  
Semite. 
- An enemy to the western 
powers with negative and 
essentialistic images and 
often as a parcel of 
Western identity 
constructions. 65 
3.3.1 Driving forces 
With more focus on Islamophobia, the comparisons made between anti- Semitism and 
Islamophobia are directed towards the driving forces, eventually, to reach a definition more 
relevant to Islamophobia in the EU foreign policy. 
3.3.1.1 Race 
Nina Glick Schiller highlights the interplay between a number of factors influencing the new 
variant of Islamophobia. She argued that it is urgent to note just what is happening in Europe 
and elsewhere around the question of race. On the one hand, the crimes of Nazism are 
condemned; on the other hand, other kinds of discrimination based on essentialized cultural 
difference often go unnoticed in ways that reintroduce and normalize processes of 
racialization. For example, it is failing to connect the growing attacks on Muslims to the 
persistence and revival of ideas of essential racial difference.66 
3.3.1.2 Religion 
As religion is concerned, Christianity was not vanquished as a category of identity by the 
growth of nation-states but went hand in hand with the penetration of capitalism, modernity, 
and nationalism. Most people in Europe may not be religious, but acknowledging Christianity 
within the EU constitution was hotly debated rather than readily dismissed as an outdated and 
discredited idea.67 
3.3.1.3 Nationalism 
Dorms of Christian identity mixed with essentialized nationalism and its racialized logic of 
blood and belonging, Schiller (2005) argues, is alive and well in Europe. These complex 
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modes of belonging must be understood within the context of a generalized sense of 
insecurity. All contribute to the legitimization of old and new instruments of state repression 
in the name of the need to safeguard “national security”. Therefore, the campaign against 
Islamic bodies is part and parcel of the current resurrection in many European states of 
nation-state building projects constructed on the basis of racialized concepts of culturally 
homogenous nations- whose cultural commonality is singled out by physical appearance. 68 
3.3.1.4 Assimilation and integration 
Göran, (2009) argues that Muslims who adapt integration and assimilation projects do so only 
because of specific local and national ideologies and political discourses. For example British 
multicultural policy is different from that of France or Germany or Sweden.  It is therefore 
unlikely that immigrants of different Muslim cultural backgrounds will have similar attitudes 
towards assimilation and integration policies.   It is more plausible that they directly or 
indirectly have adjusted to the expectations of the political system.69 
However, Abduljalil Sajid, (2005) argues that Islamophobia is heightened by one contextual 
factor. Namely, a high proportion of refugees and people seeking asylum are Muslims. 
Demonization of refugees is therefore frequently a coded attack against Muslims, for the 
worlds “Muslim”, “asylum seeker”, and “refugee” and “immigrant” become conflated in the 
popular imagination. The common experiences of immigrant communities of unemployment, 
rejection, alienation, and violence have combined with Islamophobia to make integration 
particularly difficult.70 To that point, instead of arguing that Muslims are unwilling to 
assimilate (a position that some Muslims of course also embrace) that they do not want to 
become British or Swedish, it is more fruitful to ask if the large majority of Muslim 
immigrants have a real chance to become integrated into the society or are they excluded by 
discrimination and xenophobia. 
3.3.1.5 War on Terror 
War on terror is used to increase dramatically the ability of the state to control and spy on its 
citizenry. Islam that is feared is an embedded one. It is increasingly confined as a dual legal 
system that denies citizen rights to those racialized as outside of the culturally- racially-
homogenous nation. This is on the ground that such persons may in the future be linked to 
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some form of terrorist or anti- democratic activities.71 On the other hand, she argued that 
mainstream Christians see members of the “free churches” as fanatical, but state security 
agencies do not categorize, label, spy on, or deny citizenship to members of such 
organizations the way they do members of Muslim organizations, who because of their 
religious values alone are declared a threat to the constitution. German law differentiates 
between good and bad Muslim organizations but it does not distinguish between good and bad 
Christian organizations.72 
Furthermore, in a study carried out by CEPS,73 it is found that the war on terror is also 
perceived as a war on Islam with regard to various conflict situations around the world, 
including the Israel- Palestine conflict. Abduljalil Sajid argues that EU foreign policy seems 
to side with non- Muslims against Muslims, agrees with the view that the terms “Muslims” 
and “terrorists” are synonymous and that for example the UK government supports Israel 
against the Palestinians. Such perceptions of UK foreign policy may or may not be accurate. 
The point is that they help fashion the lens through which events are interpreted- not only by 
Muslims but by non- Muslims, too.74 
3.3.1.6 Political discourses/efforts 
Currently, according to Abduljalil (2005), there are two broad perspectives that dominate 
discussions about Islam in the EU; those on the right who argue that the basis of European 
culture and civilization is Christianity.  These people claim that Islam is external and even 
antithetical to the culture of the EU. Those on the left argue that what makes Europe special is 
its secular, democratic and humanitarian values. Despite this universalistic approach that 
dissenters Christianity, leftists often critique certain Islamic practices such as veiling and 
ritual slaughtering of animals.  They do this not because it is not Christian but because it 
presents a culture that promotes submission to religion, on that does not allow individuals to 
subscribe to secularist values. Also, there is a skeptical, secular and agnostic outlook with 
regard to all religions. This outlook is expressed in the media, perhaps particularly the left 
liberal media, and is opposed to all religions, not only to Islam.75 
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Therefore, despite the differing rationales, both the left and right in the EU, Öyzürex, Esra, 
(2005) argue that they adopt exclusionary stances against Muslims whether those Muslims 
are secular or religious.76 
3.3.2 Present Political moment 
There are tempting arguments made by a number of researchers that discuss how Jews and 
Muslims have suffered from discrimination and exclusion in Europe and that both have a 
common enemy in right-wing Christian fundamentalism. However, it is necessary to note that 
political parties in different European countries have disavowed Nazi ideology and court 
Jewish voters whereby no single party espouses anti- Semitism. However, these some of these 
same political parties can go into xenophobic and anti- Islamic directions. In this xenophobic 
and Islamophobic context, old myths are reconfigured and reassembled together with new 
elements and contexts for present purposes. 
 
This becomes apparent when one listens to influential members of the European press; 
politicians and social scientists describe Islamic residents of Europe as so radically different 
that they are inassimilable. Why else that these “frightening” others lack the capacity for 
change? Why else assume that the line of demarcation that allows one to detect this 
threatening difference is where one’s ancestors were born? The very concept of immutable 
difference, however, seems to build on a historical view of cultural difference as a product of 
biological essence. 
The assumption that the Islamic population can be recognized and denied rights and legal 
protections guaranteed to other citizens is a central part of the antiterrorist laws that have been 
instituted in various European states. It is also puzzling to not recognize the growth of 
nationalist rhetoric in all the states of the expanded European Union. The anti- immigrant 
sentiment that is so widespread in every state in Europe is one way that national identities are 
being maintained within the context of a broader European identity. 
Consequently, the EU and its rhetoric do not mark the end of the moment of nationalism on 
either the European or the world stage but rather the intersection of national, regional and 
global forces. The world continues to be divided up into nation- states, although ones of very 
unequal power and degrees of autonomy. 
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For example, what is happening at the level of localities, nation-states and Europe as a whole 
cannot be separated from the global economy and its political fault lines. To talk about 
Europe and Islamophobia without talking about more global forces is to miss the 
triangulation and contention of USA and European interests over sources of oil in the Middle 
East, Africa and central Asia. Recently discussions of globalization have revived and updated 
scholars’ understanding of imperialism. 
Islamophobia as a new variant of historical anti- Islam theme driven by different 
forces such as religion/s, nationalism, national security, and a racialized discourse 
about culture and a central part of instituted anti- terrorist laws.   
 
3.3.3 The question of Palestine 
Initially, this author draws on Matti’s Bunzl two views in terms of the “alarmist” and the 
“deniers,” that will be explored a bit later, arguing that anti- Semitic forms have different 
functions nowadays. In the past, it was associated with the right wing attacking the Jews so as 
to purify the nation of alien elements.  More recently, young Muslims who assault Jews do 
not aspire to that goal but rather as a political expression against events occurring in the 
Middle East. However, the author interplays the meanings of the two terms; the “alarmist” 
and the “deniers” differently as related to Islamophobia along the current political discourses. 
According to the author, the deniers of Islamophobia are those who downplay the 
manifestation of Islamophobia. For example, Cesarani presents data from Allen and Nielsen’s 
summary report on Islamophobia in the EU after September 11th, 2001 that seems to support 
the idea that there is hardly any Islamophobia in the European Union. The impression that 
Cesarani is underestimating the importance of Islamophobia is also strengthened when he 
continues by presenting data illustrating that anti- Semitism and anti- Jewish crimes have 
increased between 2000 and 2006. It is unfortunate that he has paid so little attention to 
contemporary literature on Islamophobia and reported incidents that can be linked to anti- 
Islam in Europe.77 
As for the alarmist, the author draws on Paul A. Silverstein’s elaboration on the two terms in 
his commentary on Matti Bunzl. He argues that the alarmists have a tendency to stress that 
there should be an incompatibility between Islam and Europe and that the growing number of 
Muslim cultural backgrounds will foster an Islamization of Europe. Further, any attempt to 
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make Muslims and Jews equal partners in the societies of Europe, for example by the 
establishment of Muslim umbrella organization that can function as interlocutors with 
European states, is wrong and should be ended as long as Muslims are unwilling to accept the 
state of Israel. Interestingly, the issue of the acceptance of Muslims in Europe being 
conditioned on their acceptance of the state of Israel is far more complicated. 
However, denying anti- Semitism will somehow, as elaborated by Silverstein, dilute a 
narrative of Jewish persecution that in certain versions justified the creation of the state of 
Israel and its continued existence. This way, the alarmist of anti- Semitism seem to be 
alarmed that an increased attention to European Muslim (alarming Islamophobia) or further 
attention to the discrimination of the (Palestinians) will break the Jewish monopoly on 
victimization, and hence threaten the recognized need for a Jewish state. In other words, they 
have a political interest on insisting on the ongoing threat of anti- Semitism in Europe, 
particularly by Muslims and in linking Muslim anti Semitism in Europe and the Middle East 
to the Palestinian struggle.78 This argument is also supported by Klug (2003).79 However, this 
linking between anti Semitic and Islamophobia according to John Bunzl is also dangerous. He 
argues that: 
“Branding hostilities emanating from Middle East automatically or intentionally as Anti-
Semitic is dangerous because doing so would banalize and trivialize genuine Anti-Semitism. 
It would, I suggest, also constitute a misjudgment of hostility by Muslims. Anti-Semitic 
prejudice and bigotry of the Christian-European variant is not driving the big majority of 
Muslims and not even the few perpetrators of violence. The hostility toward Jews is rather a 
regrettable by-product of more recent events in the Middle East and the world over.  A more 
detailed analysis would yield more specific results according to country, origins of 
immigrants, social status, area if residence, etc. To blame Non-Europeans of Anti-Semitism 
might also conform to mechanisms of projection and/or externalization”.80 
This way, anti- Semitism of the Christian- European variant does not drive Muslims behavior 
in Europe. Rather, it is the events in the Middle East and the suffering of Palestinians under 
the occupation of a self-defined Jewish state of Israel that instigates behaviors against Jews in 
Europe. Consequently, according to the author’s reading, a critical position of the state of 
Israel and its policies against the Palestinians amount to anti Semitism by Muslims and 
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Palestinians. Moreover, anti- Semitism in Europe is reduced to acts carried only by Muslims 
in Europe (Middle Eastern migrants of Muslim background in particular) while non- Muslim 
Europeans are portrayed to be no longer anti- Semitic. Extending the logic of this argument 
further, the new anti- Semite is not only a Muslim living in Europe - but also the anti- Semitic 
Muslims living in countries such as Iran and Palestine. 
In summary, whereas the deniers and the alarmists are different groups, neglecting one of the 
groups does not contribute to uncover, explain and understand the phenomenon of 
Islamophobia. Therefore, the author attempts to indentify both alarmist and deniers as related 
to Islamophobia along three categories in the following manner: 
Islamophobia in Europe 
Category The alarmist The deniers 
1.  who alarm (stress more) the 
manifestation of Islamophobia 
who deny (stress less) the 
manifestations of Islamophobia  
2.  who stress less on anti Semitism 
made by Muslims and 
(Palestinians) 
who stress more on anti Semitism 
made by Muslims and 
(Palestinians) 
3.  who stress more on the 
(Palestinian- Muslim) struggle 
who stress less on the (Palestinian- 
Muslim) struggle 
The author takes on the above three categories in identifying the alarmist and deniers of 
Islamophobia in connection with the definition of anti- Semitism and Islamophobia outlined 
by the Swedish National Council for Crime Prevention as follows:81 
The fear of, hostility or hate against Islam and Muslim population [Judaism or Jewish 
populations], which activates an anti- Islamic [anti- Jewish] reaction against Islam 
[Judaism], Muslim [Jewish] property, its institutions or an individual or persons that 
are perceived as Muslims [Jewish] or as a Muslim [Jews] representative.  
As for the first category, it involves the classic definition of Islamophobia [anti- Semitism] 
alarmists and deniers. 
However, John Bunzl brings attention to the Merriam- Webster International Dictionary 
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(2004) redefining the term “new anti- Semitism” in the following manner: 
1. Hostility towards Jews as a religious or racial minority group, often accompanied by 
social, political or economic discrimination. 
2. Opposition to Zionism 
3. Sympathy with opponents of Israel. 
Bunzl argues in his article “Perception and interest in the Israel/ Palestine Conflict”82 that the 
extended definition of anti- Semitism as outlined above in the points (B) and (C) was 
promoted by the Israeli establishment, official Jewish communities and American Jewish 
organizations! At times, the latter might have been additionally motivated after Sep. 11th by a 
desire to present Israel and the Jews as victims of “international Islamic terrorism”. Another 
element is Israel’s need to delegitimize critique, opposition or resistance that is older than the 
conflict over Palestine itself. Arab objection to the Zionist colonization of Palestine was 
“explained” for internal and external consumption not as a rational and predictable behavior 
but, as Bunzl argues, in the following manner as: 
“Groundless hatred deriving from culture, religion and – Anti-Semitism” 
Israeli leaders including Ben- Gurion tried to transfer the European articulation of anti-
Semitism to the Middle East. Even today we often hear that Israeli settlers or soldiers are not 
attacked because: 
“They represent an occupation regime but simply because they are Jews” 
A similar mechanism is used to attempt to delegitimize accusations in Europe against Israeli 
state policies. In a vicious circle then the diagnosis of a “New Anti-Semitism” is used to 
prove the justice of the Zionist cause: 
“Jews should leave Europe for a “safe haven” in Israel/Palestine” 
In contradiction, any meaningful definition of anti- Semitism follows number (A), i.e. 
hostility towards Jews “because” they are Jews irrespective of what they do or think leads to a 
conclusion that (B) and (C) could only be constructed as anti- Semitic if and when they are 
directed against Israel. To that point, Israel defines itself as State of the Jewish people 
officially. This is also because of the ascribed and stereotyped “Jewish” characteristics of this 
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state. So, according to Bunzl, it is not true that only anti- Semites associate Jews with Israel.83 
Further, Bowen argues that a debate is going on for example, in France about whether any 
anti- Zionist position inevitably contains elements of anti- Semitism to the extent that the 
issue is no longer Israel’s right to exist but the right to criticize Israel.84 
As for the second category of Islamophobia, it is related to the perpetrator of anti- Semitism. 
Muslims and Palestinians are of concern in this case. However, this category serves to explain 
the extended the definition of anti- Semitism. Nevertheless, it can be implied the other way 
around in relating the perpetrators of Islamophobia to the Jews in Europe and in Israel. 
Literature can indicate this tendency in both ways.85 In other words, there is Islamophobic 
actions carried out by some Jews in Europe and in Israel as well as an anti- Semitic actions 
made by some Muslims in Europe and in Palestine. This, however, leads to exclude the 
European type of non- Jewish Islamophobia and non- Muslim anti- Semitism. 
As for the third category of Islamophobia, it is a pressing necessity for Israel not only to 
justify its existence by placing a greater emphasis on anti- Semitism made by Muslims in 
Europe but also by reducing or even denying the Palestinian struggle. Again, it can be 
implied the other way around by stressing more on the Israeli struggle. 
3.3.3.1 The Influential factors in the EU policy 
The author argues that an incomplete analysis of Islamophobia and anti- Semitism in Europe 
plays a role in determining the extent to which the EU policy is pro- Israel or pro- Palestine.  
For example, a higher manifestation of anti- Semitism in Europe might determine a pro- Israel 
EU position. In the other direction, it is questionable whether a higher manifestation of 
Islamophobia in Europe might determine a pro- Palestine EU position or not. 
However, a new variant of anti- Semitism extends the classical definition of anti- Semitism 
and implies further two more definitions, namely, opposition to Zionism and sympathy with 
opponents of Israel. The extended definitions of anti-Semitism, however, have no parallel 
definitions for Islamophobia. 
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Taking this on, the author suggests a line of analysis related to the EU foreign policy towards 
Israel- Palestine with two ends, one is pro- Palestine and the other is pro- Israel in the 
following manner. 
EU Foreign Policy 
Pro- Israel Pro Palestine 
a higher manifestation of anti Semitism  a higher manifestation of Islamophobia 
stressing more on anti Semitism made by 
Muslims in Europe and in Palestine 
stressing more on Islamophobia made by 
Jews in Europe and in Israel 
stressing more on the Jewish struggle  stressing more on Palestinian struggle 
In determining the extent of which the EU is willing and in fact pro- Israel or pro- Palestine, 
it is important to explore the contextual factors influencing the EU foreign policy towards 
Palestine. 
3.3.3.1.1 Psychology 
Fear and prejudice of the other (Muslim) in Europe is fueled by conspiracy theories. Some 
parties in Europe are proposing the theory that Muslims are striving for world domination or 
Europe Islamization. Fear and prejudice as mentioned earlier involve condescension towards 
Islam, colonialism and post war hatreds and ordinary racism (black Africans have harder time 
sometimes than northern Africans do for example, regardless of their religious affiliation). 
Psychology factor in Europe is also a crucial factor in the Israel- Palestine conflict. To a 
certain extent, it determines whether the EU is pro- Israel or pro- Palestine for the relationship 
evolves from European feelings of guilt towards the Jews because of European Christian anti-
Semitism that culminated in the Holocaust. Further, a psychoanalytic concept of projection 
“attribution of one’s own attitudes, feelings, or memories to others” plays a role in projecting 
old hatred and anti- Semites in Europe on Arabs- Palestinians and Muslims.86 It is disturbing 
though to describe it new- anti-Semitism in an attempt to deny old traditional hostility by 
projecting it on non- Europeans, currently, Hamas. 
In another direction, there is the feeling of sympathy in Europe with the occupied 
Palestinians. This can be viewed for example in the EU humanitarian assistance at largest to 
Palestine and European solidarity movements. 
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3.3.3.1.2 Political discourses/efforts 
Some scholars in the West have studied and depicted Islam, focusing on how the East/ West 
dichotomy came to be an important way to divide the world. As well, power relations have 
influenced scholarly knowledge.87 As shown in Orientalism, many of today’s critical issues in 
respect to Islam and foreign policy are related to broader historical, political and intellectual 
contexts. More specifically, Said argues that Orientalism had been produced by certain power 
relation which western states exercised (or sought to exercise) over the (Orient). Furthermore, 
“no one writing, thinking or acting on the Orient could do so without taking account of the 
limitation on thought and action inspired by Orientalism.”  Many Europeans did not need 
Samuel Huntington to feel as they do towards Muslims, and the whole complex of anti- 
Islamic sentiments is far older in history. 
However, in a post- Cold War climate where the clash of civilization theory has been widely 
accepted and when the atrocity of Sep.11th and subsequent attacks in Europe have been 
attributed to Islam, a climate has been created where Muslims have been stigmatized 
collectively in and out of Europe. For example, Al- Qaida has erroneously come to serve as 
an explanatory matrix for all of the heterogeneous Islamic militant groups including Hamas. 
3.3.3.1.3 Race and culture 
Race, sometimes combined with culture, continues to play an important role within individual 
European states.  The former is seen in the fear of demographic decline of the white 
European. The latter, according to Abduljalil, is seen in the fear of Islamizing Europe – if not 
by the old fear of Muslim force, then by the present fear of Muslim immigration irrespective 
to the wide range of racial and cultural backgrounds of Muslims.88 In other words, this 
campaign against Islam is constructed on the basis of racialized concepts of culturally 
homogenous nations- whose common culture is singled by the physical appearance even 
though it is very difficult to distinguish between anti- Arab racism from the fear of Islam. 
It is important to understand that concepts of racialized difference can persist and are 
sometimes reinvigorated. The concept of race is not only modern but also continues to remain 
deeply embedded within the concept of the Jewish people. A form of racialized thinking 
underlines European acceptance of the Zionist project in Israel in ways that pave the way for 
other processes of racialization. 
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According to Bowen, today’s racial theories have for at least two reasons been disputed. First, 
Muslims in Europe do not belong to the same race. Often, they are accepted as long they stay 
in their so called Muslim countries. Second, distinguishing anti- race from fear of Islam is 
difficult. For example, French attitudes towards Muslims are not new; they are deeply rooted 
in Algerian colonization in 1830 onward and the Algerian war  in 1954-62 and continuing 
violence in North Africa and elsewhere. 89 However, it seems as if the cultural theories and 
explanations (i.e. it is in his/her culture/ nature to behave and think in a certain way- it is 
because of he/she is a Muslim or a Kurd that behaves in a certain way) have grown more 
popular in recent years. 
Nevertheless, Schiller Further, 90argues that racialized difference has become the bedrock of 
citizenship laws of the state of Israel and of European support of Israel. Through its right of 
return, the state of Israel legitimates the ideological links between biology and nation. Israel 
law defines national belonging by descent. It is a biologically based logic that allows a person 
newly arrived from Brooklyn, New York, to claim the West Bank as his home land and 
defend it with arms while denying the rights of Palestinians born there (including the right of 
defense). It is a racially- based logic that justifies the collective punishment of Palestinians by 
imprisoning them in massive, walled ghettos. 
3.3.3.1.4 Religion 
While the Palestinian people compromise Jews [Samaritans], Christians and mostly Muslims, 
Palestine is often perceived to be a place with a Muslim majority where recently, Hamas is an 
elected “terrorist” movement, and also in conflict with, according to Bunzl, a self declared 
Jewish state of Israel. 91 This Western perception evokes deep emotion in Europe. 
As an example given by Schiller, German youth have explained that the reason why there is 
much cancer in Germany is because by following Hitler and killing millions of Jews, their 
ancestors made a pact with the devil.92 The only way to get free of the curse that continues 
through generations is to apologize to the Jews, support the state of Israel and accept Jesus. A 
broader network of organizations and websites preach support for the war on Islamic terror. 
Islam is often portrayed as the enemy. Often, heard the Christian crusades against the 
Muslims that evokes as a model for today. Spiritual warfare, military warfare, the war on 
terror, anti- Muslim crusaders are all part of a global fundamentalist Christian campaign. 
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3.3.3.1.5 Political efforts 
Political efforts play into the hands of a xenophobic politics. Islamophobic incidents in 
Europe are present and also enforced by political efforts. Further, this perception is carried out 
along an apocalyptic political discourse when political leaders talk about the struggle against 
evil and speak in the name of God and try to impose their perception of the good.93 
Political effort in generalizing negative assumption ignores domestic circumstances. This is in 
the case of firstly, in the presentation of right- wing of Muslims by assuming that Muslim 
immigrants are capable of turning the Christian continent into a Muslim one whereby, the 
status of Christians linking it to the Jews will be subordinated. Secondly, by assuming 
Muslim immigrants are less capable of integrating into Europe due to their culture, religion 
and race. Thirdly, the left-wing variation of Islamophobia assumes that Islam is a monolithic 
religion that does not allow for room for others from within.94 It also ignores reasons and 
tensions, which for example can explain outbreaks of violence in occupied Palestine much 
better than just the adherence to a certain religion. 
3.3.3.1.6 Realities 
Much research demonstrates that Muslim residents have the lowest levels of income, the 
highest levels of unemployment, receive the fewest health services, do poorly in school 
system and have the worst living conditions. Despite the variety among Muslim populations 
and European policies towards them, these findings are more or less valid for many members 
of the EU. 
Islamophobic incidents, including verbal and sometimes physical attacks against Muslims, 
are present throughout Europe; similar incidents such as these have also been carried out 
against Jews. This is not a new phenomenon. For some decades, these kinds of incidents have 
increased when there is high tension or violence in Israel-Palestine.95 A recent study shows 
that both anti- Semitism and Islamophobia are on the rise in Europe.96 Besides, a new anti- 
Semitism variant is increasingly ascribed to the Arabs and Muslims in the Middle East, of 
particular, in Palestine. 
However, John Bunzl argued that it is problematic to describe verbal and physical attacks 
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against Jews that have increased since 2000 in Europe as the new Anti- Semitism for two 
reasons: the suffix new implies the continuity and/or transformation of traditional hostility. In 
addition, this diagnosis ignores the objective situation of Jewish communities where the EU 
perceives itself after all as the antithesis to Nazism and the Holocaust. To that point, no state 
or relevant party has anti- Semitic platforms. Even right wing parties court Jewish candidates 
and see them as well as Israel as allies against Islamic threat. Moreover, Jews are seen as 
Europeans while Muslims are not manifested in memorials, museums and culture. Drawing 
on Bunzl own words, he says that Israel “is not in but from Europe”. 
3.3.3.1.7 Media efforts 
Ridiculing religion by the media in Europe appears to be even-handed, but since Muslims 
have less influence and less access to public platforms, attacks are far more undermining. In 
relation to Israel- Palestine, the mainstream media presents Israel as a modern state.  This is 
often in contrast to states where the primary religious practice is Islam.  Further, Jews are 
perceived as European, while Muslims (and Arabs) are perceived as the non- European, 
backward other.97 
Further, Israel’s self-defence against Palestinian “barbarism”, Arab aggression and Islamic 
terrorism, including Hamas, serves as powerful images of a non- civilised other that 
understands only brute force and repression.98 
3.3.3.1.8 Global events 
In the aftermath of September11th and consequent attacks in Europe, a growing number of 
individuals of Muslim cultural background suffered from anti- Muslim tendencies and 
Islamophobia in both Europe and the USA even though they were not involved in the attacks. 
Despite that, many Muslims organizations condemned the violence against innocent peoples 
in the name of Islam, many Muslims experienced that they were held responsible, that they 
had to explain and take a strong stance against actions even though they had nothing to do 
with the attacks.99 
The following war on terrorism launched by the USA has also had a negative effect on many 
individuals of a Muslim cultural background in Europe. As a consequence, Muslims often 
                                                           
97 Massad, Josef, the Post Colonial Colony: time, space and bodies in Palestine/ Israel in the persistence of the 
Palestinian Question, Routledge, NY, (2006),  p13-40 
98 Strindberg and Wärn, Realities of Resistance: Hizballah, the Palestinian Rejectionists, and al- Qa’ida 
Compared, Journal of Palestine studies, (Vol. XXX1V. no. 3, Spring, 2005) 
99 Muslims in the European Union: Muslims in the European Union, Discrimination and Islamophobia, (2006), 
European Monitoring Center on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC), 2006, p13-14 
Theories 
 
52   
 
suffer the negative stereotype of being constructed as so-called home-grown terrorists and the 
enemy from within. 
In a similar way, Jews have been attacked in both North Africa and Europe after the second 
intifada that was initiated after Ariel Sharon’s visit to the Temple Mount in Jerusalem, an area 
known to Muslims as al- Haram al Sharif, on September 28th, 2000. Afterward, the Israeli 
offensive against the Gaza Strip on 27th of December 2008, a growing number of Jews have 
felt and experienced increasing anti- Semitism in the West. Resembling what happened to 
many Muslims after September 11, Jews were attacked in Europe following the political 
development in the Middle East. More examples could easily be added to the list. It is clear 
that local ethnic, cultural and religious minorities are closely linked to global 
developments.100 
As the debate continues over Islamophobia, the author meanwhile suggests four qualities of 
Islamophobia that can be helpful in understanding how EU foreign policy is shaped. 
Subsequently, from this point onwards, Islamophobia is examined in term of : 
* “Patterns of prejudice based on socio- economic and educational grounds against 
Muslims” 
* “Patterns of prejudice that rests on the notion of a dichotomy between the good 
West- and bad Islam, mainly on the basis of religion, culture and race constructed 
differences” 
* “Patterns of prejudice fuelled by September 11th as a part of a Judeo- Christian 
campaign against Islamic terrorism” 
* “Patterns of prejudice rest on the notion of superiority of a European Jew to an 
Arab- Muslim Palestinian” 
Reflections 
- Disregarding any global dimensions in the analysis of Islamophobia is misleading. 
Could anyone denounce Islamophobia without raising broader questions about imperialism, 
capitalism and its embodied structures of power? These questions have a contemporary 
relevance; the dismissal of efforts to link Islamophobia, anti- Semitism, racism, 
fundamentalist Christianity, and critiques of capitalism deserves further refinement. 
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- Developments in Europe that have global resonances should be studied more carefully 
before passing a judgment on its significance and character. Equally important is to ask the 
question: who is saying what, when and why? In other words: an examination of the 
speaker’s motivation is crucial. 
- The European feeling of guilt due to the “awareness of European Christian anti- 
Semitism culminating in the Holocaust” is a key factor affecting the European emotions 
towards Israel- Palestine. Also, it is a crucial factor in determining the EU policy towards a 
space and people that evokes emotions because of concepts such as Holy Land, Judaism, 
Christianity and Islam. 
- Furthermore, it is a necessity not only to establish a common definition of 
Islamophobia that is accepted by academics but also, to establish a legitimate discourse that 
reflects realities in Israel- Palestine that is guided by a perspective of justice and takes 
historical responsibilities and power relations seriously into account. Such a discourse has to 
be distinguished from mechanisms of projection that use the drama in occupied Palestine in 
order to feed old hatreds or serve new identity constructions. 
- It is absurd to assume that either anti- Semitism or Islamophobia constitute a reason or 
even a justification because genuine anti- Semite or Islamophobe will use any pretext to 
demonstrate passion. Denial is also not the answer. Despite that one might fall into the logic 
of a highly emotive and dichotomized debate between the alarmist and the deniers, it is useful 
to see the two polarities while still recognizing the many others who lie in-between, such as 
those who see both anti- Semitism and anti- Islamic attacks as a forms of xenophobia. 
- The promoters of the new- anti Semitism differentiate it from earlier anti- Semitism 
often by (1) relating it to Muslims which in turn linked to Europe’s continuing efforts to 
colonize the Muslim world (or occupation of Palestine). This scenario produces at least three 
problems; firstly, it fails to distinguish between the attacks against Jews because they are 
Jews according to European classic anti-Semitism and the attacks against Jews as supporting 
and allied with the state of Israel (or Israelis). Secondly, it fails to distinguish how and to 
what extent today non- Muslim Europeans are perpetrators of anti- Semitic acts and on what 
bases. Thirdly, it fails to differentiate anti- Semitism in a more personal form than the 
institutionalized form. Is it a church/ mosque or state supported anti-Semitism or manifested 
in hate crimes in which individuals or small groups attack individual Jews or visibly Jewish 
symbols? 
- On the other way around, relating Islamophobia to Jews (Israelis) which in turn is 
linked to the Israeli conflict with the Muslim world and ongoing occupation of Palestine. In a 
similar way, this scenario is problematic. Firstly, it fails to distinguish between the attacks 
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against Muslims because they are Muslims and the attacks against Muslims as supporting 
stateless Palestine (or Palestinians). Secondly, it fails to distinguish how and to what extent 
today non- Jewish Europeans are perpetrators of Islamophobic acts and on what bases. 
Thirdly, it fails to differentiate Islamophobia as a more personal one from institutionalized 
one. Is it a church/ Synagogues or state supported Islamophobia or that manifested in hate 
crimes in which individuals or small groups attack individual Muslims (Palestinians) or 
visibly Islamic symbols? 
 
To reach a common understanding of a social phenomenon is very complex. For example, 
Muslims can easily understand an expression addressing Muslims as a blunt form of 
Islamophobia, while the critic can hold that his or her view or analysis of Islam is a correct 
and objective description of the real situation that reveals the true nature of Islam. Similarly, 
Jews can experience Muslims’ criticizing the state of Israel as being anti- Semitic while 
Muslims can argue that they are describing the true nature of the state of Israel. To diminish 
this problem, it is necessary to study the sayings (i.e. the statement, the text) in its historical 
and philosophical context and to analyze the EU contextual and power relations and to track 
down the intention (if possible) that motivates the expression made by the EU. How to 
describe social phenomena and come to a common understanding is generally a very difficult 
task, but the problem should however not be used as an excuse for avoiding precise 
definitions, on the contrary. 
With this critic in mind, it is also important to underline that political discourse has changed 
dramatically over the last decades in regard to Islam and immigration in particular. While no 
established political parties in Europe supports or articulates anti- Semitic opinions, it is 
evident that a growing number of right- wing parties are articulating stronger and stronger 
anti- foreign and anti- Muslim attitudes.101 The lesson to be leant from the heated debates is 
that it is necessary to defend the European constitution and its defense of human rights, 
freedom of religion and equality regardless of ethnic, cultural, political, sexual or religious 
affiliation. Instead of debating who is to blame or who is suffering the most, it is important to 
work out a definition that could be used for fighting all forms of discrimination in Europe and 
in the EU foreign policy no matter if it is related to Jews or Muslims. 
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3 The Deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian  
This chapter analyzes the manner in which the EU deployed its foreign policy around the 
2006 Palestinian elections with the question “how did the EU boycott of the elected Hamas 
representatives occur?” at its core. 
When answering this, one is tempted to echo the man in the Irish joke, when a visitor looking 
for Dublin asks him for directions, and he responds, “Well, I wouldn’t have started from 
here.” Nevertheless, one had to start from here. 
4.1 Setting the Context 
The focus of this section is placed on the socio- economic political background of the EU 
boycott of the elected Hamas representatives in 2006, particularly in the second Intifada 
which led to a sweeping victory of Hamas. Emphasis is placed on the second Intifada, 
because of the EU’s relations with only one actor in the conflict– Israel – and its lack of 
contact with the other – Hamas. 
It is worth stressing here, that the point of this section is to reveal the socio- economic and 
political background leading to the victory of Hamas in the election 
It is almost impossible to contextualize Palestinian socio- economic and political 
development, especially the boycott of the Hamas-elected government, without touching on 
the Israel- Palestine conflict, especially because Hamas has taken an increasingly active role 
in it.  This will allow for an informed discussion of the development on the ground in 
Palestine that led to Hamas’s sweeping victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary election. 
This socio- economic and political development is linked to (1) The failure to end the Israeli 
occupation of the Palestinian lands and people (2) the failure of the Oslo peace process and 
(3) the second Intifada and finally an (4) Introduction to Hamas. 
4.1.1 The failure to end the occupation 
Palestinian loss and frustration has never ended since the creation of Israel in 1948 against the 
will of the native populations. In creating Israel, the Palestinians lost around 78% of the 
territory of historic Palestine including the western part of Jerusalem. What remained were 
two separate pieces of land known as the West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the Gaza Strip 
along the Mediterranean Sea and bordering Egypt. Over 700,000 Palestinians were driven 
away from their land to neighboring countries and became refugees. The problem of refugees 
became a major problem in the Israel- Palestine conflict because of the growing numbers of 
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refugees over the generations, with the descendents totaling more than 6 million by the year 
2006. In 1967, Israel won another war and occupied the West Bank and the eastern part of 
Jerusalem that had been under Jordanian rule and the Gaza Strip which had been 
administrated by Egypt. In addition, Israel occupied the Syrian Golan heights in the north and 
the Egyptian Sinai in the south. For Palestinians, the losses were multiple. Israel forced 
another major transfer of Palestinian refugees, some of whom had been uprooted to the West 
Bank in the 1948 war were once again uprooted and became new refugees again due to this 
1967 war.102 
Two years prior to the 1967 war, Yasser Arafat and other Palestinian activists in the West 
Bank, in the Gaza Strip and in neighboring countries established Fateh- the Palestinian 
National Liberation Movement.  Fateh did not declare an ideological affiliation and had a 
secular outlook. Around the same time and together with other leftists’ factions, the 
Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) was established as a national umbrella for the 
Palestinian national struggle. From the mid 1960s- 1980s the PLO led the Palestinian national 
movement and embraced armed struggle. However, weakened Arab countries together with 
the newly established PLO failed in their military efforts to liberate Palestine. The position of 
the PLO was further weakened in the aftermath of the Gulf War, when the PLO sided 
politically with Iraq against the US- led coalition. After months of secret talks, in 1993, an 
initial agreement was reached between the PLO and Israel, namely, the Oslo agreement/s, 
eventually, the PLO made two historic concessions, in the following consequences:103  
1. It gave away its long term goal- the liberation of Palestine by recognizing Israel and its 
right to exist.  
2. It dropped the armed struggle for the sake of negotiations for an agreement that hoped to 
regain the West Bank, Gaza Strip and East Jerusalem and establish a Palestinian state by 
the 1967 borders.  
4.1.2 The failure of the Oslo agreements 
The opinion of the Palestinians differed widely in response to the Oslo agreements. Those 
who supported Oslo argued that it was the best deal the Palestinians could hope to achieve 
given the unfavorable conditions they faced and the imbalance in power relations propitious 
to Israel.  Those who opposed Oslo argued that it constituted surrender to Israel by officially 
recognizing the Israeli state and dropping the armed struggle without concrete gains.  In the 
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historical context of Israel receiving unreserved support from the international community, 
most particularly, the US, these same people also thought that Oslo was designed to prioritize 
Israeli demands over Palestinian demands during peace negotiations. 
Unlike the PLO, Hamas rejected negotiations with Israel. The PLO and other neighboring 
countries took up negotiations because they were mainly based on the condition that the right 
of Israel to exist be recognized. Hamas also readopted the old call for liberation of Palestine, 
as was the case with the PLO in the mid 1960s. The reasons for Hamas's opposition did not 
change during the eight years of the Oslo peace process. Hamas was not ready to recognize 
Israel while not gaining anything tangible in return, which would eventually lead to a viable 
Palestinian state. According to some pragmatic Hamas leaders, the recognition of Israel 
should serve the Palestinians during the negotiation process and could be spelled out at the 
end of the negotiation process but should not be a precondition to start the negotiations. Later 
on, the reality strengthened the opponents of the Oslo agreements. Thirteen years later, a 
viable Palestinian state seemed to be less realistic than at any time before.104 
In the process, and due to the vague decision-making structure of the Oslo agreements, the 
Palestinians were completely dependent upon the good will of the more powerful state of 
Israel. 
- Control over vital resources such as land and water in the OPT are either left to the 
Israeli side or referred to joint committees. The joint committees required consensus which 
effectively provided Israel with a veto power at a time when it was the Palestinians who 
needed to make changes and build up their state.      
- There was an absent outsider, preferably, a neutral and independent, arbitrator who 
could have ironed out some of the deficits of the Oslo agreements. For Palestinians and others 
who supported the Palestinians, it was also doubtful whether the US administration could be 
an honest broker. This is not only because it views Israel as a strategic partner and negotiates 
mainly on the basis of Israel’s security but also because it supplies Israel with military aid that 
is used against the Palestinians.105 
In theory: the Oslo agreements were divided into two phases: 
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1. A five- year interim phase meant to explore and test the competence of Palestinian self- 
rule and its ability to control “illegal” armed resistance, while at the same time not 
addressing any of the major Palestinian issues. This, if proved successful was to be 
followed by 
2. A second phase negotiation on a “final settlement” for major issues such as refugees, 
Jerusalem, borders and Israeli settlements. 
On November 8th , 1999, the Oslo final status negotiations began to deal with the five “red 
lines” set out by Barak: no return to the 1967 borders, a united Jerusalem as Israel's capital, no 
foreign army west of the Jordan valley, no return of Palestinian refugees to Israeli territories 
and most settlements to be absorbed by Israel. Thus, the peace process quickly became 
deadlocked. 
In principle: the Oslo agreements were based on the following three main principles: 
- The first is the mutual recognition between Israel and the PLO bringing the Palestinian 
National Authority (PNA) into being. This constituted a step that was for a long time 
considered to be a taboo by Israelis.  On the Palestinian side, in 1974 the PLO implicitly 
recognized Israel by abandoning its demand for a Palestinian state in a unified Palestine and 
instead calling for a national authority on any territory liberated from Israeli occupation. This 
was also spelled out in the Palestinian Declaration of Independence on November 15th , 1988 
in reference to the UN General Assembly partition resolution 181, and finally in the PLO 
Chairman Arafat’s speech in December, 1988 referring to UN Security Council Resolutions 
242 and 338 aiming to reach a comprehensive settlement among the parties concerned, 
including Israel.106 
- The second principle was marked not only by the limited territorial and administrative 
autonomy of the Palestinians but also the PNA was supposedly to take full responsibility for 
education, health and social services for all Palestinians in areas A, B, and C. As a result. 
while the West Bank and Gaza were to be viewed as one territorial unit and Palestinian police 
were supposedly to be deployed in area B, Israel freed itself from the cost of public services 
while retaining total territorial control over East Jerusalem  and partial control over the West 
Bank and the Gaza Strip.107  So handing over the administrative autonomy and financial 
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responsibility to the PNA appeared to be an Israeli goal in itself. The provision of security to 
Israel by a Palestinian police force added to the benefit Israel gained from the redeployment/ 
autonomy arrangement rather than a withdrawal/ autonomy that is often directed in a selective 
Israeli manner. 
- The third major principle of Oslo was the deferral of all critical issues to a final status 
negotiation. Those issues included the Palestinian water resources, the demarcation of 
borders, and most importantly the future of settlements in the OPT and annexed East 
Jerusalem and most controversially, the refugees’ right of return. Contrary to Olso, permanent 
status, “will commence as soon as possible but not later than the beginning of the third year of 
the interim period”108 turned out not to take place anyway. Up to that point, one can argue 
whether the rational per se was flawed or the flawed implementation of the Oslo agreements 
was the reason for its failure. 
From the Palestinian perspective, this postponing of major issues has been made deliberately 
by Israel so that the resulting confrontational disorder will fail to meet minimal requirements 
for the restitution of Palestinian rights. This argument can be further explored in a given 
example such as the settlements. The expansion of settlements and the continued development 
of an elaborate Israeli-only bypass road system throughout the West Bank and inside and 
around Jerusalem continued. From 1992- 1996, under the same Rabin and Peres Labor 
government that initiated and signed the Oslo agreements, the number of settlers in the West 
Bank grew by 49%. When the second intifada broke out in 2000, the number of settlers in the 
West Bank and Gaza reached 198,300 while in 2005, the number of settlers reached 
247,000.109 At the same time, the continued buildup of settlements and the expansion of the 
encroaching bypass roads created a situation where Palestinian lands were divided and cut up. 
This policy directly contradicted the spirit of the Oslo agreements’ suggestion- and only 
served to undermine any trust-building between Palestine and Israel. 
From the Israeli perspective, the Palestinians clearly failed to prove that they were fit to be 
peace partners. Thus, advancement could be jointly undertaken to solve the conflict, given 
that the Israelis were confronted by suicide attacks by Hamas, Islamic Jihad and individual 
cells that the PNA could not prevent, just as IDF was not able to prevent them. Despite 
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extremely limited control over Palestinian land and security, the full blame was placed on the 
PNA for the failure to stop attacks on Israel.110 
In consequence: the implementation of the Oslo agreements went hand in hand with 
strangling the Palestinian economy and the unprecedented rise in unemployment and poverty. 
A policy of closure was carried out by Israel in 1993 marking the beginning of a lasting 
policy that ultimately resulted in the building of the separation wall. For Israel, the wall 
prevents infiltration of Palestinian “terrorists” and stops suicide bombings in Israel. For 
Palestinians, the “Apartheid” wall is designed to de-facto annex more land of the OPT to 
Israel. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruled its illegality.111 However, the policy of 
closure and separation along Israeli defined lines has continued to have far reaching 
consequences up until today. The impact of such policy on the following Israeli measures 
created further Palestinian economic dependency on Israel as follows: 
- The Palestinian labor market. The number of legally employed Palestinian workers in 
Israel decreased in the first years of Oslo from 116,000 in 1992 to 51,000 in July 1997. 
Needless to say the number of illegal workers amounted to 1/3 of those workers who made 
the difficult choice on a daily basis whether to cross the checkpoints illegally or stay at home 
with no source of income. 
- Exports and imports. Almost 90% of Palestinian imports in 1986 came either from or 
via Israel. As for exports, 65% of exports from the West Bank and 85% from Gaza strip were 
exported to Israel. 
- The restriction of movement, the separation not only cut off the West Bank from Gaza 
Strip and created de facto a split of the two territorial entities. This is in contrary to the Oslo 
agreement but also the wall separated the annexed East Jerusalem and thus served to separate 
even more Palestinian land and people from each other. 
The international donor community pledged $2.4 billion in support of the Oslo agreements in 
a conference in Washington in October in 1993.112 As a result of the closure policy, these and 
other donor funds had, in spite of their large volume, to be reprogrammed to short term 
emergency measures that could not alleviate the negative impact of the closure policy. 
                                                           
110  Palestinian- Israeli Interim Agreement on the West Bank and Gaza Strip[Oslo II], Washington 28, 
September, (1995), Article XIII, 2a 
111 Vermonters for a just peace in Palestine/Israel,2004, (http://www.vtjp.org/background/wallreport9.htm ) 
112  Secretariat of the Local Aid Coordination Committee for Development Assistance in the West Bank and 
Gaza Strip, (1996), partners in peace, July1996, p5 
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian 
 
61   
 
As a result, the Oslo period was characterized by growing poverty, unemployment and 
frustration that manifested itself in violence. The mutual trust between Israelis and 
Palestinians that was supposed to be building up from the Oslo peace process never occurred.  
Finally, the failure of Oslo served to corroborate Hamas’s position from the beginning that 
peace negotiations with Israel were useless and this ultimately proved to be an impetus for the 
rise of Hamas as a political power in the OPT. This is largely synonymous with the ascent of 
Hamas during the second Intifada to political power- a process that also culminated in the 
2006 election. 
4.1.3 The Second Intifada 
With Ariel Sharon’s visit to the al Aqsa mosque on September 28th, 2000, the fate of the Oslo 
peace process was sealed.  Large demonstrations erupted the following day after Friday 
prayers. The response of the Israeli forces can be characterized as disproportionate, as stone 
throwing crowds met with snipers and rubber coated steel bullets. On September 29th, 2000, 
4 Palestinians were killed and more than 200 wounded. In contrast, 14 Israeli police officers 
were wounded by stone throwing. This singular event developed into a second Intifada with 
far more devastating consequences than the first one. In the following two days, another 15 
Palestinians were killed in the West Bank, among them 4 children.113  In Gaza, unarmed 
protesters were killed and injured every day. During the first three months of the second 
Intifada, 237 Palestinian civilians were killed by Israeli forces, among them 83 children. At 
the same time, Israeli settlers killed 6 Palestinian civilians, among them a 2-month-old baby. 
Moreover, 35 Palestinian policemen were killed. Inside Israel, 12 Israeli Arabs were killed 
during demonstrations in October 2000.114 
A few days later, it was the Palestinian mainly Fateh- affiliated groups that took the lead in 
exchanges of fire and shooting on the Israeli army and the settlers. Thus 18 Israeli settlers and 
19 soldiers were killed in the OPT during the three months.115 As a result of the high death 
toll, the character of the intifada changed from a popular Intifada to an armed struggle. 
Interestingly, Hamas abstained from becoming involved in the intifada in the beginning. Fateh 
was about to regain its image of being a resistance movement and increasing its popularity 
amongst Palestinians by confronting the Israeli occupation forces as Hamas had positioned 
itself during the whole Oslo agreements period. Over time, “gains” were being calculated by 
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assessing the losses inflicted on the enemy. After over two years of intifada, the death toll 
stands at approximately 600 Israelis and 2,000 Palestinians. The objectively higher number of 
Palestinian deaths led some Israelis to believe that they are “winning” the struggle. The 
relative “gains” made by Palestinians in terms of Israeli casualties mean to some Palestinians 
that the intifada is paying off. In the first intifada the ratio of casualties was approximately 
10:1, whereas in the second intifada, as a result of the suicide bombing, this ratio was lowered 
to 3:1. In many ways, then, body counts became the definition of success.116 
On March 28th, a suicide bomber blew himself up at a gas station close to Qalqilya killing 
himself and two Israelis.  This was the first suicide attack for which Hamas claimed 
responsibility since the outbreak of the second Intifada. More attacks followed in June, 
August, and December 2001. In the following year, the suicide bombings reached their peak 
with 220 Israelis killed in such attacks- 80 of them during Hamas suicide bombings.117 Hamas 
became well known for its suicide bombings and also for mortar attacks mainly on 
settlements inside Gaza Strip and later on for its trademark homemade Qassam rockets. 
Before his assassination in August 2003, a Hamas leader, namely, Ismail abu Shanab said: “I 
want to affirm that at the beginning of the Intifada, we in Hamas did not commit any acts of 
violence. Nothing. Israel, however, killed scores of Palestinian civilians” and “The 
Palestinians turned from a cat into a tiger, because they put us in a cage with no chance to 
move”.118 
At the same time, Barak applied repressive measures including bombing Palestinian police 
stations, re-invading Palestinian towns, villages and refugee camps and putting some under 
siege, destroying infrastructure and agricultural lands. After taking over office Sharon only 
intensified those measures and squeezed the Palestinians tighter. In the end, 2002 was marked 
as the deadliest year for Palestinians as 989 Palestinians were killed by Israeli forces in the 
OPT.119 Sharon’s political perspective was a long-term interim solution making a conscious 
decision not to negotiate with the Palestinian counterpart unless there was a complete end to 
violence, at time when ending violence based on political settlement should have been 
regarded as the aim of negotiations. He also took the opportunity to isolate the PNA Chairman 
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Arafat both politically and physically and in April 2002, the Israeli army re-invaded most of 
the West Bank and leveled the Jenin refugee camp during “Operation Defense Shield” 
arresting 7,000 Palestinians, and killing 497 Palestinians between March 1st andMay 7th, 2002, 
destroying 11 schools and vandalizing 9 others.120 Consequently, the second Intifada has far 
reaching negative impacts leading eventually to an in- viable Palestinian state based on the 
following factors: 
- Separation wall:121 It aimed at preventing any infiltration into Israel from beyond the 
“Green Line”. This wall is not built on Israel’s border and thereby de facto annexes more 
Palestinian land (7% of the West Bank) and cages in 290,000 Palestinians (including East 
Jerusalemites) finding themselves living between the wall and the ‘Green Line’ (see Map 4 in 
Annex A).122 Israel also isolated Palestinian population centers from one another by building 
electric fences around Areas A, restricting freedom of movement of individuals and goods 
and services. In this way, the Palestinian population of the West Bank is divided into 54 
enclaves separated by walls and checkpoints  
- Settlements: Israel has continued to expand settlements. Thus, there exists an internal 
form of separation in addition to the external one. There is the expanding network of 
settlements and highways connecting them, which are being built at an alarming pace. This is 
leading to the envelopment of East Jerusalem and its isolation from the rest of the West Bank 
as well as the separation of the northern parts from the southern parts of the West Bank. The 
present plans do not include withdrawal from the settlements. 
- Destruction of the PNA infrastructure. The infrastructure of the Palestinian Authority 
(PNA) has been progressively destroyed, marking a clear reversal along the path towards 
Palestinian statehood. A further exacerbation to the ability of the PNA to govern effectively is 
the withholding of Palestinian tax revenues collected by Israel. 
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- Reoccupation: Israel has also reoccupied the West Bank by military force.123 The 
reoccupation, devastating use of force, curfews, closures, checkpoint and human rights and 
humanitarian law violations, resulted not only in a rapidly rising number of civilian 
Palestinian casualties but also by mid 2002, the humanitarian situation according to UNSCO 
was as follows:124 
- A rise in the rate of unemployment to above 50% (370,000 workers) compared to 11% 
(71,000 workers) during the nine months of 2000. 
- A rise in the poverty rate defined as consumption of less than $2.10 per day/ per 
person by almost 300%. The poverty rate in Gaza Strip in particular is above 70%. 
- Approximately 42% of Gazans are entirely dependant on food aid and 70% have 
reduced the quality of the food they consume. 
- An average closure day is estimated to cost the local economy about $7 million. 
- Near bankruptcy of the Palestinian authority, and the possible collapse of municipal 
services. 
Nevertheless, Al Haq reports, that the Israeli occupying forces continue to subject the 
Palestinian civilian population to numerous measures that violate their fundamental human 
rights. For example, “extrajudicial killings and targeted assassinations, property destruction, 
movement restrictions, mass arrests and arbitrary detentions, torture and ill-treatment, forced 
transfer and deportation”, Al- Haq adds that those violations are perpetrated by the security 
forces with complete impunity and have led to “the emergence of a humanitarian crisis of 
rising proportions, including malnutrition and poverty”.125 
In this context, the Palestinians found themselves politically isolated and economically 
deprived. Consequently, Palestinians increased their support for Hamas. More Palestinians 
grew frustrated by the Israeli occupation. Furthermore, while Sharon was hailed as “a man of 
peace” by US- President Bush particularly in the aftermath of Operation Defense Shield, the 
Palestinians realized increasingly that they could not rely on international support. The feeling 
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of isolation further increased in the wake of the ICJ ruling of the illegality of the separation 
wall in July 2004 when no tangible measures against Israel ensued.126 
The mainstream Israeli narrative is that the Palestinians foolishly rejected the generous offers 
made by Barak at Camp David in July 2000 and opted for a violent strategy as an alternative 
means to reach the objective of a single state in historical Palestine. The Barak offers at Camp 
David can be criticized for not providing for a viable Palestinian state, notably because of a 
lack of contiguity between the north and south of the West Bank and Gaza. Yet this was later 
changed between Camp David and Taba in January 2001 (see Map 2 in Annex 1). More 
fundamentally, many Israelis regard Palestinian suicide attacks on civilians as a confirmation 
that the Palestinians were not striving for an end to the occupation, but were still determined 
to destroy the state of Israel itself. 127 The rhetoric of Hamas and Islamic Jihad and their rising 
support, especially among younger Palestinians, is cause for considerable concern and 
mistrust. Also, different messages can be heard from Islamic leaders and supporters, the 
consistent rhetorical line remains that Hamas has not abandoned the objective to liberate all of 
Palestine, i.e. the “Palestine from the river to the sea”.128 
However, according to the Mitchell report, it was only after the disproportionate use of Israeli 
force that the Palestinians increasingly endorsed violent means, including the suicide 
bombings. Despite this, for the majority of the Israeli population the suicide bombings within 
Israel’s 1948 frontiers confirm their most dreaded fears.129 The fact that many Palestinians 
doubt whether the extremist Islamic movements would retain public support following a two-
state solution did not sway the Israeli population. The struggle with the Palestinians has once 
again become an existential one justifying any and all means of attack and reprisal. The 
minimum level of public trust necessary to reach a negotiated deal has completely dissipated. 
As for the Palestinians, the Israeli violence in the second Intifada intensified 
disproportionately, causing Hamas to gain increasing support. The Islamic movements argued 
that in as far as “Israel only understands the language of force”; violence aimed at the greatest 
possible damage to Israel is the only means to achieve the end of occupation. Alternative 
approaches condemning suicide attacks as ethically repugnant and “war crimes”, as well as 
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counterproductive to the Palestinian cause, gained increasingly less sympathy in the light of 
Israeli actions when the greater the level of Palestinian violence, the greater the support for 
Israeli extreme right-wing views. This includes both secular and religious persons, who 
implicitly reject the notion of negotiations with the PNA and the end of conflict through a 
viable Palestinian state on the 1967 borders. 
Both societies but most critically the Palestinians, have suffered tremendously.  The 
Palestinian economy is in a state of collapse, the humanitarian situation in the occupied 
territories is disastrous, and exacerbated by the constant curfews and closures. The second 
Intifada and the segregation of the Palestinian communities both from Israel and from each 
other have dramatically increased the unemployment level to about 50%, leading to a 
situation in which approximately 60% live below the poverty line. In addition the curfews and 
closures have also prevented the smooth delivery of humanitarian aid through UNRWA and 
other agencies. 
4.1.3.1 Increased popularity of Hamas 
The economic collapse increased the popularity of Hamas and its wide supporting network 
penetrating almost every aspect of life in the OPT. Hamas was able to provide its services to 
Palestinians effectively at a time when the PNA was not able to provide effective relief and 
could hardly maintain its basic services due to increased demands and declining availability 
of funds. Nevertheless, the importance of the Hamas network is often overestimated for there 
are no accurate figures relating to Hamas’s overall annual budget. The figures are provided by 
different sources upon more or less substantiated estimates. Those estimates range between 
$25-30 million per year outside the OPT for ‘Dawa’ activities to $70-90 million per year. 
Even if this figure is accepted, it should be noted that this figure does not exceed, as an 
example, the Swedish International Development Agency annual budget for the Palestinian 
people. While its importance is inflated, it could not lessen absolute poverty or even prevent a 
slip of 60% of the Palestinian populations to below poverty level by mid 2002. 130 
Thus the macro level impact of Hamas’s welfare network is practically negligible; however, it 
has been highly appreciated by the Palestinians. Support through Dawa activities is usually 
not provided based on political or family affiliation (in perceived contrast to the PNA 
institution) and is perceived to be handled by clean hands (uncorrupted) and decent persons 
(also in contrast to PNA institution). Hamas, being outside the political institutions, has had 
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the additional advantage of not being obligated to provide such services to the Palestinians. 
They were voluntary services. The PNA, on the other hand, could hardly fulfill its basic 
functions and obligations. Thus Hamas did not fear any disappointment as anything it 
provided was appreciated. Also, Hamas could take the credit without incurring the blame of 
failing and in contrast to aid agencies Hamas did not have to bother about building up 
institutions and infrastructure.131 Its support went directly to people that were unconcerned 
with the issue of sustainability. Therefore, Hamas’ relatively small support contribution was 
highly tangible and visible. 
As Israel has withdrawn from the Gaza Strip unilaterally, without coordination with the PNA 
due to the “no partner” credo, the withdrawal has greatly strengthened Hamas and weakened 
Fateh and the PNA. Many Palestinians perceived that Israel was forced to withdraw due to 
Hamas’s continued pressure and attacks that made the Israeli presence in the Gaza Strip costly 
and led to loss of life. On the other hand, Abbas was weaker than before because of the 
unilateral nature of the Israeli decisions while Hamas was given more support and accorded 
more respect by Palestinians that translated into votes in the 2006 election. 
4.1.3.2 Decreased popularity of Fateh 
The second Intifada had so weakened and divided Fateh that it, too, found it difficult to 
accommodate Hamas and the other groups politically without calling into question the 
monopoly of authority and the position of interlocutor granted to them by Oslo. Throughout 
this period, Fateh was challenged by the following main issues: 
Firstly, Fateh failed to discuss the key issues of defining national objectives and the 
appropriate tools by which to achieve them. The leadership was required to pursue them with 
Hamas and the other factions for fear that it could unravel their special status as the 
“legitimate” authority. 
Secondly, the inability of any Fatah leader to do so was also, of course, bound up with the 
evolution of the movement itself. Fateh was having great difficulty in accommodating its own 
“younger” generation of leaders, let alone the other factions. Paradoxically, it was Hamas that 
was better positioned than Fateh with regard to leadership because it was respected by its 
young members and operated with a clear mandate. 
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Thirdly and more importantly, is the corruption of Fateh. Corruption was the attribute that 
came to mark Fateh top leaders, ministers and high ranking staff. As poverty and 
unemployment were rising, the high lifestyle of Fateh officials (sometimes referred to as the 
returnees) infuriated the public. The elections gave the public a chance to punish those 
officials.  For example, when Palestinians who voted for Hamas were asked about why they 
chose Hamas, 43.0% said that they voted for Hamas with the hope of ending corruption and 
18.8% voted for Hamas for religious reasons. Only 11.8% voted for Hamas for its political 
agenda.132 
With the erosion of legitimacy and popularity of Fateh, the power of Hamas manifested itself 
in victories in student union elections and local council and municipal elections. In the course 
of local elections, Hamas was able to capture important positions of Mayor in the West Bank 
and Gaza Strip. Thus, Hamas activists were elected either with an absolute majority or in 
coalition with the leftist PFLP against Fateh and Hamas became a dominating influential 
party at a local level. At this time, though, Hamas decided not to nominate a candidate for the 
presidential election. This decision was probably motivated by two reasons: first, Abbas, a 
Fatah candidate was supported by a majority and furthermore, the president of the PNA was 
at the forefront of dealing with unfruitful peace negotiations with Israel, something which 
Hamas was not eager to do. Following the presidential elections, the call for the Palestinian 
legislative election grew stronger. It is worth noting though, that elections had been overdue 
for a long time during Arafat's life time. Some argue that Arafat feared Fateh’s loss even 
earlier. 
4.1.3.3 Security 
How was it possible that Hamas, which had the trust of only 12% of the Palestinians in June 
2000133 and was listed as a terror organization by the EU and US, could have such a sweeping 
victory in January 2006 during a democratic election? Said reflected on the political 
development,134 more specifically, however, from the beginning of the second intifada until 
2006, Hamas’s political, social and military actions brought Palestinian voters to support this 
movement. In particular, polls confirm that Hamas’ strategy of suicide bombings was 
supported by Palestinians, reaching 72% in spring 2002 following Israel’s Operation Defense 
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Shield – though this figure decreased to 60% in April 2003.135 One can argue that the growing 
support of Palestinians for Hamas appears to be not only confined to socio- economic and 
political issues especially in the Gaza Strip that suffered a devastating situation on the ground, 
but also to growing feelings of isolation and insecurity. 
Up to that point, leading Hamas figures argued that “if there is no security for Palestinians, 
there will be no security for Israelis either”. Sheikh Yasin, one of Hamas’s original founders 
and also its undisputed spiritual leader, expounded on Hamas’s philosophy by saying “our 
main battle has always been against Israeli solders and settlers. The attacks inside Israel are 
operations we carry on in response to Israeli’s crimes against our people. They are not the 
strategy of our movement. Our strategy is to defend ourselves against an occupying army and 
settlers and settlement”.136 
Also, during the second Intifada, Hamas participated in the unilateral efforts of four de-
escalation initiatives (2nd of June 2nd –9th of Aug 9th, 2001, 16th December 16th- 17th January 
17th, 2002, 19th  September 19th –21st October 21st, 2002 and 29th June 29th- 19th August 19th, 
2003).  However, during these times when de-escalation was supposed to occur, the Israeli 
forces continued to kill Palestinians, make incursions into the OPT, and arrest Palestinians 
and demolish houses. It was noted in the last ceasefire in June 2003 that the number of 
Palestinian deaths caused by Israeli forces indeed decreased. However, in place of this, arrests 
of Palestinians increased four-fold and the Israeli “targeted killings” (assassinations) 
continued.137 This confirmed what Palestinians had already known for a long time: Israel was 
not able to truly commit to de-escalating the conflict. This provided Hamas with the 
justification to return to armed operations. 
There were, however, two other possible causes of the truce breakdowns: the failure of the 
international community to use these moments of de-escalation to develop a new political 
dynamic. Also, the failure to provide any feeling of “safety” to the Palestinians that could 
sustain the momentum towards complete ceasefire. In other words, the international 
community failed to deliver safety to the Palestinians. However, the renewed suicide 
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bombings with the collapse of a cease fire prompted the EU to list the whole of Hamas, 
including Izz al- din al Qassam, as a terror organization on the 11th September 11th, 2003.138 
In 2004, the Israeli government decided to liquidate the top political leadership of Hamas in 
the OPT. Thus, the spiritual leader and guiding figure of Hamas, Sheikh Yasin was 
assassinated in March 2004, and approximately one month later his successor Rantisi was to 
follow. The funerals brought thousands of Palestinians to the streets and did little to diminish 
support for Hamas. 
Contrary to expectations though, with the Israeli withdrawal from the Gaza Strip in August 
2005, the Director of the National Security Council confirmed: “a few months before 
disengagement we were sure that Hamas would escalate attacks to give the impression that 
Israel was retreating under fire. But Hamas chose the opposite strategy. The last seven days of 
withdrawal may be the most peaceful of the last five years”.139 However, aside from 
presenting Hamas itself as a winner during the Israeli withdrawal, the Gaza Strip remained a 
de facto entity encircled and controlled by Israel, with borders and cargo terminals opening 
only when Israel desired. 
Inside the Gaza Strip, chaos and anarchy increased, with armed militants and gangs taking 
control at a more rapid speed than before. At the same time, tensions between Fateh and 
Hamas increased leading to occasional clashes and providing a first glimpse of what was to 
follow. When the Palestinians were asked in March 2006 about the perceived priorities of the 
new Hamas government, 28.2% responded that solving unemployment and poverty problems 
would be the top priority; for 23% combating corruption came next , followed by 19.2% 
wanting an end to the security chaos. As for resisting the occupation, the wall, refugees and 
prisoners issues fared low in the priority list.140 
4.1.4 Hams’ rise to power 
The point here is to discuss the emergence of the Islamic Resistance Movement (Hamas) and 
its development in relevance to the Palestinian national struggle, moving towards the top 
leadership in the Palestinian political structure. 
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4.1.4.1 Hamas formation 
Islamic movements, both historically and currently, differ in their understanding and 
interpretation of Islam. The two distinguishing elements are the perceptions of different 
movements concerning the ends and the means. The ends denoted the extent to which politics 
is ingrained in Islam, while the means reflect the controversy on the use of violence to 
achieve the ends. The spectrum of interpretations tends to vacillate between two extremes. At 
one end, there is an understanding that efforts should be focused on morals and religious 
teachings away from politics and state making where accepted means are peaceful ones. To 
this end, a small group like al- Dawa believes only in spreading religious teaching and 
morality. Another group is Hizb al Tahrir whose politicization of religion is very strong and 
purely intellectual. It believes neither in violence nor in political participation in the existing 
systems. 
At the other end of the spectrum, there is another understanding of Islam that politicizes 
religion and renders it the ultimate judge in all aspects of life including politics. Here, there 
are groups such as al Qaeda which embrace violence wholeheartedly in their pursuit of their 
political aims. Along the spectrum, the Muslim Brotherhood occupies most of the center. It 
believes in politicized Islam and that Islamic states should be established with peaceful means 
as stressed by the movement founders in Egypt in 1930s. Over the decades however, splinter 
groups within the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Syria adopted violence and clashed with 
their governments. In the 1980s, some Muslim Brotherhood groups adhered to more peaceful 
means as was the case in Tunis.141 
In the spectrum Hamas stands between Muslim Brotherhood and al Qaeda but closer to the 
former than to the latter, by virtue of its unique specificity of using violence only against 
foreign occupying powers and not against national governments. Therefore, Hamas offers a 
contemporary case of an Islamic movement engaged in a liberation struggle against a foreign 
occupation. Islamic movements have been driven by various causes; the majority of which 
were focused on the corrupt regimes of their own countries. Other ‘globalised’ pan-Islamic 
movements have expanded their campaigns across geopolitical lines rejecting the notion of 
individual Muslim nation-states. Contrary to both, Hamas remained a nation-based political 
movement limiting its struggle to Palestine and fighting a foreign occupier. This is of 
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significance as it exposes a great misperception in the West that all Islamic movements can fit 
neatly into one single ‘terrorist’ category.142 
Hamas came into being officially on December 14th, 1987, declaring itself only a few days 
after the eruption of the first intifada- the Palestinian uprising, on December 8th. The decision 
to establish Hamas was taken a day after the first intifada and was in response to two 
opposing views on how Palestinians should move forward in confronting occupation. 
According to Hroub, it still remains a question to what extent the religious- political ideals 
constitute the make up of Hamas. At the highly politicized junctures of Hamas life, it was 
evident that  politics occupies a leading position. With the eruption of the second Intifada, the 
confrontational policy within Hamas gained a stronger position, the logic being that Hamas 
would suffer losses if it decided not to partake in the intifada equally with all the other 
Palestinian militant factions considering as well extremely difficult living conditions for 
ordinary Palestinians. It was the moment for creating Hamas in view to another growing 
rivalry with the Islamic Jihad, another Islamic movement in Palestine, to defend Palestinian 
citizens against occupation attacks. The very first incident which started the intifada was 
executed by the Islamic Jihad and this compelled the Muslim Brothers Movement to speed up 
its internal transformation.143 
Militarily, Hamas adopted the controversial tactic of suicide bombing to which its name 
became attached for the rest of the world. The first use of this tactic was in 1994, in retaliation 
for a massacre of Palestinians praying in a mosque in the Palestinian city of Hebron where a 
Jewish settler fired a machine gun upon the people praying and killed 29 of them. Hamas 
vowed to avenge this act and did so. Since then, all of Hamas’s attacks against Israeli civilians 
have been in retaliation for specific Israeli atrocities against Palestinian civilians. Although it 
is often argued that they are no more brutal than attacks Israelis perpetrated against 
Palestinians for decades, the suicide attacks have damaged the reputation of Hamas and the 
Palestinians worldwide – especially in the West. Hamas’ justification for these attacks goes 
like this (1) these operations are the exception to the rule and are only driven by the need to 
retaliate – ‘an eye for an eye.’ (2) To keep extending an offer to Israel by which civilians on 
both sides would be spared from being killed- Israel never accepted this offer. (3) Arguing 
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that Israeli society, as a whole, should pay the price of the occupation as much as Palestinian 
society pays the price for that occupation- suffering should be felt on both sides.144 
4.1.4.2 Hamas into elections 
In 2005, Hamas made historic decisions moving it firmly to the top of the Palestinian 
leadership. The movement decided to run for the Palestinian Legislative Council during 
elections in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Hamas’ decision to participate in the 2006 election 
was completely in opposition to its initial refusal to take part in the 1996 elections, as Hamas 
perceived these elections to be an outcome of a corrupt Oslo peace process. A spokesperson 
of the first Hamas government concedes: “many things have changed. Abbas believes in 
democracy and institutions and has allowed Hamas to become more involved”.145 
The justification for this can be explained in the following ways; firstly, the main ideological 
barrier, the de facto acceptance of the Oslo agreements was less relevant because pragmatic 
considerations had gained more weight. Abstaining from participation in the elections of 1996 
on the grounds that it would constitute an acceptance of Oslo was no longer relevant in 2005. 
The Oslo agreements were completely disregarded by Israel and by the Palestinians after five 
years of the Intifada. Secondly, the pragmatic doctrine in Hamas that favored participation in 
elections was achieved by gradually easing into politics by first participating only in local 
elections. The successful results of those local elections definitely backed Hamas’s activists 
who voiced their support for participation in the PNA. In contrast to 1996, Hamas could 
expect to become a strong opposition force in the Palestinian parliament.  Hamas had been 
progressing politically since the 2000 intifada and had become more confident of its own 
strength, particularly after winning almost two-thirds of the seats in the municipal elections in 
2005. Thirdly, the altered political climate after Arafat’s death given the results of the 
election. 
Anyway, Hamas’s participation in the elections had a profound impact on the nature of the 
movement, the Palestinian political scene and on the peace process at large. It would help 
politicize the movement at the expense of its well-known militarism. On March 12th, 2005,146 
Hamas announced its official decision to participate in the Parliamentary election, scheduled 
initially for July 2005 and later postponed to January 2006. 
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In the parliamentary election, Hamas benefited from having a high level of support because of 
its socio- economic work in helping the poor and supporting thousands of Palestinians along 
with a policy of political and military confrontation with Israel. This paid off considerably. 
On January 25th, 2006, Hamas won the election in the OPT, one that was widely accepted as a 
fair and democratic process. Indeed, Hamas won by a sweeping majority. Hamas won 76 
seats in the 132-member parliament. Fateh, the dominant force in Palestinian politics for four 
decades, won 43 seats, while 13 other seats went to smaller parties and independents. While 
many experts on the Palestinian issue had predicted a victory for Hamas, its large sweeping 
victory with a majority of seats surprised everyone including Hamas. 
It has often been argued that the reason Hamas won the elections was because (1) the 
Palestinian voters were tired of the Fateh-led PNA in almost all aspects. Not only in 
negotiating with Israel during the Oslo period but also internally with its day-to-day 
management of services to Palestinians.  In particular, there was wide belief that corruption 
and incompetence existed within the upper leadership of Fateh.  Also, (2) Fateh was held 
responsible for the negative socio- economic and political consequences the second Intifada. 
Hamas, on the other hand, steadily built a reputation as a non-corrupt, clean-handed party that 
could deliver better results to the Palestinian people.  Palestinians trusted Hamas to build 
hospitals and schools or provide social services far more than they had Fatah’s old guard.147 
Consequently, Hamas has reaped the benefits of devoted and honest work from the 
Palestinian people. 
Interestingly, a Palestinian Christian was appointed to the Hamas Cabinet as the Minister of 
Tourism.  In a way, it can be concluded that the vast number of people who voted for Hamas 
but were not actual members of Hamas suggested that the people were seeking a reform. 
4.2 The EU Policy towards OPT 
While focusing on the EU reaction to the run up, evolution and aftermath of the Hamas 
victory in the 2006 election, this section begins by setting the political, legal and policy 
context in which the EU’s reactions are constructed and pursued. It includes the Euro- 
Mediterranean Human Right Network report:148 (1) the EU common strategy in terms of the 
EU position and objectives, the EU declarations, and the human rights and international 
                                                           
147  Esther, Pan, “Implications of the Palestinian elections”, (http://www.cfr.org/publication/9687 ) 
148 Active but Acquiescent, the EU’s response to the Israeli military offensive in Gaza Strip, (2009), Euro- 
Mediterranean Human Right Network (EMHRN), Copenhagen, Denmark 
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian 
 
75   
 
humanitarian law obligations. (2) The EU instruments in terms of diplomacy, contractual 
relations and capacity building. 
4.2.1 The EU Common Strategy 
The EU position has developed over decades into a clear view on the Israeli- Palestinian 
conflict and its resolution. Specifically, it is officially, as mentioned earlier, a two- state 
solution leading to a final and comprehensive settlement of the conflict. It is based on the 
implementation of the road map, with the state of Israel and a democratically viable and 
sovereign Palestinian state along the 1967 borders with minor and mutually agreed 
adjustments if necessary, living side by side within secure and recognized borders and 
enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. This is in accordance with the UN Security 
Council Resolutions.149 This also includes a fair solution to the complex issue of Jerusalem, 
and a just, viable, realistic and agreed solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees as well 
as a solution to the Israeli- Syrian and Israeli- Lebanese paths along two wings: 
The first wing is securing Israeli and Palestinian rights to self- determination. The EU 
historically recognized Israel’s right to a statehood. As for the Palestinians, the EU articulated 
its position beginning with the EU support of self-determination in the 1980 Venice 
Declaration.150 By the end of the Oslo process, the EU advanced its support to a Palestinian 
state along with Israel’s security.151 The EU sees a need to address political, economic, and 
security issues simultaneously, wherever necessary by negotiations between the Israelis and 
the Palestinians. It recognizes that continued and comprehensive Palestinian reform is also 
necessary. The EU stresses the need, however for Palestinians to be confident in their 
institution- building efforts, which will lead to a viable and functioning state. 
The second wing is complying with international human rights and humanitarian law. The EU 
unreservedly condemns terrorists, violence and incitement. Terrorist attacks against Israel 
have no justification whatsoever and the EU has included Hamas, the Islamic Jihad and other 
armed Palestinian groups in its list of terrorist organizations. The EU recognizes Israel’s right 
to protect its citizens from those attacks but emphasizes that the Israeli government, in 
exercising this right, should act within international law and to take no action that aggravates 
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the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians. Most EU declarations on the 
conflict since the 1970s have condemned Palestinian acts of “terrorism”, while also 
condemning Israeli violations, for example, settlements constructions in the OPT. 
However, with the outbreak of the second intifada, the EU intensified its calls to a halt and a 
reversal of the settlement construction, and denounced the violation of human rights and 
humanitarian law, ranging from Palestinian suicide bombings to Israeli incursions, extra 
judicial killings, forms of collective punishment and the construction of the wall in the WB.152  
Condemnations of Israel’s military incursions and closure of Gaza as well as Hamas’ 
indiscriminate launching of rockets into Israeli towns have also been featured prominently in 
the EU declarations since the unilateral Israeli disengagement from Gaza Strip in 2005 and 
the political separation between the Hamas- controlled Gaza Strip and the PA Fateh 
controlled- WB in 2007.153 
4.2.1.1 Declarations 
The following EU declarations and ideas are regarded as milestones in the peace process and 
in developing relations with the parties: 
- The 1980 Venice document: it established the right to existence and to security of all states 
in the region, including Israel, and justice for all peoples, which implies the recognition of the 
legitimate rights of the Palestinian people.154 
- The 1999 Berlin document: it introduced the notion of a viable Palestinian state by saying 
that the European Union is convinced that the creation of a democratic, viable and peaceful 
sovereign Palestinian State on the basis of existing agreements and through negotiations 
would be the best guarantee of Israel’s security and Israel’s acceptance as an equal partner in 
the region.155 
- The 2002 Seville document: it is explicit on the expected solution to the conflict: A 
settlement can be achieved through negotiations and only negotiations. The objective is an 
end to the occupation and the early establishment of a democratic, viable, peaceful and 
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sovereign State of Palestine, on the basis of the 1967 borders, if necessary with minor 
adjustments agreed by the parties. The final result should be two states living side by side 
within secure and recognized borders enjoying normal relations with their neighbors. In this 
context, a fair solution should be found to the complex issue of Jerusalem, and a just, viable 
and agreed solution to the problem of the Palestinian refugees.156 
4.2.1.2 Obligations 
The EU polices towards Palestine are governed by a complex legal framework consisting of 
two main sets of norms, principles and norms pertaining to International Humanitarian Law 
(IHL) and International Human Rights Law (IHRL), and specific EU commitments and 
instruments that are of a binding or non- binding nature. 
The EU member states remain bound by their obligation under IHL and IHRL, such as those 
which are conventional in nature or customary. When considering member states’ obligations 
in the context of EU external relations, two types of obligations are relevant and play specific 
roles. Altogether, they serve as a comprehensive framework by which the EU and its 
members must deploy the instruments of their policy. 
Firstly, IHL lays down the states’ obligation in all circumstances to respect and ensure respect 
for IHL. This obligation has far reaching consequences with regard to the relations of the EU 
member states with a third state engaged in an armed conflict. This is in terms of respecting 
this body of norms, and also in taking all possible steps to ensure that IHL is respected by 
mainly Israel and the Palestinians. Furthermore, such obligation is imposed in all 
circumstances which means that member states of the EU cannot hide behind the parties of 
the conflict to avoid their own responsibilities.157 
In 2005, the UK presidency of the EU expressed the view that article 1 of the Geneva 
Convention obligation must remain with the parties to the conflict. This restrictive 
interpretation of the scope of the obligation was rejected by the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ) in the 2004 Advisory Opinion on the legal consequences of the construction of a wall in 
the OPT. It stated that every high contracting party to the convention, regardless of whether 
they are parties to the conflict or not, is bound by this obligation.158 This interpretation is also 
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well founded in the practice of states and international organizations, as well as doctrinal 
opinions. While there is no indication of concrete measures to be taken to put such obligations 
into effect,159 the framework of the EU policy offers important tools for member states to 
ensure their compliance. 
Secondly, the collective legal interest of ensuring compliance with fundamental norms has 
implications under general international law on state responsibility given Article 41 of the 
International Law Commission Articles on responsibility of states for internationally 
Wrongful Acts. 160 It clarifies that states shall cooperate to bring an end through lawful means 
to any serious or systematic breach of a norm of general international law; and no state shall 
recognize as lawful a situation created by such a breach nor render assistance in maintaining 
that situation.161 
4.2.1.3 Commitments 
Specific human rights commitments in the context of EU external relations are based on the 
general obligation contained in Article 6, Para. 2 of the Treaty on European Union (TEU). It 
states that the EU: 
“Shall respect fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention on Human 
Rights and as they result from constitutional traditions common to the member states, as 
general principles of Community law”162 
In a more programmatic manner, Article 177 para. 2 and 181 para.1 of the Treaty laying down 
such policies in the field of development, economic and financial cooperation shall contribute 
to the objective of respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms. In the same direction, 
Article 11 of the treaty holds that one of the EU’s common foreign and security policy 
objectives is to develop and to consolidate respect for fundamental human rights and 
freedoms. Although those commitments are laid down as objectives to be pursued, they also 
contribute in defining the EU policies’ legal framework, and keep the character of a binding 
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nature of the legal obligations. This way, the EU has implemented human rights 
conditionality in its relation with third countries.163 
As a result, the EU may offer benefits or may reserve the right to unilaterally withdraw such 
benefits due to a third country’s breach of a norm. In addition, the EU may resort to negative 
conditionality. The examples given are the restrictive measures or sanctions, in order to 
uphold respect for human rights, democracy and rule of law and good governance.164 
4.2.2 The EU Instruments 
In relation to the Israel- Palestine conflict and in order to contribute to the fulfillment of two 
states’ solutions concerning the respect of human rights and IHL, the EU has deployed its 
policy instruments as analyzed by the Euro- Mediterranean human rights network,165 under 
three major directions (1) diplomacy (2) contractual relations and (3) capacity building. 
4.2.2.1 Diplomacy 
Decision-making procedures require unanimity among the EU member states and the method 
of influence is  mostly that of socialization. Hence having determined unanimous common 
interests, the EU acts through awareness-raising, arguing, persuading and dialogue with the 
third country in the conflict, rather than by pressure and coercion. Further, the EU diplomatic 
role in the Middle East includes multilateral and unilateral initiatives. For example, following 
the 1991 Madrid conference, the EU multilateral diplomatic initiatives took the form of 
chairing the Regional Economic Development Working Group. In 1995 and in the context of 
Oslo, a multilateral forum intended to foster peace through functional cooperation in the 
Mediterranean, the EU launched the Euro- Mediterranean partnership (EMP). In 2008, the 
EMP was incorporated in the French- inspired Union for the Mediterranean (UFM), of which 
Israel, the PA and the Arab Mediterranean countries amongst others were members. Like the 
EMP, the UFM aimed to promote mutual interest and cooperation in specific policy domains. 
Most noticeably, it is the EU’s participation in the Quartet alongside the US, Russia, and the 
United Nations. 
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In the context of the Quartet, the EU has promoted several diplomatic initiatives such as the 
roadmap for peace166 under the 2002 Danish presidency, and the 2002-5 push for PA reform 
undertaken by the Quartet task force on Palestinian Reform. The EU has also staffed and 
financed Quartet initiatives such as the Quartet Envoy for disengagement in 2005-6 and the 
office of the Quartet Representatives since 2007. 
As for unilateral frameworks of action, it is the EU’s declaratory diplomacy and the roles of 
the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) High Representative Javier Solana and the 
EU Special Representative for the Middle East Peace Process (MEPP). Declaring diplomacy 
entails the issuing of public statements during meetings of the Council of Ministers and the 
European Council and in response to specific situations and events. They take the form of 
Council of Ministers or European Council conclusions or statements by the EU Presidency, 
the Troika (the CFSP High Representative, External Relations Commissioner and Presidency) 
or the CFSP High Representative. The purpose of these declarations is both to signal the 
Union’s collective position and to praise, shaming particular acts and actors. Declarations are 
pinpointed as forms of actions for the implementation of the EU’s Guidelines on Human 
rights and IHL.167 
As for the roles of the CFSP High Representative and the Special Representative for the 
MEPP, the High Representative acts in response to and in the context of particular diplomatic 
initiatives (e.g. road map, ceasefire talks). The special representative, however, (currently 
Marc Otte, previously Miguel Moratinos) is tasked with establishing contact with the two 
parties of conflict, promoting compliance with agreements, human rights and international 
law. EU diplomacy normally takes the lead, mainly during a specific crisis (e.g. the Israeli 
siege of the Church of the Nativity in 2002), rather than the overall mediation of the conflict, 
which remains firmly in the hands of the US.168 
4.2.2.2 Contractual relations 
Here decision-making is mixed- qualified majority and unanimity voting reflecting the mixed 
nature of agreements which the EU has concluded with the parties. Since the 1960s, the EU 
contractual ties with Israel- PLO/ PA have been progressively upgraded. Israel’s Association 
agreement which entered into force in 2000 is extensive and covers political dialogue, free 
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trade in industrial and select agricultural products, freedom of establishment, free movement 
of capital, the harmonization of regulatory frameworks as well as social and cultural 
cooperation.169 While far less developed than in the case of Israel, the PLO signed an Interim 
Association Agreement with the EU in 1997, providing for the partial liberalization of trade. 
However, as opposed to EU- Israel relations, the implementation of the EU- PLO agreement 
has been grossly ineffective due to Israel’s non-recognition of, and thus non-cooperation in 
the functioning of the agreement. Finally, both Israel and the PA have been included in the 
European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), with Action Plans having been published for both in 
2004. The implementation of the EU- Israel Action Plan has accelerated over the years, 
whereas the EU- PA Action plan remains largely a dead letter.170 
In the context of these contractual relations, the EU can rely on socialization, conditionality, 
and passive enforcement to pursue its objectives and induce compliance with human rights 
and IHL. However human rights embedded in contractual agreements have limited impact 
and the Commission and the Council have constantly refused to invoke ‘non- execution’ 
clauses to deal with ‘non-compliance’ with human rights in the EMP countries. 171  
Specifically, in the case of the EU- PA action plan, clear steps were spelled out in areas of 
democracy, human rights, the judiciary, fiscal transparency, the security sector and the 
administration. In the case of Israel, the action plan instead mentions: “facilitating efforts to 
resolve the Middle East conflict, strengthening the fight against terrorism and arms 
proliferation, promoting the respect for human rights, improving the dialogue between 
cultures and religions, cooperation in the fight against ant- Semitism, racism and 
xenophobia”. When it comes to international law, the action plan limits itself to stating that 
the EU and Israel would “work together to promote “the respect of human rights and 
international humanitarian law”.172 
4.2.2.3 Capacity building 
The last policy direction is the assistance to the Palestinians including both financial aid, 
primarily disbursed by the commission under the majority voting, as well a European Security 
and Defense Policy (ESDP), and missions deployed under the CFSP unanimously agreed to 
by the member states. Assistance can influence the Palestinians through capacity building and 
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conditionality. To the extent that the persistence and deterioration of the conflict is viewed as 
being due to inadequate ‘Palestinian’ capabilities, assistance can financially and technically 
support the build up of such capacities. Alternatively, the EU can engage in aid conditionality, 
including both negative conditionality and positive conditionality such as the suspension of 
aid to the Hamas government as well as positive conditionality such as the reform-related EU 
conditionality used particularly in the 2002-2005 period. 
EU aid to the Palestinians has been disbursed to support state building ‘survival’ and 
economic development ‘subsistence’, although and particularly since 2000, it has increasingly 
taken the form of humanitarian assistance and payments to cover the PA’s recurrent 
expenditure. For example, the average EU annual transfers to the Palestinians have risen 
exponentially, reaching almost 1 bn Euro in 2008 if member state contributions are included. 
In the context of the ESDP, the EU has been involved in border monitoring and capacity 
building in the security sector. Since 2005, practically since 2007, the EU Police Mission in 
the Palestinian Territories (EUPOL- COPPS) has provided civil police training and equipment 
and has engaged in the reconstruction of Palestinian security and judicial facilities. For 
example, prisons, courts, and police stations.173 
In November 2005, the US- brokered Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) and up 
until June 2007, the EU engaged in broader monitoring at the Rafah crossing174through its 
border monitoring mission EUBAM. While not having executive power over who could cross 
at Rafah, Israel, beyond retaining on indirect presence and control through its liaison office at 
Kerem Shalom, could also determine at will when and whether to let EUBAM function in 
practice by allowing or stopping EU monitors placed in Israel from reaching Rafah. In this 
way, Israel reserved the right to withdraw its consent to the border arrangement whereby the 
EUBAM had no power to ensure Israel’s respect for the terms of the AMA. The AMA, and 
EUBAM operating within it, did not ensure free access between Gaza strip and Egypt.175 
4.2.3 The EU Boycott Policy of Elected Hamas 
With regard to the Palestinian Parliamentary elections, on January 25th, 2006 the Quartet 
praised the electoral process that was free, fair and secure and called parties to respect the 
results of the elections and the outcome of the Palestinian constitutional process so it may 
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unfold into an atmosphere of calm and security. It also noted that the Palestinians voted for 
change in their aspiration for peace and statehood as articulated by President Abbas in his 
statement following the polls of the elections.176 
However, the EU was caught in the dilemma of either having to accept the democratic will of 
the Palestinian people and abide by their decision to elect Hamas or to join the Israeli efforts 
to bring down the Hamas government. Five days after the elections the Quartet decided to call 
upon the newly elected Hamas government to commit to three “principles”.177 
Specifically, on January 30th, 2006, the Quartet affirmed that a solution for the Israel- 
Palestine conflict should be negotiated as a two-state solution. Its view was that all members 
of a future Palestinian government must be committed to nonviolence, recognition of Israel, 
and acceptance of previous agreements and obligations including the Road Map. Further, the 
Quartet called upon the newly elected parliament to support a government committed to those 
principles as well as the rule of law, tolerance, reform and sound fiscal management. The two 
parties to the conflict were also reminded to avoid unilateral actions which would prejudice 
final status issues and reaffirmed its commitment to a just, comprehensive and lasting 
settlement to the Arab- Israeli conflict based upon UN Security Resolutions 242 and 338. 178 
The Quartet recalled its statement of January 30th on March 30th, 2006,179 and re-called the 
new Palestinian Government to commit itself to the three principles mentioned. 
Hamas refused to fully endorse the three conditions spelled out on January 30th, and in 
response the EU, along with the Quartet exerted strong conditionality on the PA by 
boycotting the government and withholding assistance.180 Further, the international 
community froze international bank transactions. Israel halted the transfer of PA tax revenues, 
arrested dozens of Hamas ministers and parliamentarians and restricted their movement 
within the OPT. The EU repeatedly called on Israel to fulfill its legal obligations with respect 
to the delivery of tax revenues, the easing of restrictions and the implementation of the AMA. 
                                                           
176 Quartet statement on the PLC elections 26 January 2006  
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/88161.pdf 
177 Quartet statement, (2006), London, 30 January, 2006  http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMittlererOsten/Downloads/NOQ-Erkl-Jan06-
engl.pdf  
178 Quartet statement, (2006), London, ibid. http://www.auswaertiges-
amt.de/diplo/de/Aussenpolitik/RegionaleSchwerpunkte/NaherUndMittlererOsten/Downloads/NOQ-Erkl-Jan06-
engl.pdf 
179  Statement of the Quartet 30 January 2006 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressdata/en/declarations/89111.pdf 
180  Alvaro de Soto, (2007), End of Mission Report, May, 2007. Reprinted in the Guardian, June 14th, p 17-19. 
See at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/jun/13/usa.israel   
The deployment of the EU policy in 2006 Palestinian 
 
84   
 
However, on the contrary, Israel did not meet its obligations. As well, the EUBAM, which 
required Israeli cooperation, in practice, acquiesced to the frequent closure of Rafah. The 
closure of Rafah increased significantly after June 10th, 2006- two weeks prior to the capture 
of Israeli Corporal Gilad Shalit in an attack on a military base near Gaza on June 25th, 
2006.181 
With the EU monitors unable to reach Rafah, the crossing was closed 85% of the time 
between June 2006 and June 2007. The EU or unilateral Egyptian actions only led to its 
occasional opening for humanitarian and religious pilgrimage purposes up until June 2007, 
when the crossing was permanently shut.182 The closure of the Rafah crossing has had serious 
implications for the access of Palestinians to health care, academic opportunities and 
employment abroad, for the separation of families, for commerce and business, and in term of 
fuelling a general sense of entrapment amongst the civilian population of Gaza Strip.183 
EUBAM could not have opened the Rafah crossing alone and thus cannot be held primarily 
responsible for its closure. Yet, according to Gisha, by remaining part of the AMA 
arrangement despite the frequent closure of Rafah until its permanent closure in 2007, the EU 
has acquiesced in the collective punishment of the Palestinians caused by the closure.184 
On April 5th,  2006 Javier Solana, appeared before the European parliament and he described 
the situation on which Europe’s position should be based. In the OPT, he noted that Hamas 
has taken over the reins of government and the programme as presented by Prime Minister 
Haniyeh is unacceptable to the international community. He added that ultimately, the 
unwillingness of Hamas to come into line with the EU principles along with the fact that 
Hamas appears on the European list of terrorist organizations must inevitably have 
consequences for the EU in reference to the impossibility of regarding Hamas as a valid 
partner. He elaborated that the EU does not want principally to see the Hamas government fail 
but rather, besides respecting the Quartet’s three principles, also to apply the Rule of Law, 
democratic transfer of power, and to maintain the pluralistic nature of Palestinian society. If it 
does so, Hamas can be regarded as a fully- fledged political entity.185 
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He added further, that it is an entirely new development that a movement affiliated to the 
Muslim Brotherhood has come to power in Palestine in democratic elections of. In principle, 
the EU will continue to support President Abbas in line with the Quartet statement of March 
30th, and continue its aid to the Palestinian people for it is a moral imperative which the EU 
cannot shirk. Finally, the humanitarian crisis and instability on the OPT do no good to 
anyone, starting with Israel itself.186 
However, the unprecedented policies of boycott, sanctioning and closure instituted against an 
occupied population pushed the OPT to the humanitarian and economic brink, setting off 
alarm bells at UN agencies, the World Bank and international NGOs.187 In response, at the 
EU’s insistence, the Quartet agreed on a Temporary International Mechanism (TIM). 
Beginning in August 2006, the TIM provided social allowances to civil servants and 
pensioners, direct financial and material support to the health, education, water and social 
sectors, as well as funds to pay fuel bills. Alongside growing humanitarian needs, TIM led to 
a surge in EU aid to the OPT. Commission and member states’ aid rose from 500 million 
Euro in 2005 to almost 700 million Euro in 2006 and 1 billion Euro in late 2007. 188 While the 
boycott paralyzed the PA, thus further worsening the economic and humanitarian situation in 
the OPT, the TIM and the surge in aid that came with it pulled Palestine one step back from 
humanitarian catastrophe. 
The increase of assistance through the TIM, so as to avoid deepening humanitarian crisis, 
entailed the de- development of the governance structures of a potential Palestinian state. 
However, the TIM contributed to reversing the progress made in 2002-5, which had been 
promoted, especially by the EU. For example, the by-passing of official institutions, with the 
exception of the Presidency, led to a re- centralization of power in the hands of the president, 
namely, Mahmoud Abbas and generated an increasingly unaccountable management of 
available PA funds. It was significantly harder in the Gaza Strip, where Israel’s increasing 
closures post disengagement along with the absence of a functioning PA, pushed the Gaza 
Strip into chaos and lawlessness, which increased from 2006 up until the Hamas takeover in 
June 2007.189 To a certain extent, the EU policies in 2006-7, alongside those of the US and 
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Israel as well as international dynamics within the Palestinian political scene, had contributed 
to the polarization between Fatah and Hamas. 
With regard to the international framework, Solana also stated in the same speech on April 
5th, 2006 that the EU aimed to continue to work with the Quartet, in close coordination with 
the United States for they could make the EU’s role more effective and involve the Arab 
countries for they can and should do far more politically and  economically. In working on the 
peace process he stressed that the Israel- Palestine conflict is part of the serious crisis which 
the Middle East is undergoing and described the role of the United States as being able to 
exert a positive but also a negative influence of the situation in Iraq.190 
A year later, in view of rising factional violence between Fateh and Hamas, the EU repeatedly 
called for national unity.191 When the two were reconciled in the Saudi- brokered National 
Unity Government (NUG) in February-March 2007, the Europeans appeared willing to 
reconsider their approach to the PA. 
At the time, the Quartet conditions were not fully respected, through the Mecca agreement the 
NUG, including Hamas, had made significant steps towards them, in particular by agreeing to 
‘respect’ rather than to ‘accept’ previous agreements, 192the EU reaction was important in 
determining the future of Palestinian reconciliation in so far as the NUG could have survived 
only if it were allowed to function. This in turn required a resumption of aid to it, together 
with Israel’s lifting of restrictions on movement, release of imprisoned lawmakers and other 
prisoners and resumption of PA tax revenue transfers. EUPOL- COPPA could also have 
assisted the PA security forces, where the Fateh- Hamas divide played a significant role. 
However, when the US and Israel made clear that the Mecca agreement fell short of meeting 
the Quartet principles,193 the EU muted its initial support for the NUG. The boycott and 
sanctioning policies of the EU, like those of Israel and the US, has remained unchanged. 
On the top of this, the US financed armed and trained security forces loyal to Fateh. 
Everything was set for a new round of confrontation in May- June 2007, which culminated in 
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Hamas’ take over of the Gaza Strip and Abbas’ dissolution of the NUG and nomination of a 
non- Hamas caretaker government in the West Bank under the Premiership of Salam Fayyad. 
Reflections 
At least, there are three points of ambiguity within the EU boycott policy of the elected 
Hamas: 
1. The first concerns the ambiguity in defining the Hamas government and its inability to 
make a difference between Hamas, as a terrorist group listed by the EU, and the actual 
elected government. It is worth noting, that the EU acted within a wider international 
context. 
2. The second regards the formation of a Palestinian National Unity Government, and 
whether the EU genuinely favors reconciliation throughout the OPT or whether the EU 
seeks to reinstate the PA in Gaza given its inability to conduct border monitoring, 
reconstruction and aid policy under current conditions. 
3. The third regards the two wings of the EU position, the observer notes a gap separating 
the EU political objectives and the legal commitments, and the absence of concrete 
measures to ensure that such objectives are accomplished and commitments kept. 
Specifically, the policy of boycotting Hamas and gradually isolating Gaza, financing the PA- 
controlled WB and unconditionally supporting Israel was not a road towards respecting 
international human rights law or humanitarian law or a two-state solution, but rather made 
the accomplishment of these EU declared objectives for a peaceful middle East less likely. 
The military offensive in Gaza Strip later on was the strategic testimony to this fact. 
 
 
 
 
Interviews 
 
88   
 
4 The EU Policy Model 
This chapter elaborates on the theoretical discussion of Orientalism in connection to 
Islamophobia in two ways: (1) analyzing the imbalanced power relations in the EU policy 
towards Palestine and (2) discussing the implications of the imbalanced power relations on 
Islamophobia. 
It is worth noting that it is not easy to reflect on the analysis of power relations in the EU 
boycott policy of the elected Hamas government for it is a two- legged policy, one towards 
the OPT and the other towards Israel. In this way, the EU is dealing with a well- established 
state and an occupier, or, one can also say with stateless Palestine and the occupied territories. 
Therefore, the author suggests an abstract model and an operational model of the EU policy 
towards Palestine. Reiterating the aims of the dissertation, it aims to provide a form of 
abstract model and operational model that uncovers and explains the case under study. In 
doing so, this chapter forms a link between the main question and the secondary questions of 
the dissertation.  
In Orientalism, Said shed light on Foucault’s main achievement in reference to knowledge 
and power. Foucault argued that what we take to be the truth is in fact always really the 
product of a certain way of representing reality, of a certain way of seeing “discourse”.194 This 
way of seeing is not a misrepresentation, a false or distorted perception of reality, because 
there is no truth and no accurate representation.195 This makes representation in connection to 
Foucault more challenging if not impossible to come up with any definition, for example, of 
Islamophobia and can be taken to the extreme that there is no reality out there. 
Orientalism, however, contributes to resolving the problem of representation. This is 
specifically in term of West- East/ Islam, not only in defining Islamophobia, but also and 
more importantly in this dissertation, in answering the question of power in the EU’s boycott 
policy of the elected Hamas government. This is intimately entangled with distinct colonial 
histories and imperial institutions. Hence, Said insisted that no writing, thinking or acting on 
the Orient could do so without taking account of the limitations on thought and actions 
inspired by Orientalism. 
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Nevertheless, it is useful to bring Foucault’s considerations into play - they are needed in the 
analysis of power relations as outlined in five considerations. First, it is the imbalanced 
relations in inherited systems. Second, the imbalanced relations generated from the types of 
objectives each partner possesses. In other words, the main motives behind which power is 
exerted to influence the actions of others. Third the instruments and channels through which 
power is diverted to achieve an act over the actions of others. Fourth, it is the type of 
institutions, which host the actors, where the exertion of power can take place. Fifth, it is the 
degree of rationalization used by actors in order to ensure the effectiveness of the instruments 
used to exert power and the certainties of their results.196 In this way, power is adjusted into 
processes that are more or less refined, transformed, and re-organized to suit current situations 
while various costs are expended to ensure the effectiveness of power. 
In this respect, the EU is an institution that consists of a growing number of European states 
with different interests and objectives. However, the EU and its member states acted within a 
wider international context. Taking the EU member states’ reactions altogether, the drivers of 
the EU’s response come to the fore. The EU’s common approach towards a Hamas 
government based on free and democratic elections (as far as this was possible in the context 
of ongoing occupation) was that of isolation. Arguably, the EU’s cancelation of the budget 
and support for Hamas is not necessarily to make the Hamas- led government fail (the 
approach some in the US and Israel have taken) but rather to force a change in behavior on 
the part of Hamas. 
However, as reflected earlier, there are at least three points of ambiguity within the EU’s 
boycott policy of the elected Hamas; in defining the Hamas government, in seeking 
reconciliation between Fateh and Hamas, and the gap separating the EU’s political objectives 
and the legal commitments. 
The majority EU consensus explains the latter by way of three dilemmas. First, it is the 
inconsistency between diplomatic words and action. Second, there is no comprehensive 
rethinking of the effectiveness or even purpose of the EU’s aid to the OPT. Third, there is no 
majority consensuses of desisting from rewarding Israel through EU contractual relations or 
on ensuring that the Israel agreements are lawfully implemented. 
Several factors may explain the EU’s approach and assuage the perceived need to act in the 
Middle East. This is felt particularly strongly by those member states whose political systems 
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and public opinion are sensitive to the development in the Middle East region accommodating 
the unwillingness of the EU majority to take a firm stance towards Israel through deeds and 
not only words. This unwillingness could be directed by a plurality of interests, ranging from 
transatlantic relations to commercial ties with Israel, alongside ideological commitments to 
Israel, and persists even when the EU knowingly acts against its aims and interests in the 
region. 
Therefore, one should refer back to the historical processes of the conflict from which it has 
been generated and the sources of strengths and weaknesses of such power relations and 
actions resulting in imbalanced power relations, and similarly also to the conditions that 
enforce their strength or deplete their control. 
5.1 Imbalanced Power Relations 
Drawing on the analysis of Yasid Anani,197of power relations, three types of imbalanced 
power relations were identified: (1) power relations (2) relationships of communications (3) 
objective capacity with the following consequences: 
5.1.1 Power Relations 
Two different levels of power relations are defined, in reference to Anani,198 in this part (1) 
global, and (2) local. Moreover, by defining possible actors, the discussion of this part takes a 
more practical route envisaging the possible influence of different actors through power 
relations in the EU’s foreign policy towards Palestine. 
Now, in order to clarify global and local levels, it is important to define the actors on each 
level and their connection to other actors and groups in other levels, likewise, their assumed 
aims and interests. 
The abstraction in the categorization of actors is used in order to ease the understanding of the 
complexity of the power structure in the EU policy towards Palestine. Abstraction does not 
imply that each of these actors works alone to achieve his aims, because aims can be mutual 
to several actors on several levels, and consequently, power can be exerted by several actors 
through several channels in order to reach an individual or allied aim. The plexus of actors’ 
relationships is complex and multileveled and these are not exerted unilaterally. Power could 
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be more evident on certain levels and through certain actors where tangible measures in the 
form of pressure can be observed, for example, through negotiations. 
The EU as a major actor is connected with other actors at different levels within different 
power relations and structures. Subsequently, a state of competition might have existed 
between the two local actors, namely, Israel and OPT. Each tries to exert power in different 
channels to fulfill his aims and expectations as well as gain benefit. 
5.1.1.1 Global level 
At the beginning, it is important to point out the potential global influence in the EU policy 
towards Israel- Palestine. Such global influence on the decision- making in the EU’s policy is 
a process which unfolds in different forms, either through trade protocols between the 
political entities or directly through sponsors and major donors such as the EU, USAID, UN 
and others. 
As an example, global interactions have influenced the independency of political spaces in 
such a manner that instabilities and insecurity in one space interrupt the flow of transactions 
in other spaces. In relation, global trade sees no borders. Global interests range from 
exploiting natural resources and establishing new markets and regional trade infrastructure, to 
strategic political and social coalitions and reforms. One important global factor, which is a 
major global concern nowadays and has been strongly emphasized since September11th, 2001 
is security. It is seen as a basic need to sustain development and maintain the processes of 
world trade. 
The global domains, in reference to the Center for European Policy Studies (CEPS),199 can be 
classified into three directions to a regional system of the wider Middle East in following 
manner: 
- Firstly, policy domains: this is in terms of (1) Security: inter state, international 
terrorism, and ‘visas, asylum, illegal immigration and trafficking’. (2) Economics: 
macroeconomics, trade in goods and services, ‘structural, poverty reduction’, energy, regional 
infrastructures such as ‘transport, water, power, etc’, and finally legal movement of people.(3) 
Governance and human development: governance ‘democratizations, judiciary, anti 
corruption’, ‘civil society, media and human rights’, education, and culture. 
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- Secondly, geographic and political grouping: it includes (1) Maghreb, (2) Masreq, (3) 
Barcelona group, (4) Agadir group, (5) Gulf Cooperation Council, (6) Arab League, (7) Iran, 
(8) wider Middle East, and (9) Islamic states.  
- Thirdly, external actors: this as in the Quartet includes (1) EU, (2) USA, (3) Russia, 
(4) UN, and others ‘associated with the quartet, e.g. Norway and Japan’.  
In this context, power is exerted by governments through different means and mechanisms in 
a certain areas. Specifically, governments have formal and informal contacts with the two 
entities, namely, Israel, and Palestine, as well as indirect relations with private institutions 
within the entities. The governments are connected to them directly through diplomatic 
relations. However, governments can also be in contact with different groups and factions 
within the same entity such as Hamas and Fateh as well as individuals through indirect and 
informal relations. For some reason, the governments have specific interests in the entity and 
tend to empower certain groups and individuals to sustain their interests. This can take one or 
multiple forms. 
For example, to enforce political alliances within one or more of the entities by strengthening 
some groups or by supporting one of the entities as an ally by exerting certain powers over the 
other entity due to the reciprocal political and/ or economic affiliations. Between 
governments, the main channel for communications is diplomacy and through the diplomatic 
bodies. Regional governments can be important actors in the Middle East region in 
connection with each entity but also at varied degrees. 
As well, power can be exerted through international organizations and can vary in terms of 
political, economic or military humanitarian concerns. International organizations produce 
legislation and treaties, which governments collectively sign. It is important to note the power 
in the form of binding treaties and show the complexity of the global power and its influence 
on regional and local spaces. Here also, a global market can be added along a line of 
governments, institutions and individuals at all levels. The influence of market, information, 
including media, and technology is a crucial factor in defining power relations between 
countries on the basis not only of demands and needs, but also along the costs of production 
and distribution. To engage within a global market depends vitally on financial, 
infrastructural, scientific, institutional, and administrative resources.  
5.1.1.2 Local level 
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The actors at the local level are connected in several dimensions to other actors at local and 
global levels. Possible influential actors at the local level can be categorized as follows: 
- The state:  it is the main national and local actor with its system of governance, with 
all its territory, institutions, regulations, managerial and executive systems. Hypothetically, 
the state aims at facilitating and producing collective goods and services for the majority of 
people living within its borders. A big share of global power is infiltrated through the 
government of the state via juridical, executive and administrative bodies through formal- 
regulations, permits and informal- individual confrontation and negotiation mechanisms.  
However, the power can be exerted through other actors such as agreements with influential 
private or media sectors.  
- The civil society organizations such as NGOs, the national society of information such 
as newsletters, TV stations, journals and others which affect public opinion. It represents 
several local groups with different sector concerns again through different forms. The civil 
society is often known in the OPT as non- governmental organizations. Some power 
mechanisms exerted by the NGOs through pressure on or complaints to the state are 
supported as a power relation as well as support from other global actors. The inactive role 
also influences the regulation and legislation and the governance of the state. As for media, it 
can be an instrument of power provoking public opinion and magnifying the focus on certain 
issues in the form of information and misinformation. How media is viewed is important as a 
tool of support or on the other hand as opposition to specific actors or interests. 
- The private sector with its investments and local networks is again connected to the 
global market. The private sector’s actors aim at gaining benefits from providing certain 
benefits. It is worth noting that all three above-mentioned local levels are connected to global 
powers and sometime convey the agendas of global powers to a certain extent. 
Reflections 
- On an important note, there are too many global players such as the Quartet, where the 
EU, in addition to the US, the UN and Russia are included, the Middle East regional 
governments and the Arab- Muslim “world” at large along with civil societies- NGOs and 
private sectors. 
- In the form of international political conventions over a certain line of policies, such 
as the measures taken for security and against terrorism, or in the form of incentives in return 
for political, economic and juridical reforms, new market products, investments, industries as 
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well as infrastructure and provision of services, the influence of international organizations is 
considerable.  
- The state, as discussed earlier, does not exist in the case of Palestine. On the contrary, 
it is still occupied by a matrix of control by the state of Israel. 
5.1.2 Relationships of Communications 
Communication and the method by which information flows between partners influence the 
level of power between partners. Here, in drawing further on the work of Anani,200 the 
discussion is divided into three main sections (1) language as a medium of communication (2) 
language as information and (3) participation as means of communications. 
5.1.2.1 Language 
Flyvbjerg realized how the language of protocols does not stand strongly in front of action 
due to power relations. 
“The written and spoken language that we used is structured by idealism, while reality and 
our actions as human beings are manipulated by power”.201 
It is worth focusing on the meaning of ‘rationalize’ as a verb, which holds a different, yet 
negative meaning than does rational. According to the Oxford Dictionary, rationalizing 
means: 
“The justification of behavior to make it appear rational or socially acceptable by ignoring, 
concealing, or glossing its real motive; an act of making such a justification”202 
Consequently, power relations through means of communications such as protocols and 
agreements can be a source of transforming rational facts into rationalized facts, which suits 
the aims of the powerful. 
5.1.2.2 Information and misinformation 
Here, Flyvbjerg reflects on the combination between power relations with relationships of 
communication as a strategy used by the powerful: 
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“in modern societies the ability to facilitate or suppress knowledge is in large part what makes 
one party more powerful than another”203 
Obviously, the aim of communication is to send a piece of information, and when received 
determines the form of dis/agreement between the sender and the receiver. This way, 
information can shift the balance of power in favor of those who have it or who can process it 
differently and even turn it into misinformation. This can be carried out at varied degrees in 
three forms; the form being a complete set of hidden or unrevealed information, a form of 
partially or selectively revealed information, and the form of totally distorted information. 
5.1.2.3 Participation 
In order to convey the needs and interests of all involved partners, participation is essential. 
However, the degree of involvement of participants in the work of Arnstein is categorized in 
the following manner:204 
1. Non- participation: this is when the powerful participant fully controls information. 
2. Tokenism: the less powerful partner communicates his views to the powerful participant 
at varied degrees according to his power to influence decision- making due to different 
levels of representation, the scientific and technological capacity in addition to negotiation 
ability. 
3. Empowerment: this is shaped in the relationship between partners when all partners have 
equal flows of information.  Therefore, empowerment is rare in the case of imbalanced 
power relations. 
5.1.2 Objective Capacity 
Up to now, it is clear that the relationships of communication, scientific and technological 
capacities are basic to achieving a better position of the partners. Nevertheless, the focus in 
this section, is placed on a more socially oriented discussion that goes beyond the technical, 
infrastructural, economic, and even military capacities. Accordingly, this section discusses 
objective capacity, in reference to the work of Anani,205from four different angles (1) 
cognition (2) culture (3) the right to participate, and (3) technical capacities 
5.1.3.1 Cognition 
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In countering a powerful and less powerful partners, even if information is equally circulated 
between both of them on equal terms, the powerful would benefit more from what is given 
than the less powerful. One reason is that the difference in cognition creates gaps in power 
relations. This gap might influence the partners’ participation, the formulation, not only of 
their needs, but also in the equivalence in the use of resources. This can be viewed, to a 
certain excent, from the EU association agreements with Israel compared to the dead letter 
with the Palestinians. 
5.1.3.2 Culture 
The cultural differences between partners involved, eventually, produce considerable 
differences in the evaluation process. Different partners attach different meanings to different 
things and foresee different potentials in different resources. For example, Israel and the 
Palestinians have differences in identifying their needs and interests keeping in mind the 
different history, culture, and power relations. As a given example, the Jews in Israel, do not 
perceive Palestine the same way as Muslim and Christian Palestinians. The cultural 
development of the common space as Palestine on different sides might be vastly different 
due to the non- parallel line of history and consequently, a different, socio- economic and 
political progression and not only religion. 
5.1.3.3 Right to participate 
It was discussed earlier how important it is to possess information in order to enable one 
partner to engage in partnership and make the best out of the process. Hence, participation 
here is discussed as knowledge about the processes of how to participate and the right to 
participate as a capacity in itself. 
Due to wide-ranging power differences and capacities around a common space as Palestine, 
the contribution of the people living closer to the space could be more effective and more 
relevant to local needs. At the same time, the people who are living on the less powerful side 
of the common space contribute inefficiently not only because of knowledge and cognitive 
skills but also because of the weak traces of the participation within the existing political, 
systems. 
5.1.3.4 Technical capacities 
It is not only obvious that Israel posses technological and economic capacity in the region but 
also it exercises it along the social structure of the society. Therefore, according to Yiftachel 
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(1995),206it allows for more local participation within the legal definition of rights and 
freedoms. This influences Israel and the Palestinians differently, in terms of expectations, 
priorities and needs both locally and nationally that creates different reaction and interaction. 
Therefore, it is essential to find the right mechanism to overcome the knowledge capacity of 
the less powerful and less informed societies, especially in terms of role and rights of 
individuals and institutions.  
 
5.2 An Abstract Model  
The abstract model is a conceptual representation.  Based on the discussion of imbalanced 
power relations and drawing further on Anani’s model, 207 it aims at representing the finding 
of the dissertation. A common space in relation to the abstract idea is composed, mainly, of a 
special territorially de-fined area and the process between the entities involved. 
Space 
State of Israel
Stateless Palestine 
 
Figure 2: An illustration of a common space 
The common space is divided into two parts (1) an abstract territorial concept: it re-
conceptualizes the different types of interrelated processes within a common space (e.g. 
territorial, social, political, etc.) between the state of Israel as one entity and the OPT as a 
stateless entity, and (2) the operationalized concept: it explains the different processes 
between the entities involved. 
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Consequently, the model draws not only a conceptual framework for the EU policy towards 
Palestine but also towards Israel. This is because of the EU’s vision in promoting peace based 
on a two-state solution considering the two entities. In this way, the common space is a core 
concern for all entities. Bringing in a common space as ‘one common space’ displays 
relatively a situation where the influence of the divisions of the territorial borders is 
minimized. This is because the model aims at looking at the EU policy towards Israel- 
Palestine as an interrelated complex of different social, economic, and political processes that 
is generated within a territorially defined space. Therefore, having a common space facilitates 
the illustration of this aim. 
Also, the model offers a foundation for practical and theoretical discourse in the EU policy 
towards Israel- Palestine. It invites a new way of seeing and thinking of the particularity of 
the imbalanced power relations in an occupying- occupied context. In doing so, it is worth 
noting that a border line is a significant component in defining territorial boundaries by 
differentiating areas from each other socially, politically, etc., within a certain space. 
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Figure 3: The model of the EU policy towards Israel- Palestine  
Figure 3 is an abstract chart suggesting a model for imbalanced power relations in the EU 
policy towards Israel- Palestine. The circle in the middle is a symbolic common space. Yet, 
this space itself is divided by a border line based on social, political and economic, etc. 
differences. At the same time, other global and local actors’ interests lie in the same space and 
consequently within the extent to which this border line is drawn. The arrows represent the 
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imbalanced power relations between the three entities, respectively, the EU, Israel and OPT. 
The three dimension of imbalanced power relations compromise (1) power relations, (2) 
objective capacity and (3) relationships of communications. The chart also shows directly and 
indirectly the way imbalanced power relations affect the space ‘circle in the middle’ between 
mainly Israel and OPT and also in connection to the EU as a highlighted actor as concerned in 
this dissertation. Each entity is explained in terms of possible relations with each other; 
however, other actors who are not highlighted in the chart within different levels influence the 
same common space. 
Further, it is necessary to understand the meaning of the border line in a defined common 
space and its association with imbalanced power relations. To create a border means to create 
parameters for different categories. Those parameters display different qualities, such as 
accessibility, blockade and semi- blockade. 
Moreover, the act of diminishing borders by creating new ones can be very crucial and can 
bring about different problems that did not exist before. Dialectically, this has both negative 
and positive effect on the elements, events, and systems within border areas. 
Figure 4 illustrates in an abstract manner the dynamics between the two sides of the border 
line, namely Israel and Palestine with a wide range of differences. 
Israel
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Figure 4: Setting the border line  
Interviews 
 
100   
 
However, Figure 5 demonstrates that the growth of one side of the border line tends to be 
higher and in favor with the powerful- Israel, eventually, pushing the border line to acquire 
more area from the other powerless- Palestine. This is in spite of the relative power-resistance 
on the Palestine side. 
 
Israel
Palestine 
 
Figure 5: Re-setting the border line (1) 
The brief review of the borders reveals a very important characteristic that plays a role in 
extending the differences between the two sides of the border space. The movement of the 
border line or in other words the transitional character of the border line creates not only a 
physical border, limiting mobility of people and goods between two entities, but also creates 
social, political, cultural differences on the two sides of the border. 
However, the territorial concept alone is like clapping with one hand, as it does not explain 
the social, political, and economic processes. The way in which imbalanced power relations 
impact the EU policy towards Israel- Palestine is the task of the operationalized model, which 
will complement the abstract model as, illustrated in figure 6 as follows: 
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Figure 6: Resetting the border line (2) 
 
5.2 An Operationalized Model 
This section aims to convert the abstract model into an operationalized model. More 
specifically, this section highlights three main strategic mechanisms formulated through 
imbalanced relations while drawing further on Anani’s model.208 This model, however, 
demonstrates the most common strategies that are constructed through imbalanced power 
relations: (1) rationalization (2) timing and (3) replacement of actors. 
5.3.1 Rationalization 
Rationalization according to Flyvbjerg shifts power relations by providing incomplete or 
misinformation as a form of relationships of communication. If one of the powerful actors 
benefits from maintaining a specific situation, this actor refers to several methods to 
rationalize the facts in the following way. 209 
- One is through magnifying one’s own advantages and minimizing or trivializing the 
disadvantages of the others. often, in the same vein, in the same way around upon one’s 
interest 
                                                           
208 Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid. 
209 Flyvbjerg, (1998), ibid., p98 
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For example, the EU insisted that the elected Hamas comply with three “principles”. 
However, those same principles soon evolved into strict conditions for the recognition of 
newly elected Hamas government. 
Initially, the first condition stood at the forefront of the EU policy- makers for Hamas has 
been included on the EU’s list of terrorist organizations since 2003. However, this concerns 
Hamas as a political party and not an elected government nominated by different groups, 
among which no single group was nominated at least officially by Hamas. Besides, Hamas 
and non- Hamas members have both participated in these groups in the election. It is also 
worth noting that the vast number of people who voted for Hamas but were not actual 
members of Hamas suggested that the people were seeking a new liberal nationalist 
movement,210 that promised reform more so than a religious movement led by Hamas. 
Besides, Hamas’s victory is significant not only for Palestinians but also for Arabs, Muslims 
and beyond. For the Palestinians, for the first time in half a century, the Palestinian Islamists 
have moved to top leadership in a peaceful way without violence, giving Palestinians as a 
whole, including Hamas, a sense of pride. Unlike many other Arab countries, the Palestinians 
embraced democracy not only in theory but in practice. 
For Hamas itself, the victory provided a great challenge given the harsh reality on the ground 
with which it had to deal. At the Arab level, the victory of Hamas was unique. Political Islam 
has reached the top in a democratic process. Islamic movements in the region considered the 
victory of Hamas as their own victory. Arab and Muslim regimes watched the rise of Hamas 
with anxiety and fear it will encourage their local Islamists to pursue power. Seculars 
remained divided in the Arab world between supporting the nationalist liberation side of 
Hamas and Hamas religious substance.211 
Apparently, however, the Quartet went beyond calling on Hamas to renounce terrorism. The 
latter two conditions in particular were disputable. Hamas was called upon to recognize 
Israel, despite the fact that only states (or at most the Palestinian Liberation Organization 
(PLO) as a legal representative of the Palestinians, of which Hamas is not a part, and which 
has recognized Israel) recognize other states and that the borders by which Israel would be 
recognized were left undefined. Regarding the acceptance of previous agreements, ironically, 
                                                           
210 Hroub, Khaked, (2006), ibid., pxviii 
211 Hroub, Khaked, (2006), ibid., pxx 
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it was the Israeli Sharon government, which first asserted that it would only respect, rather 
than accept previous agreements in 2001.212 
- Another mechanisms would change the priorities and weight in such a way to 
rationalize the decision making process. 
The 2006-8 periods saw a deepening of the EU- Israeli ties, irrespective of Israel’s 
increasingly serious violations of IHRL and IHL contrary to the second wing of the EU 
position. In the autumn of 2008, there were some developments regarding the misapplication 
of the EU-Israel association agreement, whereby  EU benefits are illegally granted to Israeli 
settlements in the OPT such as trade preferences granted to settlement products. Suspected 
issues regulating the rules of origin problem were publically exposed in the autumn of 2008 
by the UK, which proposed in the Council a discussion of ways to tighten the arrangement. 
Yet, rather than proposing to move away from the technical arrangement, to place the burden 
of providing the precise origin of products on Israel rather on the European customs 
authorities, and to seek a legal solution to the problem, the focus has shifted to the question of 
labeling. This is in order to allow consumers to make an informed choice between Palestinian 
products and products produced in Israeli settlements.213 
The awareness of refraining from assisting illegal Israeli actions in the OPT however may be 
slowly spreading. Yet, the EU has neither sought legal solutions to avoid rendering aid or 
assistance to internationally unlawful acts in the OPT, nor adopted safeguard measures to 
avoid extending existing misapplications of EU-Israel agreements to other policy domains. 
Further, the French Presidency, having secured Israel’s participation in its project- the Union 
for the Mediterranean- decided to proceed with the upgrade despite Israel’s conduct in the 
conflict. In addition, the EU member states have continued to bolster Israel’s military capacity 
through arms exports. For example, in 2007, 18 EU member states authorized 1018 licenses 
to Israel, although license authorizations do not amount to actual military exports, they signal 
member states’ intention to equip the Israeli army. For the period 2004-2007, the actual 
exports of the 13 EU member states’ conventional Military equipment to Israel, saw France 
                                                           
212 Ha’aretz article on 20 March, 2007, “The Syrian secret Sharon did not reveal to Olmert”, by Akiva Eldar at 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/839634.html 
213 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid. See also Barak Ravid (2008), “Livni to Miliband: U.K. plan to label 
West Bank goods is ‘exaggerated’ ”, Haaretz, 16 November, 
http://www.haaretz.com/hasen/spages/1037780.html 
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topping the list, (59,465,503), followed by Romania (20,990,793), and then the UK 
(10,470,819).214 
5.3.2 Timing 
Timing is a very important factor. Tactical timing of events such as when to allow 
negotiations and to exchange views, and when to ignore them, can be used to achieve 
particular ends for the more powerful actors. It is a means of switching power on and off. The 
following text demonstrate according Anani’s model,215 two forms of timing (1) strategic 
timing and (2) timing in implementation. 
- Strategic timing: when an actor is approached at a certain point in time to reflect upon 
a certain issue, it is a switch-on for this actor to use what power he has. The actor has to show 
either compliance or opposition and consequently elaborate on the process of decision-
making. However, if the case was totally the opposite, meaning the actor was not approached 
for his reflection and even ignored through the articulation of power relationships between 
other actors- for example participation, then the actor’s power stays in a switched-off mode 
marginalized by the main power formation. This all depends also on the actor’s 
organizational, structural, and personal traits and conditions, and on the coalition and 
opposition state of the involved actors. 
More specifically, and in view of the victory of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary elections 
and its subsequent entry into the Palestinian Authority, it took the EU, alongside the Quartet, 
only five days to impose conditionality on the legitimately elected government by the 
occupied Palestinians. 
The EU, alongside the US and Israel, stated its will to work with the caretaker government in 
the West Bank, a willingness which soon crystallized into what became known as the West 
Bank first strategy. The logic underpinning this strategy was that of rendering the West Bank 
a prosperous place, signaling to the Palestinians the dividends that could be reaped through 
moderation and cooperation with the international community and Israel. The EU’s West 
Bank first strategy contained three elements. All three elements failed to deliver. 
                                                           
214 Israel- OPT, Fuelling conflict: Foreign arms supplies to Israel/Gaza, (2009), Amnesty International, 
International Secretariat, UK, February, 2009  
http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/MDE15/012/2009/en/3301b5c0-189b-4ba2-9bca-
%2068e116fd590f/mde150122009en.pdf 
215 Anani, Yasid, (2006), ibid. 
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First and on the economic front, the EU immediately resumed financial transfers to the PA. At 
the Paris donor conference in December 2007, the EU and its member states reconfirmed their 
role as the most generous funder of the PA. They pledged $3.4 billion out of total of $7.7 
billion in budget support, development aid and humanitarian assistance. Of these funds, the 
EU pledged 440 million Euros channeled to support Fayyad’s Palestinian Reform and 
Development Plan (PRDP) for 2008-10. By February 2008, the Commission replaced the 
TIM with a new financial instrument- PEGASE- entirely devoted to supporting the PA 
caretaker government. Of the 440 million Euros pledged, 325 million Euros would be 
channeled through PEGASE.216 
Despite this, living standards did not improve. The World Bank argued that “aid and reform 
without access are unlikely to revive the Palestinian economy”.217 Yet whereas donor 
assistance met and surpassed initial expectations and the caretaker government made some 
steps forwards in reform, Israel’s movement restrictions increased,218 non- compliance with 
the AMA persisted and settlement construction accelerated.219  
The French Presidency warned of Israel’s “worrying indifference to repeated calls from 
international community”. 220 Yet, little action followed. The economic situation in the West 
Bank thus failed to improve in 2008.221  
Second and on the security front, the EU activated EUPOL- COPPS in the West Bank. The 
purpose of the mission was that of training and equipping the PA civil police in order to 
improve living standards in the West Bank by increasing security. 222 EUPOL-COPPS trained 
and equipped approximately 600 police officers and helped improve law and order in West 
Bank, particularly in towns such as Nablus and Jenin. In May 2008 the mission was expanded 
into a broader rule of a law mission covering the penal and judicial systems.223  
                                                           
216 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid. See also, EC assistance to the Palestinians in 2008, and in 2009 
http://eeas.europa.eu/occupied_palestinian_territory/ec_assistance/ec_aid_to_pa_2008_en.pdf 
217  Word Bank (2008) “Palestinian Economic Prospects: Aid, Access and Reform”, Economic Monitoring 
Report to the Ad Hoc Liaison Committee, 22 September 2008, p.1. Note at 
 http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTWESTBANKGAZA/Resources/AHLCSept15,08.pdf 
218 The Middle East Quartet: A Progress Report, 25 September, co-signed by several NGOs, including EMHRN, 
http://en.euromedrights.org/index.php/publications/emhrn_publications/emhrn_publications_2008/3804.html 
219 Peace Now Report, (2008), Summary of Construction in the WB 
http://www.peacenow.org.il/data/SIP_STORAGE/files/5/3935.pdf and B’tselem, 
http://www.btselem.org/english/Settlements/Statistics.asp 
220 EU Presidency statement on constructing new units in the WB, 
www.delisr.ec.europa.eu/english/whatsnew.asp?id=1023 
221 Word Bank (2008), ibid. 
222 US concentrated, instead, on training and equipping the PA national security forces and the presidential guard 
223 The EU’s police mission in the OPT: http://www.consilium.europa.eu/showPage.aspx?id=974&lang=en 
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Whereas EUPOL-COPPS contributed to improved law and order in the West Bank, it failed 
or rather could not succeed in managing effectively the security sector. In turn, despite 
improved security in the West Bank, security forces remained politicized, lacking democratic 
practices. They engaged in human rights violations such as arbitrary arrests and detentions, 
particularly against tens of Hamas members and supporters in the West Bank. This is almost 
similar to what Hamas did with its Fateh supporters in Gaza Strip.224 
Furthermore, the efforts of the Palestinian civilian police were exploited by the frequent 
Israeli military incursions in the same cities in which PA forces were deployed. The EU tried 
to solve this by sponsoring human rights training programs among police forces, but these 
micro interventions were limited. 
Third and on the diplomatic front, the member states, the Commission, the Council and the 
High Representative pledged their support for the Annapolis process launched by the US in 
November 2007. In the run-up to the Annapolis conference, the EU suggested an “Action 
Strategy for the Middle East Peace Process”, committing to support  bilateral efforts between 
the involved parties, the mediating role of the US, and the efforts of the Quartet and of the 
Arab league to promote the Arab initiative.225The Annapolis process in practice failed to 
advance any further by late 2008.  
In 2008, the EU persisted in a vitiated strategy conceptualized during the Oslo years. It 
increased its assistance to the PA despite its growing undemocratic practices, and supported 
the diplomatic process while in practice acquiescing in Israel’s policies. The point was that 
this would be sufficient to provide security to Israel while improving the lot of the 
Palestinians so as to secure their moderation and compliance.226 Yet, as Richard Norton put it, 
all the Palestinians have seen is an “entrenched occupation and a weak, corrupt government 
that is, at best an ineffectual parody of democracy”.227 
                                                           
224 Muriel Asseburg (2009) “European Conflict Management in the Middle East: Toward a More Effective 
Approach”, February, 2009, Carnegie Papers, Beirut 
225 EU High Representative Javier Solana and EU Commissioner for External Relations Benita Ferrero-Waldner, 
“Statebuilding For Peace In The Middle East: An EU Action Strategy”, Joint Paper, Nov., 2007 
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/reports/97949.pdf 
226 Tocci, Nathalie, (2009), “Playing by Paying: International Aid to Palestine”, in the International Specter, 
Vol.44, No.3, September 2009, p19-25. Book Review of: International Assistance to the Palestinians after Oslo: 
Political Guilt; Wasted Money, by Anne Le More, London, Routledge, 2008 
227 Norten, Augustus Richard, (2009), “The Gaza war: Antecedents and Consequences”, Real Institute Elcano, 
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- Timing in implementation: the division of implementation might not be based 
ultimately upon limited financial resources but could also be planned to reduce the effect of 
possible deficiencies or at least controversial issues on public opinion. 
As outlined earlier, the EU financial resources and support to the Palestinians have increased 
with the boycott of Hamas, arguably, to overcome public opinions and political deficiencies. 
One example as observed from the Oslo agreements, the first phase contained issues which to 
a certain extent, were guaranteed not to provoke public opinion and not to generate public 
resistance. Likewise, the most important issues were postponed to the following phases, 
especially, the final phase. Consequently, the phase-by-phase publication of information is 
somehow a timing issue using information and communication relationships to avoid negative 
public opinion against the Oslo agreements in Israel, Palestine and in Europe. 
Another example is the EU’s border monitoring efforts. Whereas on most occasions EU 
initiatives are mentioned in the context of the need to secure open access and implement the 
Agreement on Movement and Access (AMA) taking the path of international law and public 
opinions. On other occasions, especially when it is restricted by Israel, its emphasis is on anti- 
arms smuggling, which could entail a further sealing of Gaza’s borders, particularly if actions 
are taken to detect and destroy tunnels before access is assured. 
5.3.3 Replacement of Actors 
The different levels of power relations between actors are not always stable. Actors’ 
relationships could be reformulated into new combinations of allies and adversaries. In other 
cases, actors can be totally dismissed depending on their capacities, communication skills as 
well as their power relations. 
In the work of Flyvbjerg (1998) and Forster (1989), replacing and displacing actors is another 
mechanism of practicing power, which is used by stronger coalitions to terminate opposition 
and replace it with approval. Through this process, the right to participate in decision making 
through one’s official position and freedom of expressing scientific concerns is taken away 
and moved to another actor who can ratify the major interests of the strong coalition. 
In this direction, the EU, alongside Israel and the US, persisted in negative conditionality 
towards Hamas between June 2007 and December 2008. The implicit objective remained that 
of “defeating” Hamas through a double-track strategy of punishment of Hamas and 
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consequently of the population of Gaza Strip, and rewards to the PA/ Fateh government, and 
thus to the population of the West Bank. Yet, an unwavering unwillingness to exert any form 
of pressure on Israel regarding its human rights and IHL obligations as an occupying power. 
It is important to note here that the EU alone did not cause the collapse of national unity and 
the political separation between the West Bank and Gaza Strip that ensued, which was 
determined, inter alia, by internal Palestinian political dynamics, Israel, the US and other 
actors in the region. Yet, by supporting Israeli and American policies and imposing negative 
conditionality towards Hamas and the NUG, the EU played an active part in the international 
approach which led to these results. 
Paradoxically, technical assistance and diplomatic support to the WB could not compensate 
for the deteriorating situation on the ground. The West Bank first approach failed with respect 
to its objective of positively altering Palestinian incentives in favor of the “moderation”, also 
because alongside it there was a second policy element, the isolation of Gaza Strip. If we turn 
to Gaza, on the other hand, the EU’s own isolation of the Gaza Strip through its refusal of 
contact with and assistance to its authorities signaled through its deeds the EU acquiescence 
in Israel’s strategy of curbing Hamas through collective punishment of the population. The 
strategy, while punishing the civilian population, ending the Palestinians’ view of democracy, 
had little to dispower Hamas, which remained firmly in control of the Gaza Strip. Israel, in 
another direction, the second wing of the EU policy towards Israel- Palestine is that of a 
deepening relationship, regardless of Israel’s conduct in the conflict.228 
Hence, since June 2007 the EU has persisted in its boycott of the Hamas government in Gaza 
by refusing contact with it and refraining from channeling aid through it. The approved EU 
sewage system and the airport project in the Gaza Strip, for example were totally 
dysfunctional. In terms of cash assistance, the only EU aid channeled to the Gaza Strip in 
2008 was the payments to 28,500 civil employees. This includes the PA civil servants who 
did not go to work under the Hamas administration as well as teachers and health workers and 
24,000 Gaza residents under the Palestinian Vulnerable Families program. In addition, the 
payments to cover private sector arrears and to pay for fuel bills to operate Gaza’s power 
plant, as well as humanitarian assistance under ECHO and the URWA, amounting to a total of 
approximately 220 million Euros.229 In this case, cash money to the Gaza Strip did not help 
                                                           
228 Active but Acquiescent, (2009), ibid. 
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for it must be continuously negotiated with Israel. Meanwhile, as Israel’s siege of Gaza 
tightened. 
Further, in September 2007 Israel classified the Gaza Strip as “hostile territory”,230 
significantly restricting the access of humanitarian goods and fuel, while effectively banning 
the movement of commercial goods and people in and out of the territory. The declared aim 
was that of exerting pressure on Hamas, essentially creating a direct link between the pursuit 
of political goals and the collective punishment of the civilian population.231 
Yet Israel’s closure of the Gaza Strip persisted leading to 50% unemployment rate and to the 
shut down of 95% of Gaza’s industry due to lack of raw materials and export opportunities.232 
Israel also continued to restrict humanitarian access, including basic food and medicine. The 
Gaza Strip requires a daily average of 400-500 truckloads of humanitarian assistance at daily 
basis according to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICC) and the UN. Between  
June 19th and November 5th, 2008, the average number of daily truckloads dropped to 120.233 
On November 4-5th 2008, the situation got worse when Israel carried out an incursion, 
allegedly in order to destroy a tunnel under construction, which killed six Hamas militants. 
Hamas resumed rockets attacks, including launching longer-range missiles, creating 
additional Israeli public pressure on the government to take action. By November 5th, Gaza’s 
borders were almost entirely closed as Israel allowed a mere 6 truckloads per day to enter the 
Strip. In a situation in which over 80% of the 1.5 million people in Gaza are dependent on 
food aid, 234the effect was devastating.  
                                                                                                                                                                                     
of the Palestinian economy for the reconstruction of Gaza, Sharm-el-Sheikh, Europa press release, 2 March 
2009, http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/09/81 
230 The term “hostile territory” has no basis in IHL 
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However, the EU objected to Israel’s closure policy, recognizing it as an illegal act of 
collective punishment. Yet, beyond words, little was done to induce Israel to lift the closure, 
for example on fuel supplies below Gaza’s minimum needs.235 
By permitting and operating under Israeli restrictions on fuel purchases and on the repair and 
maintenance of power plant turbines and the electricity network, the EU has implicitly 
recognized these restrictions as lawful. As far as EUBAM is concerned, the EU did not take 
further initiatives to ensure the implementation of the AMA after the complete closure of 
Rafah post- June 2007.236 
Reflections 
- Imbalanced power relations in their three forms- power relations, relationships of 
communications and objective capacity- exist between a complex net of actors. They also 
exist in many forms such as arrangements and agreements. Actors can be in groups or 
individuals, forming alliances and adversaries with each other. Actors can be directly 
involved visibly forming relations with each other, however, informal actors can generate 
hidden mechanisms that can indirectly influence the decision- making processes.  
- As long as there is communications between actors and exchange of information, 
imbalanced power relations can exist and there is no way to remove totally the negative effect 
of these relations. However, the difference might be reduced or minimized. 
- Reviewing the EU policies from a legal standpoint entails an obligation in the context 
of the EU external relations, stemming from specific instruments in relation to HRL, and 
relevant rules concerning state responsibility. 
- EU policies towards the OPT thus acted as a light version of the strategy espoused by 
Israel as well as the US in the same period. Hence, little pressure was exerted by the EU on 
Israel to alter the latter’s polices on the ground. 
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6 Expert Interviews 
Up until now, the general methodology scheme was presented in terms of three phases 
(observatory phase, analytical phase, and model formation phase). Further, the author took on 
the analysis of the EU common strategy in terms of the EU position, declarations, and legal 
obligations, the EU instruments via Israel- OPT in terms of diplomacy, contractual and 
capacity building, and the deployment of the EU policy between the elections and the 
collapse of national unity. 
In this chapter, however, the understanding of the EU- policy towards OPT by informed 
Europeans and Palestinians in terms of frame analysis are the ones the author proposes to deal 
with. To do so, interviews are compared interpretatively in the following manner: 
The chapter tackles the frames that define policy problems and the way in which different 
participants understand them. More specifically, how Europeans and Palestinians, informed 
about EU policy- making, frame the situational contexts that attribute social meanings to the 
EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives. The way language is used to call attention 
to the conflict that reflects the views of different communities is of significance. 
 
It details information that is still scare concerning the views of Europeans and Palestinians’ 
namely, informed Palestinian academics and politicians including the Islamists as well as 
European officials, diplomats and academic “experts” working in Palestine and in Brussels, 
on the EU’s boycott policy. Further, it examines Islamophobia, on a comparative basis, as the 
interviewees perceive it. 
 
It analyzes what the response to this boycott policy is, in terms of who is responding, how and 
what is the final product of this response for potential intervention to resolve the differences 
between the views of the different communities. Therefore, the EU policy is examined along 
frames that link perception with action.237 
 
Interpretatively, Europeans and Palestinians whose understandings of the EU’s policy are 
central to its enactment are of analytical concern in terms of: 
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1. Who? Actors (individual, collective): identify issues- relevant interpretative discourse 
communities of meaning with respect to the focus of analysis “the EU’s boycott policy of 
Hamas” 
2. How? Vehicle: identify key symbols and intervention, and finally 
3. What? Content: identify meanings (note plural: multiple possible meanings) that key 
symbol(s) has (have) for each community of meaning and their similarities and 
differences in the process framing the conflicts. Framing- reflection in terms of resolution 
of conflict requires frame breaking.238 In doing so, the author reports the views of the 
interviewees without any intervening judgment in the following manner: 
 
Int. Policy Europeans Palestinians  
Who *European diplomats at 
European embassies located in 
the West Bank- Ramallah239 
*European senior officials 
working in the European 
Commission, and the Council of 
Europe in Brussels 
*Two Professors and two 
students of one of the 
professors. 
*All European interviewees 
wished to remain anonymous 
with the exception of the two 
professors, Prof. John Bunzl and 
Prof. Roger Heacock 
*Palestinian professors at Bir Zeit and al- 
Najah universities 
*Palestinian Ministers and parliamentary- 
members in the West Bank240 
* Palestinian professionals and researchers 
working in human rights NGOs and 
research centers 
*The interviewees are respectively, 
Zahirah Kamal, Sameer abu ‘esheh, 
Sameeh shbeb, Samia al- botmeh, Said 
Kanan, Saed al- Nimr, Raed  N’eerat, 
Naser Sha2er, Kamal Hassoneh, Hasan 
Fayyad, Abdullah Abdulla 
How Vehicle: identify key symbols (language, objects, and/or acts) which have 
significant meanings for these interpretative communities 
EU *It is an economic and political partnership between 27 European countries. 
                                                           
238 Yanow, Dvora, (2000), Conducting Interpretative Policy Analysis, qualitative research methods, Sage 
Publications, California, 2000, p22 
239  It was impossible for the researcher to interview any of the diplomats at European embassies located in 
Jerusalem for the researcher is a Palestinian Identity- holder from the West Bank and is not allowed to enter 
Jerusalem 
240 Hamas members were not interviewed as planned for most of them at the time of the interview were detained 
and imprisoned. Besides, there was neither access to enter Jerusalem to interview Palestinians there nor to enter 
or to interview Palestinians in the Gaza Strip. 
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It aims for peace, freedom and prosperity that has resulted so far in free 
travel and trade, single euro currency, and better living standards and joint 
action... and much more besides. 
*It has three main bodies to run and adopt its legislation, namely, the 
European Parliament representing the people of Europe, the Council of the 
European Union representing national governments and the European 
Commission representing the common EU interest.  
 *It is also seen as having 
“influential” and less influential 
EU member states in the EU- 
policy-making process.  
*It is also seen in terms of colonial history 
to the Arab world at large and to Palestine 
in particular    
strengths  *It is considered to be a big tent for Europeans along with the principle of 
gradual progression, moving its members as one unit at different speeds and 
bringing a great number of races, languages, and religions. Many European 
representatives consider the formation of a common international European 
identity to be the strongest point of the EU. 
*The supremacy of the European court authority over local courts is among 
the major strengths of the union as well as its economic policy with solidarity 
between more and less powerful countries. 
*It is worth noting that most interviewees appraised the EU’s role as major 
donor to the Palestinians with some doubts about its effectiveness, though. 
weaknesses  *The EU had double standards in its foreign democratization policy. Some 
Palestinian interviewees, particularly, questioned how they are supposedly to 
value democracy and desire democratic process. Giving the example that the 
EU neither accepted the election results when Islamists were brought to 
power, neither has it accepted Turkey’s accession to the EU, nor requires 
(expressed at varied degrees by some interviewees) its authoritarian allies to 
practice democracy in the Arab world. 
*The lack of a common EU policy as perceived by some persons in both 
groups of interviewees amounts to a significant weakness. No common 
consistent EU foreign policy towards Palestine; Britain’s position is different 
from France’s and Germany’s is different from both along with changing 
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policy over time and power politics that formulate a consistent EU position 
along the way. 241 
 The degree of divergence between the member states goes far in explaining 
the emergence of current ambiguity within the positions of the EU member 
states. 
 *The first concerns Israel- 
Palestine violence and 
encounters of violence/ 
terrorism. 
*The second concerns the EU’s 
border monitoring efforts. 
Whereas the EU’s initiatives are 
mentioned in the context of the 
need to secure open access and 
implement the AMA, some 
others’ emphasis are placed on 
anti- arms smuggling by Hamas. 
*The third concerns the 
formation of a Palestinian 
national unity government, 
some favored reinstating the PA 
in the WB as well as in Gaza 
and thought it necessary to 
reach a resolution in the future, 
and others made it a strong 
condition that  Hamas accept 
the three conditions of the 
Quartet. 
 
*The Palestinian resistance is seen as 
being a right of the occupied Palestinians 
to resist Israeli occupation. Some argue if 
resistance is conceived as occupied 
Palestinian violence/ terrorism by the EU, 
why can the EU not see the 
disproportional violence/ terrorism of the 
occupying / terrorist state. 
* The EU’s border monitoring efforts are 
welcome in the context of the Palestinian 
need to secure open access. However, it is 
seen to be mostly ineffective given its 
inability to conduct border monitoring, 
reconstruction and aid policy under 
current conditions and Israel’s control of 
such access. Often, they are seen as one- 
sided efforts especially when the emphasis 
is placed on anti- arms smuggling, which 
could entail a further sealing of Gaza’s 
borders, particularly if actions are taken to 
destroy tunnels before access is assured. 
*The EU is seen by some as supporting, 
and others see as not genuinely favoring 
the formation of a Palestinian national 
                                                           
241  As given examples, the British mandate in Palestine and its current role in the war against Iraq. Sarkozy’s 
speech at time of the interviews asserting on TV that France supported the establishment of the state of Palestine 
along the 1967 borders was considered positively. Some Suthern European and Scandinavian states were viewed 
to be supportive to Palestinian democracy but not to an extent to put any pressure on Israel. The case with 
Germany was mostly viewed negatively in relation to Angela Merkel speech in the Knesset by then and her one-
sided empathy with Israel with no consideration the the violation of human rights Israel commits against the 
Palestinians. One Palestinian interviewee stated “sorry Israel and no sorry, go die Palestinians”. Another 
interviewee suggested that her visit sent a message that injustice against Jews alone should never happen again, 
but it is all right to commit acts of injustice against Palestinians. 
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unity government.  
Policy  Two- state resolution: Two states living in peace within internationally 
recognized borders. The state of Palestine would be established in the West 
Bank, East Jerusalem and Gaza Strip along the 1967 borders (with minor and 
mutually agreed adjustments if necessary), and would be viable, sovereign 
and democratic. 
 * The EU historically 
recognized Israel’s right to state 
hood, living in peace with its 
neighbors within secured and 
internationally recognized 
borders. 
*A key position is in serving the 
security of the state of Israel in 
reference to Conclusions of the 
EC in 1999. Another key 
position is in building a 
Palestinian state with financial 
resources channeled for this 
purpose. Here, some argued that 
the creation of a democratic, 
viable and peaceful sovereign 
Palestinian state would be the 
best guarantee to Israeli 
security. 
 
* The EU’s position towards the 
Palestinians was articulated over time to 
support Palestinian self- determination 
beginning in the 1980 Venice 
declarations. As well, by the end of the 
Oslo process, the EC advanced its support 
to the Palestinian state. 
*Either, it is seen as a pro- Israel policy, 
and furthermore as colonial in terms of 
supporting the occupier against the 
occupied. Firstly, it criticizes the conduct 
of the occupier less and that of the 
occupied more. Secondly, it limits its 
criticism as related to Israel by words such 
as condemnations, and thirdly, in the 
opposite direction, upgrades its 
agreements with Israel. Yet, its response 
to the results of democratic election in the 
OPT, by boycotting Hamas and 
consequently isolating not only Hamas but 
also the 1.5 million Palestinians living in 
Gaza Strip.  
towards *Some EU representatives 
consider the EU to be fully 
committed  to human rights and 
democracy due to an ethical 
point of view towards a 
peaceful Israel- Palestine 
*Some consider the EU’s ethical view to 
be in favor of the rights of the occupier as 
much as related to a feeling of guilt 
towards the Jewish people due to the 
holocaust legacy in Europe rather than the 
rights of the Palestinians under Israeli 
Interviews 
 
116   
 
conflict resolution. However, 
some others consider that the 
EU’s is acquiescing to a 
political agenda imposed by the 
USA and Israel and only 
pursuing further economic 
development. Many, however, 
consider the EU’s role to be 
limited to economic 
development making no sense 
when considering the major 
financial humanitarian support 
to the Palestinians. Yet, some 
wondered what else could be 
done if the EU was not helping 
the Palestinians in reference to 
the Arab- Muslim world at 
large. 
occupation. Further, some argue that the 
EU is paying the price for the occupation 
destruction in the OPT instead of the 
occupier itself. 
*Some Palestinians consider the EU’s 
financial support to be up to the conditions 
laid down by donors. Others emphasize 
that it is in violation of international law 
and used to impose the donor agenda 
against the will of the occupied people. 
*Some Palestinians see the EU’s 
economic focus as being due to its 
incapability to master its own political 
agenda in acquiescence to the political 
agenda of the USA and Israel. 
Palestine *The starting point used by each 
European diplomat  is 1967 
borders Earlier it had been  
considered a waste of efforts to 
reach a two- state solution and 
somehow out of date. 
*Essentially, Palestinians refer to 
historical Palestine as it was in 1948 and 
before the establishment of the state of 
Israel. Some, however, consider 1967 to 
be an acceptable point in history whereby 
the PLO as well as the international 
community agrees on this as a framework 
for negotiations in order to reach two- 
state solutions. 
Intervention  
A.1 Pre- election European Union Foreign Policy 
 *The EU addresses the political, economic, humanitarian and security issues 
and Palestinians reforms and institution-building as being necessary in 
building a viable state. Meanwhile, the EU calls on Israel for freezing the 
Israeli Settlement and for abstaining from measures in violation of 
international law.   
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*The EU  condemns terrorism and violence strongly, which cannot be 
allowed to hold up the peace process or political stability in the region. 242 
 *The EU policy focused among 
other things on democracy, 
good governance and human 
rights, on inter-state and intra- 
state resolutions. However, it 
has been argued by some as 
being ineffective,243 and some 
others think that it must be 
improved. 244 
* The same view, in terms of ineffective 
EU policy,245 is shared and partly 
explained by the EU’s contact with one 
actor of conflict- Israel and yet 
acquiescence to Israel and lack of contact 
with the other party- Hamas. 
 *The EU has opted for a strategy of negative conditionality towards the 
elected Hamas representatives, i.e. the threat of withdrawing benefits such as 
aid and diplomatic contacts until certain conditions have been met since 
Hamas is included on the EU’s terrorist list. However, Hamas participated in 
the parliamentary election and the PA and the EU, along with the Quartet 
insisted on three principles as they were called by some European 
interviewees and strict conditions as they were called by all the Palestinian 
interviewees.  For normal contacts to take place, Hamas would have to be 
removed from the terrorist list and for this to take place would have to 
demonstrate its withdrawal from terrorism. 
*The EU, however called for 1) the renouncement of violence 2) the 
acceptance of previous agreements and 3) the recognition of the state of 
Israel. Those conditions were elaborated further by the interviewees in the 
following manner: 
 *Firstly, all rejected violence 
and some used the term along 
*Firstly, all rejected Israeli violence and 
Palestinian violence. Some Palestinians, 
                                                           
242  The EU has listed Hamas and Islamic Jihad on its list of banned terrorist organizations for their attacks 
against Israel. At the same time, it recognizes Israel’s right to protect its citizens from these attacks. However, it 
repeatedly emphasizes that it shall exercise this right within international law and takes no action that aggravates 
the humanitarian and economic situation of the Palestinians. 
243  Given examples, it condemned attacks on civilians, the separation wall and settlement. However, it refrained 
from calling for an international independent investigation into violation of IHL and IHRL. It did not find a legal 
solution to the existing misapplications of the EU- Israel agreements. 
244  The EU has repeatedly called upon Israel to deliver tax revenues and ease the restrictions of movements. The 
EU did not object to Israel’s decision on crossing monitoring either and thus accepted closure of the border since 
June 2007 
245 Given examples, the EU called for ceasefire, yet failed to secure its goal by not exerting any pressure on 
Israel. 
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with terrorism and often 
associated it with the 
Palestinians and eventually, 
Hamas. None though addressed 
the violence carried out by the 
state of Israel, unlike the 
Palestinians. As for resistance to 
the Israeli occupation, some 
distance themselves from this 
view altogether and others 
supported only peaceful 
negotiations while some others 
limit it to non- violent means of 
resistance for now and in the 
future, along a fixed border- 
space in reference to 1967. One 
interviewee questioned the 
inability of Hamas simply to 
reject violence, for Palestinians 
have the right to name and 
define violence and not to 
accept the Israeli definition. 
Hamas could channel it 
accordingly into a refusal to 
accept Palestinian violence 
internally. 
*Secondly, some found Hamas’ 
participation in the election as 
an indirect acceptance of 
previous agreements, especially 
Oslo that brought the election 
into existence. Everyone, with 
the exception of one 
interviewee, regretted the EU’s 
as did the Europeans, confused the term 
with terrorism while some others among 
the Palestinians only mixed it with 
resistance. Further, some elaborated that 
increasingly, attempts by politicians and 
media are more likely in Israel and the 
USA and less likely in Europe to link 
violence to the Palestinian resistance. In 
relation to this, at least two positions were 
reflected; firstly, the means of resistance, 
namely, violent and none- violent 
resistance, time in terms of the past, 
current and future resistance strategy, and 
space in terms of the 1948 and 1967 
border- lines. 
* Secondly, all found Hamas’ 
participation in the election process as 
being de- facto acceptance of all previous 
agreements. It was often stated that it was 
the responsibility of the PLO, of which 
Hamas is not a part, and not of Hamas to 
carry out negotiation processes along 
those agreements and that was in 
agreement with Hamas. Some 
interviewees found a difference between 
Hamas and the nominated lists for the 
election, who were not necessarily Hamas 
members. Some questioned how the EU 
would be able to distinguish who was 
Hamas and who was not from those 
nominated for election and further among 
the Palestinians who voted for them. 
* Thirdly, to recognize the state of Israel 
and/ or according to some to recognize 
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acceptance of Hamas’ 
participation in the election in 
the first place. Many though 
expressed that the election is a 
Palestinian issue only and to 
contact the elected or not is an 
EU decision. The exceptional 
view highlighted that all EU 
member states but one, namely, 
the Netherlands, rejected 
Hamas’ participation at an 
earlier stage in the election. 
*Thirdly, the recognition of the 
state of Israel was found 
essential for any peace process 
to take place between Israel and 
the Palestinians. As for 
recognizing Israel’s right to 
exist as a Jewish state, at least 
two views are arguable; one 
finds it an Israeli issue to define 
itself a non- Jewish state and a 
second view, could predict 
difficulties in the implication of 
such recognition, especially, on 
the Palestinians living in Israel. 
Israel’s right to exist as a Jewish state is 
strongly debatable. As for the first, all 
confirmed that the PLO and Arafat had 
already done so and some others argued 
that it was important to include Hamas in 
the PLO as a mass- based movement and 
therefore to make sure those voices of the 
Palestinians are heard irrespective of their 
political party. As for the second, some 
argued that the insistence of Israel and not 
the EU to recognize Israel as a Jewish 
state was in order to expel the Palestinians 
living inside Israel and to crash the right 
of Palestinian refugees to return and thus 
the whole peace process. Some others 
were of the opinion that whether it was a 
Jewish state or not, the Palestinian’s right 
of return was not negotiable as well as 
Palestinians living inside Israel. However, 
it may cause inequalities as it does now 
between Jews and non- Jews living in 
Israel. 
A.2 Post- election European Union Foreign Policy  
 *Interviewees strongly argued that the EU boycott policy of Hamas in 2006 
was acted upon within a wider international context within which the 
escalation of conflict took place. 
*The EU boycott of Hamas implied not only withholding aid to it, but the 
international community also froze international bank transactions in 
Palestine. In addition, Israel, in violation of previous agreements and 
international law, has withheld Palestinian tax revenues amounting to one 
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third of the PA’s monthly revenues, it has repeatedly arrested dozens of 
Hamas ministers and parliamentarians, and it has restricted their movement 
between the West Bank and Gaza Strip and Jerusalem 
*It was often argued, that the boycott of Hamas and isolating Gaza, financing 
the PA- controlled West Bank, made the accomplishment of the EU’s 
declared objectives for a peaceful Middle East less likely. 
*The EU boycott, coupled with the EU’s unconditional support of Israel and 
Israel’s policy, made the EU’s pleas for democracy and good governance in 
Palestine appear to Palestinians, in particular, as a stunning illustration of the 
notorious double standards. 
 *On the EU’s aid to OPT, it 
engaged in humanitarian aid 
without demanding any 
compensation from Israel or 
investigating into its violations, 
despite its ongoing inability to 
channel funds effectively to 
Gaza. The Quartet agreed on 
this (TIM),246 coupled with a 
growing need for humanitarian 
assistance, and this resulted in a 
large increase in the EU 
assistance to the Palestinians.247  
*Aid had catastrophic effects on 
Palestinian governance and society for the 
OPT increasingly resembled a semi- 
international protectorate for the 
international community to deliver aid to 
the occupied. Further, the TIM had led to 
re-centralization of powers in Abbas’ 
hands that drew much criticism during 
Arafat’s rule and generated unaccountable 
management of the PA funds. Partly, it 
contributed to Gaza’s chaos and 
lawlessness.248  
What? Content: identify meanings (note plural: multiple possible meanings) that key 
symbol(s) has (have) for each community of meaning and their similarities 
and differences in frame conflicts 
B.1 Islamophobia Meanings and Manifestation  
 Islamophobia:249 To the interviewees, Islamophobia has a wide range of 
definitions such as hostility against Islam, or fear from Islam or hatred or ill 
                                                           
246  TIM: a mechanism through which funds were channeled to the OPT while bypassing the PA with the 
exception of the presidency. 
247 This in confirmation of the words of the UN envoy de Soto “Europeans have spent more money in boycotting 
the PA than what they previously spent in supporting it”. Quoted in Alvaro de Soto (2007), ibid., p31 
248 While the humanitarian focus generated a culture of dependence in the OPT, the absence of an effective 
Palestinian government and Israel’s hold over Gaza created fertile ground for criminal gangs 
249  The author used the same term Islamophobia as it is and in English while questioning the interviewees about 
its meaning, as they perceive it. 
Interviews 
 
121   
 
treatment to Muslims in different aspects of life or discrimination against 
Muslims and sometimes as a form of racism discrimination against Muslim 
groups. This is due to a perception that all Muslims are religious fanatics, 
have violent tendencies towards non- Muslims and reject the concept of 
equality, tolerance and democracy and, often, noted the following: 
 *A profound Islamophobia debate has been taking place since September 11 
and subsequent attacks in Madrid and London. 
*Some interviewees noted that political leaders have started more often to 
adopt apocalyptic discourse, speaking in the name of God in their speeches 
and in the name of good and evil. 
*Further debate, particularly in Europe following the Danish cartoon against 
which huge demonstrations took place. 
*It is also argued that, with the end of the Cold War, America needed a new 
ideological enemy, in reference to Islam, to serve as a threat 
*The media, seminars and hundreds of publications worldwide started to 
focus on Islam. 
* Many interviewees claimed that the media has presented Islam in Europe, 
more likely, as a negative stereotype and has played a disproportionate role 
against Islamist- violence compared to non- Islamists violence as well 
intensifying Judo-Christian West- East Islam. 
 *Some interviewees also 
pointed out that the term 
Islamophobia is not ideal 
because it is not clear or 
specific. Instead, it leaves much 
leeway for negative 
assumptions and manifestations 
of hostility against Muslims 
while some pointed out that it is 
not the rejection of a religion 
alone but a refusal to include 
people perceived as non- 
European due to their different 
race and names. 
*Many interviewees perceived 
Islamophobia to take place in Europe. 
*One form of Islamophobia outside 
Europe was mentioned in relation to the 
rise of anti -Western Islamist movements 
in predominant Muslim countries, and the 
way they are seen as terrorists in the US- 
led war on terror policy. For example, 
against the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and 
as claimed in Iraq, and more specifically 
Hezbollah in Lebanon as well as Hamas 
that are in direct conflict with Israel. It 
was further elaborated that those 
movements are more likely anti-USA 
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*Often, the term is referred to in 
connection with a Muslim 
minority in Europe and 
elsewhere with the exception of 
one interviewee, who pointed 
out that Islamic and anti-
Western movements are 
examples of violent Islamists 
coming to power even in a 
democratic process. 
imperialism and the Israeli occupation of 
Palestine and less likely to be anti- 
European. This position does not 
necessarily occupy a majority position in 
their countries as explained by a couple of 
interviewees. 
B.2 Islamophobia and Anti- Semitism  
 *The comparison made by many interviewees between Islamophobia and 
anti- Semitism was highlighted according to similarities as well as 
differences between the two in the following manner: 
*The similarity is often perceived in terms of the exclusion of minorities as 
well as prejudice and religion- based discrimination in Europe. This can 
amount to verbal or physical attacks on Muslim and Jewish individuals and 
groups and their holy places.250 
*The difference is often viewed in terms of the historical situation of the 
Jews and the contemporary situation of Muslims as “double standards” for 
religion- based attack is no longer acceptable if it is directed against Jews but 
more acceptable if it is against Muslims 
 *As related to Israel- Palestine, a colonial structure of a Jewish state on the 
ground as declared is often ignored in Europe while it continues to occupy 
Palestine and Palestinian- Hamas resistance is emphasized at varied degrees 
within and between different European countries. 
*Arguably, the very concept of anti- Semitism and that of Islamophobia 
serve to stifle both external and internal criticism of Jews and Israel and of 
Hamas and Palestine and Palestinians. 
B.3 Islamophobia and the European Union Foreign Policy   
 *The EU has established foreign policy and initiatives through which to 
pursue engagement with political Islamists. One critical element of this 
                                                           
250  For example, Prof. Bunzl stated that prejudice against Muslims nowadays in Europe reminded him exactly of 
the prejudice that took place also in Europe against Jews 
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initiative is to strengthen engagement with Islamists in and outside Europe. 
*This EU policy is met often with “curiosity” if not with “suspicion” by 
Islamists, mainly, for the EU’s position towards Turkey’s candidacy for 
membership of the EU that is one of the most disappointing examples given 
by the interviewees, and recently by the pressing EU boycott policy of the 
elected Hamas representatives. 
*It is noted by some interviewees that European governments have remained 
reluctant to support a democracy potential in Palestine led by Hamas while 
donors who distanced themselves from this could be perceived as 
(Islamophobic) aid. 
 *Some addressed the EU’s 
policy towards engaging with 
Islamists externally and 
internally as a growing concern 
to the EU. The external element 
concerns the role of Muslim 
democrat parties in the Middle 
East and North Africa while the 
internal element concerns 
tensions surrounding the 
Muslim minority communities 
in Europe. 
*Many interviewees, including the 
Islamists, legitimatize the adoption of the 
European democracy model and the way it 
functions within Europe, provided that it 
serves Islamic values and does not replace 
them, since all belong to humanity. 
However, this same EU model for 
democracy is perceived as a double-
standards model, especially as related to 
Islamists outside Europe. 
Evaluation At varied degrees, Islamophobia, anti- Semitism and the EU policy towards 
Israel- Palestine are intertwining. 
C.1  The Impact of Islamophobia on the EU Foreign Policy towards Palestine  
 *Some noted that criticism of 
Israel sometimes amounts to 
anti- Semitism. Further, 
September 11th played a 
significant role in emphasizing 
anti- Semitic projects and 
disregarding the Zionist project. 
* As for criticism of Israel in 
Europe, it is less likely and 
* It is noted that the Palestinian resistance 
to the Israeli occupation is increasingly 
being transformed into Islamic violence/ 
terrorism (read: anti- Semitism) often 
inspired by anti-Jewish themes in early 
Islamic tradition and European anti- 
Semitism. 
* It is less likely and when there is 
criticism, it is limited to words and not 
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more related to unresolved 
holocaust horror memories in 
Europe where there is a 
personal attachment to the 
feeling of responsibility for the 
persecution of Jews 
deeds due firstly, to the guilt feeling of the 
holocaust legacy. Secondly, laws set up to 
fight anti- Semitic attitudes, actions, and 
favoring some Jews, especially returnees 
to Europe. 
C.2  What is next?   
 A more coherent and consistent, credible and effective EU policy towards the 
conflict aimed at fulfilling the EU’s political vision and complying with the 
EU’s legal commitments as follows:  
 *To promote and support both independent international and domestic 
criminal investigations into alleged violations committed during the conflict 
by all parties. 
*To re-assess the EU- Israel bilateral relations as a cornerstone of its political 
approach and to introduce the logic of human rights and IHL, *To give a 
longer- term orientation to the EU’s aid to the OPT, while being careful in 
respect of independence in channeling humanitarian assistance. 
*To formulate a viable and well- thought out strategy to engage with a new 
Palestinian government representing a first step towards Palestinian 
reconciliation 
*To re-evaluate its border monitoring activities by ensuring that member 
states’ anti- arms smuggling efforts take place hand by hand with the regular 
opening of all crossings to Gaza.251 
 
Often, it is argued that the EU’s two- state solution policy, contrary to its declared objectives, 
is “neither state building nor democratization”. In terms of democracy, one damaging factor 
for the image of the European model of democracy is the “doubled- standards” of democracy 
within and outside Europe. Within Europe, the EU stands for “sovereignty” of the people 
based on justice and freedom and equalities between individuals and groups. However, the 
EU is far from reality on the part of neighboring countries in a way perceived as the “EU 
wants democracy upon its choosing” and therefore less willing to accept produced results that 
they are not seeking. 
                                                           
251  This is, as recommended, by either receiving binding guarantees from Israel that it would not impede the 
access of the EU monitors to Rafah or stationing EUBAM monitors in Egypt rather than in Israel, and/ or by 
confirming that the Rafah crossing is but one access point. 
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In term of state building, it was overstressed that the attitude of the EU towards the Israeli- 
Arab conflict is “partial”. According to some interviewees, it is “a pro- Israel” policy, not 
only by taking no enforcement measures against Israeli violations of international law to 
which the EU is committed, but also the lenient rules and wide margins adopted with 
reference to Israel is defeating the EU’s declared policy with regard to building a viable 
Palestinian state. 
 
Historically, it was strongly expressed by some interviews that Europe, particularly Britain, 
played a primary role in planting Israeli problem in the heart of the Middle East and then 
developing them before conferring its guardianship on the USA as a part of “colonial” and 
“imperial” Western projects. 
Today, many interviewees expressed, with no doubts at all, the failure of the EU’s state-
building policy due to some very sticky issues. For example, the Israeli settlement expansion, 
checkpoints and restriction of movement for Palestinians, cantoned Palestinian territories, 
division between Gaza and West Bank, and most importantly the siege of Gaza and the 
economically underdeveloped Palestinian economy whereas the EU put neither pressure on 
nor took decisive action to improve the deteriorating situation on the ground and left no space 
for viable Palestinian state building. 
 
Further, a gap is observed separating the EU’s political aims and legal commitments, and the 
absence of concrete measures to ensure that such goals can be accomplished and 
commitments kept. Critically, the reason for this discrepancy lies in the EU’s active role in 
pursuing a two- state solution while being acquiescent to the USA and Israel’s power politics. 
However, while the author becomes more sensitized to the quality of data from which the 
interviews provide theoretical insights, analyzing Islamophobia in the raw interview- data and 
transforming it into analytical categories is the core stone for interpretative policy analysis. 
This is because it attempts to identify Islamophobia in terms of possible meanings and to 
frame symbols that both Palestinian and European interviewees have. Therefore, the author 
tailored the questionnaire in a way that the research questions could be answered, thus not 
necessarily in agreement with all the views presented in the interviews in the following 
manner: 
 
Firstly, the recent parliamentary elections in 2006 in Palestine showed how complex the 
evolution of Islamists is and how crucial an understanding of Islamic movement/s and the 
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distinct position for the EU to take actually is. Whereas Hamas is the only Islamic 
government in the Arab- Muslim world which has been elected democratically, the common 
view among Europeans and the Palestinians including Islamists and non- Islamists 
interviewees, is that the EU actively collaborated in the repression of the Hamas government. 
However, the European interviewees did not share fully the aim of the boycott policy to 
completely defeat Hamas but more often argued that it was to change the stance of Hamas. 
Nevertheless, they are aware that the EU’s refusal to accept the victory of Hamas in a 
democratic electoral process has undermined the credibility of the EU’s discourse on 
democratization in Palestine and in the region. 
 
Secondly, some Palestinian interviewees argued that a critical reason for boycotting Hamas, 
was Hamas’ resistance project as a political as well as a military force. This is mainly due to 
its political opposition to give up the struggle for self- determination and liberation in return 
for a limited control and sovereignty in the Gaza Strip and parts of the WB under tight Israeli 
control and supervision. For the same reason, Israel’s declared strategy went beyond Hamas 
and it is straightforward: starving and strangulating into submission the 1.5 million 
Palestinians living in Gaza by imposing a blockade in 2006 that is supposed to lead the 
Palestinians in Gaza to replace the current Hamas government with the more dormant PA in 
the WB. For want of food and medicine, for want of cement and petrol, the people of Gaza 
live in conditions that international bodies and agencies have described as criminal.252 
 
Thirdly, some interviewees noted that the blockade of Gaza did not occur exclusively as the 
result of a propaganda machine that describes Israel’s action as self- defense, while 
demonizing the Palestinians in Gaza and those who support them as terrorists, and was the 
only possible course for Israeli politicians, in particular. The terrible consequence in the 
Palestinian suffering of this determination does not remain a serious concern, nor does 
international condemnations. 
 
Finally, the interviews contribute to the definition of Islamophobia by attempting to answer 
the questions of what, when and where one perceives Islamophobia in the EU’s foreign policy 
towards Palestine as follows: 
                                                           
252 Meanwhile, Hamas captured an Israeli solder, Gilad Shalit, and so the blockade became tighter. It included a 
ban on the most elementary commodities without which human begins find it difficult to survive. Yet, there are 
alternative ways for replacing the captive solder, such as swapping the thousands of political prisoners Israel is 
holding.     
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*Patterns of prejudice translated into disproportionate/ discriminate policy against 
Palestinians in comparison to the Israelis 
*Inspired by Orientalism and as a part of Judeo- Christian campaign against Islamic-
Palestinian/ Hamas terrorism 
*Carried out along imbalanced power relations between powerful- West and occupying 
Israel, and less powerful- Islam and occupied Palestine 
*Fuelled by attacks, carried out by Muslims in Europe and in Israel 
*Intertwined with anti Semitism and the Israel- Palestine conflict 
 
It is worth noting though, that the EU is an institution consisting of a growing number of 
European states, with different interests and objectives. Taking the EU member-states 
reactions altogether, the EU’s common approach towards the Hamas government based on 
free and democratic elections (as far as this was possible in the context of ongoing 
occupation) was one of isolation. 
However, the majority EU consensus explains the reinstatement of the EU approach in at least 
three dilemmas. First, the inconsistency between diplomatic words and the absence of deeds 
with the EU affirming the need to respect IHL and IHL while not pressing for concrete action 
to ensure this. Second, there is no comprehensive rethink of the effectiveness and purpose of 
the EU’s aid to the OPT. Third, there is no majority consensus of desisting from rewarding 
Israel through EU’s contractual relations or of ensuring that the Israel agreements are lawfully 
implemented. 
Several factors may explain the EU’s approach assuaging the perceived need to act in the 
Middle East and the measures to accommodate the unwillingness of the EU majority to take a 
firm stance towards Israel. Arguably, this unwillingness is directed by a plurality of interests, 
ranging from transatlantic relations to commercial ties with Israel, alongside ideological 
commitments to Israel, which persist even when the EU knowingly acts against its aims and 
interests in the region. 
Therefore, one should refer back to the historical processes of the conflict from which it was 
generated and the sources of strengths and weaknesses in the EU’s policy towards Israel- 
Palestine, and similarly to the conditions that enforce their strength or deplete their control. 
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To this point, the author suggests the following figure to illustrate the EU’s boycott policy and 
influential factors as expressed at varied degrees by both communities of interviewees as 
follows: 
Islamophopia EU Policy
Anti-Semitism t-3
Holocaust t-2 EU Guilt t-1
Zionism t-2
USA Policy
Pro-
Israel
Pro-
Palestine
 
Figure 7: An illustration of the E factors underpinning the EU policy towards Israel- 
Palestine 
 
At least five points are noted: firstly, while the EU’s boycott policy is a part of the 
international context, what is unclear is to what extent the EU and other international actors 
are driven by Islamophobia as an influential factor in the EU’s boycott policy of Hamas. 
However, the anti- Islamic factor whereby Israel regards a domestic Islamic movement like 
Hamas more or less as an enemy and a part of global Islamic terrorism is imported into the 
USA and European Orientalism and that Hamas is just a terrorist organization. To this point, 
the EU and its member states are viewed differently from the American experience with what 
is called the Orient. In this case, it is in relation to the Middle East, Palestine and her people 
and eventually, to Hamas. 
 
Secondly, anti- Semitism is also noted as another key factor playing a role in the EU’s policy 
towards Israel- Palestine. It is unclear though, to what extent the presence of Israel as a Jewish 
self- declared state in the middle of the Arab- Islamic Orientalist world is driven by the 
holocaust and consequently the feeling of guilt, and in which direction different actors import 
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it into their foreign policy and act upon it. Therefore, it is unreasonable, for example, to 
assume that the EU member states collectively have a guilt- feeling to the same extent. It is 
also unclear to what extent it is imported into the policy of the EU and its member states, but 
also into that of other actors such as the Middle East region. 
 
Thirdly, it is a much politicized international context by the presence of Israel as a main ally 
to the USA in one hand, and a further European colony planted in the middle of the Arab- 
Islamic world, on the other. Consequently, the interest between Israel and Europe and the 
USA is different from the interest with Saudi Arabia, for example for oil. Such context 
inspires anti- Islam debate in combating the rise of anti- colonial (read: anti- Israel) and anti- 
imperial (read: anti- Europe) ‘historically’ and anti-USA ‘currently’ Islamic movements in the 
Middle East. 
 
In this way, space and time and actors are influential. Space is in terms of local, regional and 
global, and time does not refer only to the 2006 election, but also around emerging yet related 
conflicts and crisis in the Middle East, for example, the war in Lebanon and the war in Iraq, 
and attacks such as September 11 and attacks in London and Madrid are as much as related to 
the Middle East, Islam and the rise of global and  domestic Islamic movements and the 
difference between them. Often, active players are pointed out, namely, the EU, USA, and 
Israel and to a lesser extent the UN, Russia and the Arab world. With a note, that in this 
context Israel enjoys a thriving economy and an electorate that regards the dominance of the 
army in its life. Israel can continue the occupation and the oppression of the Palestinians as in 
the exclusive past, the present and future reality of life in Israel. This is often the case as long 
as the international community is complacent, the Arab- Muslim world impotent and Gaza 
contained. 
 
Fourthly, in connection to Orientalism, it illustrates, mainly the ideological factors in 
acquiring knowledge about the Orient and about thinking on Palestine in general and on 
Hamas in particular. More importantly, it suggest how s/he pre- conceives a notion about 
Palestine in connection not only to the way Palestinians live and act, even if s/he has never 
been to Palestine and/or met anyone from Hamas, and more generally, how do we come to 
understand people who live and act differently? But more importantly, from discursive 
relations to European Jews as well as Zionism. This is reflected in a larger space over a long 
time and reflects the interests of interacting global powers. Europe, for example had direct 
relations with the European Jews and a long- standing colonial relationships to Palestine. The 
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American experience, however, is viewed as being less direct and based on abstraction, but 
increasingly and most recently, the USA has been involved directly and militarily in the 
region. 
 
Orientalism is further explained in frame analyses that include/ highlight something: focus 
such as on Hamas terrorism, as well as occlude/omit other things: blind side/spot such as the 
Israeli occupation. This is a pattern that suggests relationships such as upgrading trade 
agreements with Israel, or making order out of complexity such as imposing one- sided 
conditions on Hamas only for diplomatic contact to take place, or makes sense of policy 
issues/ questions. This is where the EU’s two- legged policy towards Israel- Palestine frames 
and contains directions/ seeds for the EU’s boycott policy of Hamas alone. This was also 
explained thoroughly in an earlier chapter regarding imbalanced power relations and was 
confirmed in terms of rationalization, timing and replacement of actors. 
 
In relation to this, the Palestinian interviews only expressed repeatedly and strongly 
imbalanced power relations between Israel and Palestinians. Note that expressions like double 
standards, one sided, impartial, inequality, occupier- occupied relationship, disproportionate 
force, strengthening state of Israel and weakening, dividing and shrinking stateless Palestine, 
enforcing the Palestinian social split, transforming the political movements into NGOs, and 
creating a Palestinian elite affiliated with Western powers …etc were used. However, the 
Europeans remained almost silent on Israel- Palestinian imbalanced power relations and often 
expressed terms such as the two sides of conflict, both of them should, must… etc.  Another 
point of difference is related to the Palestinian resistance (sometimes the right of resistance) to 
the Israeli occupation, along different means of resistance ranging from violent to peaceful. 
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Reflections 
- The views of the interviewees bring a crucial perspective to the peace process mainly 
because the interviewees are often on the ground themselves or have networks of contacts 
there and are in a strong position to evaluate progress. 
 
- While some of the views reported are not surprising, most are strong in terms of unity 
of views among heterogeneous Palestinian and European interviewees with the exceptions of 
one point, being Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation. 
 
- It is worth noting that the level of awareness of the EU’s policy and its specific 
instruments was modest among the interviewees.  It was also unclear how Palestinians, 
including the Islamists, viewed the EU’s policy differently from those views of general 
political trends in the Middle East. However, they could, together highlight the strengths and 
weaknesses of the EU’s policy. 
 
- All interviewees favored the EU’s policy over that of the USA. Some noted that the 
EU’s position towards Israel- Palestine is more balanced and less partial compared with that 
of the USA, mainly, for the latter is seen as an imperial- colonial project. Yet, the EU is 
hesitant and ineffective in pursuing its objectives. 
 
- This is why Islamists in particular desire to distance themselves from the USA and to 
a lesser extent from the EU’s influence. However, this careful attitude did not prohibit them 
from borrowing the Western models for democracy. It is just that they denounce what they 
experience as a selective opportunistic European approach. Nevertheless, this anti- western 
criticism does not imply a breaking point. The following views are expressed: (1) 
collaborating with Europe is viewed as a political necessity and (2) in the opposite direction, 
some argued that their thinking on stronger engagement and cooperation with Europe had so 
far not been a priority due to ineffective European influence compared to the US policy in the 
region and in Palestine. 
 
-As well, Islamists’ views are formulated upon an Islamic framework and in response to their 
experience of the EU policy in reality and sometimes historical relations. However, they are 
willing to accept the EU’s policy as reflecting a particular European historical and political 
evolution and to recognize its positive aspects especially in comparison with the USA’s 
policy. In turn, they expect the EU to consider and accept the results of democracy reflecting 
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a particular Palestinian historical and political experience and to coexist with it impartially 
and without coercion as a different model. 
 
- it is often argued, that the EU and its member states can and sometimes should 
undertake a review of its current foreign policy towards Palestine and mass-based Islamic 
movements such as Hamas for, mainly, the following reasons: 
 
One reason is that this policy of neglect reinforced anti- democratic regimes and radical 
Islamism in the region including Palestine. The absence of the EU policy for dialogue and 
further boycott of the elected Hamas representative has been, largely argued as being an anti- 
democratic and anti- Islam policy on the part of the EU. This is at a time when the EU could 
have played a distinctive role due to its privileged position with the PA and the tools for 
engaging Palestinian civil society. For example, one interviewee said that “Hamas is well 
positioned for it is a mass –based movement and it is ready to engage in genuine democracy.” 
Another argued that because of the EU’s acquiescence, the EU has fallen well behind the US 
with regard to engagement with Hamas in recognizing them as democratic actors within 
Palestine. 
 
A second reason is that the integration of Hamas into some of the processes of the EU’s 
policies would have allowed these policies to have a better impact on the ground, since 
Hamas represents a significant public opinion and enjoys popular support. This would help 
the EU to reduce anti- Western sentiments over questions of democracy and to avoid to be 
caught up with the USA in this area. 
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7 Conclusions 
 
This chapter, as the concluding section of the dissertation is dedicated to providing a closing 
summary of what has been discussed and tackled. It closes with an elaboration on (1) the 
EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives in the case of imbalanced power 
relations followed by two parts: (2) a summary of the findings on Islamophobia, and (3) final 
recommendations. 
 
7.1 The EU boycott policy 
The election experience in Palestine differs from election experiences elsewhere. Mainly, the 
elections take place in the Occupied Palestinian Territories (OPT) or as said in stateless 
Palestine for the Palestinians enjoy no sovereignty under Israeli military occupation.  As well, 
international aid is tailored to some but not all Palestinian political parties by listing a major 
Islamic party such as Hamas as a terrorist group and consequently disregarding Islamists’ 
views in relation to the European-Middle East peace process initiatives. 
 
From a domestic perspective, a damaging factor for the EU policy is its boycott of the elected 
Hamas representatives. Whereas, it is argued that Hamas’ integration in the Palestinian 
political system could have opened channels for re-thinking the national liberation strategy 
within the confines of law. Moreover, its integration could have presented a healthy transition 
between the PA and PLO’s political representation in a way that could have added to the PA’s 
reform  as supported by the EU for Fateh’s ill governance and Hamas’ clean-hand reputation. 
However, Hamas’ possible integration is not considered in the context of EU policy and 
initiatives, Palestinian civil society associated with Hamas was also excluded. At a later stage, 
Hamas controlled- Gaza and her 1.5 million Palestinians irrespective of their political 
affiliation were also excluded and put under siege collectively. 
 
The official discourse in Europe is that a very reasonable and attainable solution is just around 
the corner if the two sides of conflict, namely Israel- Palestine as addressed on an equal basis 
would make one final effort: a two- state solution. However, the only version acceptable to 
Israel is the one that both the Fateh- led authority in the WB and the more assertive Hamas in 
Gaza could not accept. It is an offer to relocate the Palestinians in stateless enclaves in return 
for their ending their struggle to end the Israeli occupation. It would be wrong, however, to 
assume that the EU boycott of the elected Hamas representatives is the main reason for the 
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protracted blockade and strangulation of Gaza. However, the three EU conditions seem not 
only ineffective but also critical, especially, in pressuring Hamas to move from being a 
resistance movement as implied, for it continues to be responsible for ending violence when 
they decide the context is right. Consequently, the EU- Hamas contact has decreased more 
and more. Arguably, the EU officials did not think that their policy of boycotting Hamas 
would work but actively and acquiescently, they have become a part of a boycott policy of the 
elected Hamas representatives by the occupied. 
 
From a regional perspective, it is widespread knowledge in the region that this boycott policy 
is a part of a war against terrorism where Islam and Muslims have been under attack. As 
given examples especially after September 11th are: (1) the war against Taliban movement in 
Afghanistan disregarding the deterioration of Afghani people on the ground, (2) the invasion 
of Iraq, (3) the Danish cartoon placing a bomb over the head of the prophet disregarding the 
mass Muslim convictions and respect of the prophet, (4) continued support for dictatorship 
regimes and repressing Islamists in the region remain questionable such as in Egypt and Saudi 
Arabia, (5) initiating no contacts with Islamists coming to power such as in Algeria, and (6) 
on top of that, considering Hamas and Hezbollah  to be terrorist groups rather than resistance 
movements to the Israeli occupation. Last, but not least is the EU position on Turkey’s 
accession to Europe. 
 
7.2 Islamophobia 
A profound debate over Islam has been taking place since the end of the Cold War on the 
basis of religious category, mainly, ideology and culture. Yet, a negative image of Islam as a 
depreciation- constructed image of the Orient along the West- East dichotomy has been 
intensified, and sometimes rooted back, to the longstanding conflict between Christianity and 
Islam. However, in the 1980s and early 1990s, popular anti-Muslim prejudice reached its peak 
in Europe. 
 
The term Islamophobia came into being for the first time in the UK in 1997 and has become 
popular in Europe where the Islamic threat is considered to be the enemy within and has been 
on the rise where the enemy is perceived to be external. Further, Islam has come under the 
focus of the media, seminars and hundreds of publications world- wide. Interestingly, it has 
been further linked to the political situation in the Middle East. 
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Most notably, in the aftermath of September 11th in the USA and consequent attacks in 
Europe, there was a whole string of attacks on Muslims related to the USA- led war on 
Afghanistan, and in Iraq linked to Al Qaeda. As well, Israel’s war in Lebanon is linked to 
Hezbollah, and the ongoing Israel military occupation of Palestine and its escalation, in the 
second intifada, is more likely linked to Hamas. 
 
In the same period in Europe, attacks were not only noted against Muslims but also against 
Jews, foremost in France and Belgium and these have been labeled widely under the term 
“new anti- Semitism”. Arguably, for it is linked to a new component that separates it from the 
anti- Semitism of the early twentieth century, namely, a Muslim component, yet it is not 
exclusively a Muslim phenomenon. 
 
On the one hand, a considerable amount of research has been published on anti- Semitism as 
well as on Islamophobia. More specifically, researchers have studied the socio- economic and 
political as well as the cultural differences in reference to patterns of fear, prejudice and 
discrimination around minorities, including Muslim minorities and the place of Islam in 
Europe.  
 
At least three contextual factors heightened Islamophobia in Europe, respectively, a high 
number of Muslim refugees and people seeking asylum with whom Islamophobia is 
associated in a negative stereotype way that has made their integration more difficult. This is 
sometimes regardless of whether they are practicing Muslims or not and more associated with 
race, culture and economic situation. The second factor is related to religion in two ways, one 
is the skeptical secular and agnostic outlook with religion that is repeatedly mentioned in the 
media, opposing all religions including Islam against which attacks are far more undermining 
due to Muslims having less access to media platforms. The other is related to the 
transformation in European right wing politics parting increasingly from anti- Semitism and 
becoming pro- Jewish and Islamophobic. The third factor is connected to the widely spread 
perspective among Arab- Muslims in the region, regarding the war on terror as being a war on 
Islam and Muslims. This is together with the rise in anti- imperial and anti- colonial Islamic 
movements that have been targeted even when they rise to power in a democratic process, and 
on top of it but not exclusive to it, the elected Hamas representatives. 
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On the other hand, very little research ‘if any’ has examined Islamophobia in the EU’s foreign 
policy. Yet, Muslim relations with Europeans involve more than fear of the former by the 
latter that demanded looking at the multiple layers of politics. 
 
In the work of this research, various options have opened for debate over the definitions and 
manifestation of Islamophobia. It also illustrated how imbalanced relations operate, through 
an examination of the EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives in the 2006 
Palestinian parliamentary election, and further the analysis of the views, on a comparative 
basis, of European and Palestinian experts. 
 
In this given frame analysis, the Europeans look at Hamas to a certain extent through a lens 
that distorts the actual reality in a general process of stereotyping to make Hamas appear not 
only as equally powerful as Israel, but also different and threatening to the state of a European 
colony and a self- declared Jewish state, namely, Israel. Further, it appeared that the only 
problem was the security of Israel, with little attention paid to its long on-going military 
occupation that is threatened by Hamas, and the Palestinian struggle for independence and 
self- determination. Further, self- determination is seen as a hostility, and colored politically, 
as upsetting the Israeli status quo, where only Arabs and Muslims and Hamas play an 
irrational and violent role. 
 
Looking at combating terrorism, anti- terrorism conflated in the war on terror (read: anti- 
Islam) for at least the following reasons: firstly, lumping together Islamic movements in one 
terrorist category. Secondly, in disregarding the differences between global and domestic 
Islamic movements. Taking an example of a global Islamic movement such as Al Qaeda and a 
domestically- based movement, such as Hamas. 
 
Foremost, it confirms the orientalist- colonial line inspired by Said’s reading of the Orient, 
covering Islam and the question of Palestine and shedding light on imbalanced power 
relations in constructing the opposed image of the other, namely, West- Islam. Media, 
literature, and power politics fuel this further and have helped to fashion the lens through 
which to view Islam and eventually, Hamas, in their explanations for what went wrong “in the 
Islamic world”. 
 
Further, it is linked to the EU’s two- legged policy towards Israel- Palestine. Arguably, it 
emphasizes the consequences of Israeli military occupation including curfews, closures, 
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settlement, wall, and restriction of movement, expansion into Palestinian territories and even 
performing illegal acts and attacks carried out by the powerful means of the state of Israel and 
its security forces. Israel’s continued occupation and violation of international law have no 
enforcement mechanism holding Israel responsible for such violations by the EU. In 
comparison, reactionary military resistance carried out by Palestinians who are viewed to be 
terrorists by the EU are highly condemned, and boycott policy is initiated and they are 
accused of being terrorists. 
 
In this way, Islamophobia is often connected via different definitions, among other things, to 
the factors of religion- Islam, race, culture, nationality, economy and terrorism in Europe. 
Outside Europe, it is more likely associated with the latter factor, namely, terrorism via the 
rise of anti- Western Islamist movements in predominant Muslim countries.  The EU’s policy 
sometimes appears to collaborate with those movements and at other times to eradicate them. 
Eradication is more perceived though in connection with an American- colonial and imperial 
project and eventually its ally in the Middle East, namely, Israel. This is an Islamophobic 
process of negative stereotyping of Islamic not only violence and terrorism but also anti- 
imperial and colonial resistance, compared to non- Islamic violence and terrorism and 
consequently, a disproportionate policy against it. 
 
In the work during this research, power was examined theoretically and operationally in the 
EU’s boycott policy of the elected Hamas representatives, which includes, power relations, 
relationships of communications, and objective capacity. The analysis of the three branches in 
the EU’s two- legged policy towards Israel- Palestine indicated imbalanced power relations in 
favor of the more powerful party, namely, Israel. 
 
More specifically, and from analyzing those imbalanced power relations, some important 
issues were produced and transformed into an abstract and an operational EU policy model. 
The operational model, however, presented three strategies for boycotting Hamas, namely, 
rationalization, timing and replacement of actors. 
 
However, Islamophobia as a term suffers mainly from a problem in defining and explaining 
political relations in term of religious categories, and conceals the fact that real people, rather 
than an abstract categories, are being discriminated against. In another direction, it serves to 
stifle the criticism of Islam and Muslims. 
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As compared to anti- Semitism, it is challenging to compare the two, however, in Europe, 
there has been a significant rise in anti- Semitism and Islamophobia that were considered for 
debate and some similarities as well as differences between the two were pointed out, 
increasingly, in connection to the Israel- Palestine conflict. This is viewed in blurring lines in 
the defining process which was influenced by imbalanced power relations as follows: 
 
Firstly, the difference between anti- Israel and anti- Semitism when it comes to criticizing the 
policy of Israel putting an emphasis on anti- Semitic project and disregarding the Israel 
occupation to which the Palestinians are subjected. To a certain degree, what is labeled as 
anti- Semitic (read: anti- Israel). 
 
Secondly, it is in translating the Palestinian resistance to the Israeli occupation into 
Palestinian anti- Semitism and further terrorism fueled by Israel presenting itself as a victim 
of Palestinian and Hamas terrorism. 
 
7.3 Recommendations 
- To revise the EU policy, in connection with Palestine- Israel, and the body of 
assumptions and misconceptions around the roots of the Israeli- (Arab) Palestinian conflict. 
To this point, it is more effective to acknowledge the complexities and devise an approach 
that recognizes the interests of all the players. To serve that point further, considering a 
critical assessment of the EU in particular handling the Israeli- Palestinian conflict 
complexities and the rise of Hamas born as a resistance movement out of the Israeli 
occupation and growing into Palestinian dynamic politics is viable and essential for the 
following reasons: 
 
Firstly, reality: Political Islam is one of the realities in the region and in Palestine and will not 
dissipate in the near future. It has increasingly played an influential role. Hamas is a major 
political party as demonstrated by the performance of Hamas in the 2006 parliamentary 
elections and by their strong social presence in Palestine. 
 
Secondly, political stability: It is a major factor for political stability in Palestine. The EU’s 
declared policy of promoting democracy and respect for human rights as a means of achieving 
stability in Palestine cannot be credible unless the EU supports the integration of mainstream 
Palestinian Islamists into the political process. Excluding a mass- based political party like 
Hamas discredits democracy and will not promote stability either in Palestine or in the region. 
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Thirdly, compatibility: One cannot ignore the gap between the words of the EU as a major 
supporter of the Palestinians and its inability to effect real change on the ground. Therefore, it 
is essential to radically revise its policy and show that it can help make significant progress in 
improving the lives of Palestinians, as well as ensuring that the Israelis take steps to end 
practices that engender animosity in Palestine and in the region. 
 
- To establish, in connection with the third point, concrete measures to follow up on the 
failure of the Israeli authorities to meet their obligations the impact of which is 
disproportionally and negatively affecting the Palestinians. 
 
- To re- view the intertwined Islamophobia and anti- Semitic themes in its policy. It is 
necessary to note that perceptions of Palestine and Muslim and non- Muslim Palestinians are 
not only what matters in formulating EU policy towards Palestine but also on the perceptions 
of Israel as a Jewish state. 
 
- To engage with Islamists in a broader sense while leaving room for joint work at fields 
of high importance to the EU and the Islamists such as women’s rights, minority rights, law 
and order in public life, among other issues. This engagement would help counter the feeling 
that the EU only proposes a Euro- centered democratization that does not meet the local 
community’s needs and expectations. 
 
- To move the focus in resolving the Israel- Palestine conflict from “what if’ Israel or 
Palestine, for they are endless and finding definite answers to such questions is almost 
impossible. Thus, even before one discusses either an alternative solution- a single democratic 
state for all or a more plausible, two-state settlement, one has to transform fundamentally the 
official and public mindset and the mentality that is the principal barrier to a peaceful 
reconciliation. Suggesting what is the next question, raises the possibility in a more open EU 
frame of reference. If public discourse had not been as Kissinger once put it “wrapped by 
powerful engines of myth big budgets and outright falsehoods?” many fights might have been 
avoided and peace in some form might have been possible much earlier and the EU’s policy 
might have been quite different. 
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8 Annexes 
  
 
Check-list of topics and questions for interviews 
Name  Title  
Date  Place  
Background  
 
Case study: The EU boycott policy of elected Hamas in 2006 Palestinian 
Parliamentary Elections  
What do you see as the strong points and the weak points of EU policies towards 
Palestine? 
What do you think about EU policies towards Palestine compared with those of your 
particular European country?    
What is the relation between the EU policy and international law? 
Do you think Europe serves as a normative reference point for human rights and 
democratic aspirations for Palestinians? Why not?  
Why is it that, the EU boycotted the elected Hamas government, but accepted Hamas 
participation in the elections?  
What do you think of the EU conditionality to reconnect with Hamas? 
What is the impact of the EU post- election policies on Palestinians? 
In connection to Islamophobia 
What does the term Islamophobia mean for you?  
How do you compare Islamophobia to anti Semitism in/ out Europe?  
Have Islamophobia been relevant to the EU policies towards Palestine? How?  
 
Thank you 
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Palestine 
Dates 1993 –1993  
Occupation or position held Social Worker 
Main activities and responsibilities • Identified who are unable to earn their own 
living due to many factors including illness, 
old age, physical disabilities and other 
financial and social problems. 
• Propose and implement a social service 
plan for old people in Nablus.  
Name and address of employer The Governmental Welfare Office 
Personal skills and competences  
Mother tongue(s) Arabic 
Other language(s) Excellent English and basic German 
Publications  Thesis: 
 • MA Human Rights thesis, namely 
“Gender- Balanced Human Rights 
enforcement mechanisms in Occupied 
Palestinian Territories; how can they be 
improved?, (2004) 
• MA thesis titled “The Relationship 
Between Problem Solving Ability and Locus 
of Control”, (1998) 
• Several articles at home and abroad, in 
relation to Islam, women and disadvantaged 
groups. 
 
